THREAD
3 Issues/Problems in S Korean Foreign Policy unrelated to the usual ‘shrimp among whales’ narrative
1. Sharp Partisan Polarization, particularly regarding NK
The result is abrupt right/left swings in foreign policy across partisan changes in the presidency, plus NK
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3 Issues/Problems in S Korean Foreign Policy unrelated to the usual ‘shrimp among whales’ narrative
1. Sharp Partisan Polarization, particularly regarding NK
The result is abrupt right/left swings in foreign policy across partisan changes in the presidency, plus NK
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fantasies on both sides: the right’s strangelovian paranoia about NK infiltration and NK manipulation of the SK left; the left’s adamant refusal to admit that NK is '1984' and similarly adamant insistence that NK is a normal country & brother Korean state whose inherent
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cooperativeness is undercut by the Americans and sanctions.
2. Not Enough Grand Strategy
The Lee and Park governments produced rudimentary national security strategies; the Moon gov’t hasn’t even bothered. And MOFA white papers are more boosterish about Korean pop culture
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2. Not Enough Grand Strategy
The Lee and Park governments produced rudimentary national security strategies; the Moon gov’t hasn’t even bothered. And MOFA white papers are more boosterish about Korean pop culture
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and prestige-seeking than statements of purpose about ROK national power and values. The result is an inordinate media focus on exports & the trade surplus, plus a nationalistic focus on competition with Japan, while big regional questions like the Uighurs or China’s naval
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challenge to SK oil sea lanes are under-addressed
3. Controversial Procurement Choices
SK is primarily a land-power, bc the NK army is huge. SK has conscription in response. But at the conferences, no one seems to like to admit this land-power-first point, and core infantry
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3. Controversial Procurement Choices
SK is primarily a land-power, bc the NK army is huge. SK has conscription in response. But at the conferences, no one seems to like to admit this land-power-first point, and core infantry
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issues - such as conscriptee pay (a long-standing issue), kit, or COIN training (to hedge the possibility of a post-unification NK dead-ender insurgency) – don't get the attention that glossy, high-tech platforms like US fighter purchases do. And next in this vein, the gov't
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is considering a nuclear-powered submarine and an aircraft carrier (in part because Japan has one.) That's big money.
There is actually a power-projection argument for these platforms if SK is serious serious about its SLOCs and hedging China - per point 2 above. In fact,
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There is actually a power-projection argument for these platforms if SK is serious serious about its SLOCs and hedging China - per point 2 above. In fact,
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here's an article today by a friend of mine on this very point: thediplomat.com/2021/03/why-so…). But the Moon government is dancing around China, so I don't see the procurement rationale...
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