Not unrelated to @zeithistoriker <foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/26/ger…>...
braddelong.substack.com/p/hoisted-from…
HOISTED FROM THE ARCHIVES: 2013 Introduction to Kindleberger: The World in Depression
Barry J. Eichengreen & J. Bradford DeLong
The German federal government, the political incarnation... 1/
braddelong.substack.com/p/hoisted-from…
HOISTED FROM THE ARCHIVES: 2013 Introduction to Kindleberger: The World in Depression
Barry J. Eichengreen & J. Bradford DeLong
The German federal government, the political incarnation... 1/
...of the single most consequential economic power in Europe, is one potential hegemon. It has room for countercyclical fiscal policy. It could encourage the European Central Bank to make more active use of monetary policy. It could fund a Marshall Plan for Greece and... 2/
...signal a willingness to assume joint responsibility, along with its EU partners, for some fraction of their collective debt. But Germany still thinks of itself as the steward is a small open economy. It repeats at every turn that it is beyond its capacity to stabilise... 3/
... the European system: “German taxpayers can only bear so much after all”. Unilaterally taking action to stabilise the European economy is not, in any case, its responsibility, as the matter is perceived. The EU is not a union where big countries lead and smaller... 4/
... countries follow docilely but, at least ostensibly, a collection of equals. Germany’s own difficult history in any case makes it difficult for the country to assert its influence and authority and equally difficult for its EU partners, even those who most desperately... 5/
... require it, to accept such an assertion.[6] Europe, everyone agrees, needs to strengthen its collective will and ability to take collective action. But in the absence of a hegemon at the European level, this is easier said than done. 6/END
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