Thread by @akoz33

Andrei Illarionov "Why Biden's phone call has increased the risk of another Putin offensive". My translation (with some cuts). Part I.

Perhaps dear readers you may not have noticed it yet, but astute political analysts (henceforth known as APA), who had previously announced the beginning of a “new cold war” by the “second Churchill”, have now have announced

the end of the more than seven year Russian-Ukrainian war, and as a result : " On April 2, 2021, the Russian-Ukrainian war ended in an unconditional political defeat for the Russian Federation."

The APA became so optimistic because of a phone call from Joe Biden to Vladimir Zelensky. The picture of events drawn by the APA reminds one of the Gogol police chief

who convinced his listeners of the magical properties of just of the police captain's cap: the captain doesn’t even need to go himself but just sends someone with his cap and this cap alone will drive the peasants back to their homes.

(My note: this happens in “Dead Souls”, when the landowners from whom Chichikov was trying to buy dead peasants - became worried that due to their large number they might rebel.)

That is, if a couple of centuries ago the Novorossiya police captain had to send at least his cap, today’s the "world’s police captain" does not even need to do that - one call from Mr. Biden will drive the Russian troops back to the very place of their permanent deployment.

More precisely: “will not drive”, but “has already driven out” since “the Russia-Ukraine war ended on April 2, 2021”.

The attack of optimistic enthusiasm that has engulfed a part of the political analytic audience, caused by Biden's cap, is understandable. But after the emotions subside a little, it would be good to try to calmly figure out what actually happened, and what to expect next.

And for this it is useful to answer several interrelated questions:

- Does Putin have military plans for Ukraine? And what are they?
- Is Putin ready for an attack today? And what are the most likely dates for the resumption of large-scale hostilities?
- What should Biden have done if he really wanted to protect Ukraine?

- What did Biden actually do? And what is he doing now?
- What did Biden's call reveal about his attitude to Ukraine?

(To be continued).

Part II (I have skipped some fragments to make it shorter but its still very long).

1. Does Putin have military plans for Ukraine? And what are they?
Yes, he has. Both he and his entourage (most recently - D. Kozak) talked about them more than once, and have also demonstrated their seriousness by their actions. Among the goals of military operations

(ranked according to the degree of desirability and feasibility), one can name at least the following:

1. Establishing control over the entire North Crimean Canal from Perekop to Tavriisk and Novaya Kakhovka;

2. Establishing control over the entire continental part of Taurida from the mouth of the Dnieper in the west to Vasilyevka and Orekhov in the north and Berdyansk in the east - for example, within the borders of the former Taurida province

3. Establishment of a land corridor between occupied Crimea, the continental part of Taurida and the occupied parts of Donbass;

4. Establishment of a land corridor between continental Taurida and Transnistria

2. Is Putin ready for an attack today? And what is the most likely timing of his attack?

Publicly available information indicates that Putin is not currently planning a large-scale offensive operation. There are several pieces of evidence for this.

1. The number of Russian troops concentrated on the Russian-Ukrainian border (28 battalion-tactical groups, or about 20-25 thousand people), announced by the Chief of the General Staff of Ukraine R. Khomchak, is insufficient for a major offensive operation.

Khomchak's expected increase in this grouping by another 25 BTGs, that is, about doubling the number of Russian troops, will allow them to start the first operation on the above list

(to establish control over the channel of the North Crimean Canal and capture Tavriisk and Novaya Kakhovka), but accumulation of necessary forces will require more time.

2. Everything that is known about how Putin prepares his offensives suggests that, if his intentions are serious, he conducts the concentration of troops aimed at the attack as secretly as possible.

This is how the aggression against Georgia in August 2008, the occupation of Crimea, military operations near Zelenopol and Ilovaisk, and the transfer of the Buk-M1 air defense system in 2014 were prepared.

In the few cases where the movement and accumulation of Russian troops in recent years has taken place in public (one might say: demonstratively), large-scale hostilities have not followed - Putin was bluffing.

The flow of information from numerous observers about movement of unmasked military equipment, mostly in the daytime, including through populated areas, indicates more of a deliberate Putin demonstration than of preparation for an actual offensive. At least in the near future.

3. The most important factor determining the possible start of large-scale hostilities by Putin is the schedule for the construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline.

The completion and launch of the pipeline changes (worsens) Ukraine's geopolitical position so radically that Putin will not risk an unlikely, but still possible, response from the United States and Europe while construction is still ongoing.

Last year, 2020, the pumping of Russian gas through the Ukrainian gas transportation system amounted to 55.8 billion cubic meters.

After the full completion of the construction of the Turkish Stream, gas transit through Ukraine to Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey switched to new gas pipelines, and the completion of extensions to Serbia and Hungary will reduce gas transit through Ukraine by 10-12 billion m3 annually.

Since the capacity of the first string of the NS2 gas pipeline is 55 billion cubic meters of gas, its commissioning means an almost complete cessation of the pumping of Russian gas through the GTS, and, consequently, a radical loss of Europe's interest in ensuring the security

of Ukraine. Putin will certainly not rush to launch a large-scale offensive until construction and launch of SP2 is complete and will try to get the most out of his possible attack in ideal geopolitical conditions.

3. What should Biden have done if he really wanted to help Ukraine?

(To be continued).