@EugenPinak So, yeah, I've put a little bit of effort into the subject over the years.
There is so much flag rank squid ink around MacArthur -- especially his own -- that you literally cannot trust anything written about the man without primary source cross references.
@tac_air_power@ReassessHistory The IJA needed to protect its trains from 14th AF raiding. They blanketed China with both ground observers & radar. Then fed the information into filter centers that warned the trains.
Shades the 1999 Serb F-117 shootdown, the IJA had observers watching 14th AF air fields.
All that was necessary was for ground observers and defending fighters to have radios that could talk to each other.
The attached map is from a 1933 exercise where then Captain Claire Chennault proved that.
@tac_air_power@ReassessHistory I've written a couple of Chicagoboyz columns addressing the institutional lying attached to "The bomber always gets through."
@tac_air_power@ReassessHistory Umm... the issue when the Baldwin made the comments was the use of bomber delivered mustard gas on civilian populations.
And for that to be militarily useful, you needed something a lot better than a 5-mile/8km CEP Bomber Command was getting before Gee was used.
@tac_air_power@ReassessHistory The USAAF 8th AF flying during the day with the aid of Bomber Command Gee, LORAN and H2X radar could not drop a bomb within 1,000 feet of a target 1/2 the time before March 1945.
This chart does not include "systemic error" that saw 8th AF bomber streams hitting Swiss cities.
@tac_air_power@ReassessHistory These are the average "instrument errors" from the various WW2 radars and radio navigation systems on heavy bombers versus the Norden bomb site on a sunny, 0/10ths cloud day.
Flak shooting at these planes with these instruments made the CEP increase to several miles.
This thread is on combat actions 76 years ago yesterday & #OnThisDay, 6-7 Apr 1945 at Okinawa. No, not on the sinking of the HIJMS Yamato which @JHistoryC covered very well here:
No, I'm talking about USN leadership failures on those dates at Okinawa. 1/
Failures that lead to this.
Six US Navy planes were blown out of the sky by US Navy anti-aircraft fire.
Four of those six planes were in the landing approach pattern for Yontan Air Field. 2/
Worse, one of the FM-2 Wildcats shot down exploded in mid air and it's wreckage landed on fuel barges off Hagushi Beach.
The wreckage was tracked by every ship AA gun into barges & strafed Kadena airfield downrange. The results were both horrific & operationally significant. 3/
Since COVID-19 has kept the major archives closed or so limited in access they might as well be. This thread is an examination of an on-line source of primary sources here:
The bulletpicker.com collection went public in late May, 2016 and has a huge number of ordnance, small arms, and defusing related items.
The library section is the heart of the site and it covers WW2 UK, US, Australian, and technical intelligence by those powers on German, Italian and Japanese ordnance, engineering and small arms.
This is another thread on Imperial Japanese radar countermeasures in WW2.
This thread will also include the US inter-service intelligence/classification/budget wars between the Joint Chiefs & MacArthur's Section 22 radar hunters. 1/
The information in this thread is coming from a 28 May 1945 training document from Boca Raton Army Air Field.
William Cahill of the Sec 22 Special Interest Group found it in Late Feb 2021. 2/
What Cahill found in RCM Digest 14 was yet another bit of Japanese radar countermeasures.
One utterly unique in the history of electronic warfare. 3/