i’d expect this desire for change to be bundled in w a post-pandemic treaty ostensibly made under those motivations. and hungary/poland demands. in Ireland could potentially be sold to the public based on future EU legal outcomes relating to the murder of Elaine O’Hara? (Dwyer)
Lots of selected thoughts on the draft leaked EU AI regulation follow. Not a summary but hopefully useful. 🧵
Blacklisted art 4 AI (except general scoring) exempts include state use for public security, including by contractors. Tech designed to ‘manipulate’ ppl ‘to their detriment’, to ‘target their vulnerabilities’ or profile comms metadata in indiscriminate way v possible for states.
This is clearly designed in part not to eg further upset France in the La Quadrature du Net case, where black boxes algorithmic systems inside telcos were limited. Same language as CJEU used in Art 4(c). Clear exemptions for orgs ‘on behalf’ of state to avoid CJEU scope creep.
Updates announced to England and Wales presence tracing (QR checkin) app functionality. (short thread translating what these things mean)
1st point isn't actually a change to the app or regulations. The regulations have always required everyone individually to scan in if they used the app, but allowed a 'lead member' to represent a group of up to six. This would abolish the latter. More: michae.lv/law-of-qr/
Venue history upload is controversial. The DPIA has not yet been updated to show the privacy-preserving method that the press release claims to use. May also make people wary to upload venue data. Cannot analyse without further information.
We outlines current approaches to accessing enclosed data, and argue that GDPR transparency, access, portability rights can be a powerful bottom-up, adversarial data access tool, if used well.
We outline the nature of those transparency provisions for those unfamiliar, and show how they can be used, elaborating on legal, ethical and methodological challenges — a bit like a mini-manual. A lot more could be said — but we hope this helps researchers make a good start.
Core to the DMA is the idea of "core platform services" and providers thereof, listed here and defined either within the reg or in previous regs. Big and powerful providers of these are in scope, basically.
The juicy parts of the DMA are Articles 5 and 6. These contain obligations for gatekeepers in relation to core services. Art 6 obligations can be further specified by the EC through implementing acts.
Today's Online Harms consultation response is perhaps the first major UK divergence from a big principle of EU law not tied to Brexit directly: it explicitly proposes a measure ignoring the prohibition on requiring intermediaries like platforms to generally monitor content.
the e-Commerce Directive art 15 prohibits member states from requiring internet intermediaries to actively look for illegal content; this is because the awareness would make them liable.
The Online Harms White Paper roughly kept with this, indicating that automatic detection systems were an approach platforms could use, but they would not be required to. Consultation responses (unsurprisingly) agreed.
After a long, unnecessary saga, England/Wales launches a decentralised contact tracing app based on the DP-3T work led by @carmelatroncoso, following other regions of the UK.
The original was a triple whammy of hubris: wouldn’t work abroad, wouldn’t work technologically on platforms, centralisation open for abuse and function creep.
This version has much better foundations.
I understand mistrust that may linger — but please do try this new one.
We’ve also learned plenty about platforms. If governments want the citizens to be able to run arbitrary code on mobile devices, making use of all sensors, they’ll need the law to crack open walled gardens. theguardian.com/commentisfree/…