Thread by @TGehrke_

On Thursday, US @SFRCdems will vote on a "Strategic Competition Act" with China.

On #geoeconomic front, it aims to pull together some FP, #connectivity practices into one China-centric strategy and also proposes concrete policy measures.

Some highlights [long thread]
/1

101: $15mil/year for US embassies to hire expert who helps interested businesses with supply chain diversification/management away from China
/2

113: Global infrastructure needs closer monitoring, gov involvement. The Global Infrastructure Coordinating Committee (GICC) pushed as an important coordination tool
/3

114: @SecBlinken to establish the ‘‘Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network’’ ($75mil) to boost capacity of partner countries to advance sustainable projects (e.g. legal service, debt analysis, proposal evaluation, project preparation)
/4

116: on energy connectivity, @USAID should identify strategic countries, China's energy projects in those, and "evaluate strategic or security concerns" with respect to China's connectivity actions
/5

121: on digital connectivity, @USTradeRep should negotiate digital trade agreements with EU, JAP, 5Eyes. US should pursue a "Digital Technology Trade Alliance"
/6

122: @SecBlinken should establish ‘‘Digital
Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership" to help foreign countries:
- expand digital infra
- protect tech assets (incl data)
- adopt open digital markets
- promote US digital exports
- build cybersecurity capacity
/7

138: expand #CFIUS activity to cover "higher education", if the institution receives >$1mil gift/contract from a foreigner which relates to research, development, production of critical tech, or establishes control
/8

205: US & ASEAN should
- joint analysis on risks of over-reliance on Chinese tech & infra
- share FDI screening info
- coop. on import restrictions on CN surveillance tech
- reaffirm cyber norms
- explore how CN's critical tech investments (AI) will impact Indo-Pac security
/9

208: @SecBlinken shall establish inter-agency "Technology Partnership Office" committed to
- rule of law and norms
- harmonise tech governance regimes
- R&D coop in strategic tech
- tech controls coord.
- support int. treaties
- shared data governance
...
/10

... "Technology Partnership Office" also tasked:
- coordinate tech supply chain resilience
- share info on tech transfer threats
- develop common funding mechanism to develop measurably secure supply chains (semiconductors)
Tech partnership w/ trusted democracies
/11

209: to enhance US leadership in int. standard-setting, establish an "interagency working group"; tasks:
- share security risk info with allies
- collect info about China's activities in ISOs + security risks
- engage private sector "to propose and develop secure standards"
/12

210: on #sanctions: US has not fully implemented all sanctions & restrictions on China authorised by Congress (IP theft; cyber espionage; HR abuses; int. trade abuses; trade w/ N. Korea; etc)

"Full implementation is a necessary component of strategic competition w/ China"
/13

211: US should initiate an agenda on China w/ #G7 countries on
- trade & investment
- infrastructure
- democracy & HR
- 5G security
- IP theft, subsidies, etc
- sovereign lending standards
- int. influence campaigns
- environmental standards
/14

250: on Chinese "predatory economic practices and lending" in Latin America and Caribbean: boost Inter-American Development Bank
- capital increase to $80bn
- help debt restructuring from Chinese loans
- establish safeguards to protect against future Chinese debt risks
/15

255: on Europe:
- coordinate joint strategies to diversify reliance on supply chains away from China (esp. medical & pharma)
- negotiate EU-US trade agreement
- China strategic infrastructure investments could "threaten democracy in Europe"
- share 5G/Huawei intelligence
...
/16

... on Europe continued:
- close alignment of export controls
- President should "strongly advocate" for listing more controlled items
- explore value of COCOM-like body to coordinate export controls
- help Europe analyse over-reliance on Chinese goods
...
/17

...on Europe continued:
- coordinate connectivity strategies (EU Connectivity; Three Seas; Blue Dot; EU-JAP partnership)
- strengthen development finance standards (DEFI Alliance)
/18

271 on Africa, intelligence assessment of Chinese activities incl
- amount & impact of FDI, loans, development financing, preferential trade,
- involveetment of Chinese SOEs; private tech
- amount of African debt w/ China
- identify strategic sectors, countries for US action
/19

Finally, on "Investing in our Economic Statecraft"

401: to challenge Chinese mercantilism:
- expose IP theft & subsidies
- ensure Chinese firms face costs/consequences
- provide remedies for affected US firms
- strengthen critical tech/data protection
- work w/ allies
/20

Specifically:
402: create an ‘‘intellectual property violators list" which identifies all SOEs which have benefited from IP theft

403: publish annual China subsidy list, listing all forms of discriminatory and non-market practices
/21

405: sovereign debt relief eligibility , esp. those with loans from BRI, C-Exim, CDB, AIIB
/22

406: assessment of how China uses Hong Kong to circumvent US export controls, tariffs, sanctions
/23

407: annual report on Chinese companies in US capital markets which contribute to
- undermine US national security
- abuse human rights
- support PLA; South China Sea efforts
- sanctioned
- IP theft, espionage
/24

This bill may be the most serious #geoeconomic counterweight so far to the otherwise heavy focus on domestic & defensive measures. But structuring almost all FP around China is sure to be ill-received in Europe

Here is the proposal:
foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/…

/ends

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