Updated thoughts on the situation around Ukraine. Russian troop deployments continue. The situation looks set to endure through April into May. Russian rationales (plural) offered remain unconvincing. I would look closely at mil posture and statements over next two weeks. 1/
Russian forces are deploying in staging areas, not moving to forward assembly points, or dispersing. This may change. The distance between Voronezh and Ukraine for example offers some time for indications and warnings, and modest opportunity to detect change in posture. 2/
There are indeed field hospitals, signals units, electronic warfare, air defense, MTO combat service support units involved. Mostly seeing elements of 4 armies, 3-4 VDV units, and supporting assets that belong to higher echelon commands in MDs. 3/
Shoigu implied this deployment may end in two weeks, involving two armies and VDV units. Elements of the two armies moved are from 58th and 41st CAA, but they have also activated the 8th and 20th along with high-power artillery brigades, air defense, landing craft, etc. 4/
My view of the situation has not changed. It appears a coercive demonstration, but the chance that it is not remains significant. It is too early, and overly optimistic, to assume the situation will de-escalate.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Updated thoughts on the situation around Ukraine. I was mostly inclined towards Russia making a demonstrative show of force to intimidate. This week the ongoing buildup in progress & certain aspects lead me to worry more about ultimate intent. Brief thread 1/
Russian forces continue to gather in Crimea and elsewhere near Ukraine’s borders, but fairly slowly. My sense looking at this situation is that nothing is necessarily going to happen right now, but if they have offensive operations in mind, they are more likely mid-late April. 2/
This buildup looks quite different from 2014, but that’s irrelevant. The Russian military is in a different place in terms of capability, force posture, readiness, etc. The political context is different as well. So, we should not fight the last war in analysis. 3/
Nigel raises good points here, but this is fundamentally a Western-centric view of the world which does not obtain, placing tremendous faith into Western coercive credibility over Ukraine. I respectfully differ, and so this is a brief response thread. 1/
Leaders go to war because they feel they must use force to achieve political objectives, not because they perceived a lack of Western political will somewhere. Calling Zelensky with rhetorical expressions of support is hardly an impressive deterrent. 2/
Coercive diplomacy is seeking a change in another state's behavior backed by the threat of force. Russia seeks a change in Ukraine’s position on Minsk, and that of Kyiv’s Western partners. It may work, or it may not work, but one can clearly see why they would attempt it. 3/
More thoughts on Russian military activity around Ukraine. The movements suggest a strong coercive display of force, meant to intimidate, but not a scheduled exercise, or necessarily preparation for an attack. Brief thread. 1/
The deployments appear somewhat unusual, and unscheduled, with forces active or being moved around Ukraine, especially notable were deployments to Crimea. Southern MD announcements of exercises yesterday were post hoc, unconvincing, and not encompassing of the activity. 2/
That said, Russian movements were visible, and intended to be observed. They do not appear to be of the size indicative of an invasion, either from Crimea, or elsewhere. The challenge is that sizable formations permanently based on UKR border offer little notice/warning.