When I was learning intelligence analysis many moons ago I was taught that before you get excited thinking that you have obtained a new piece of information stop for a moment and ask yourself: Why are you being told what you are?
Why is the source telling you something? What is its interest in relaying this piece of intelligence? IOW, the reason for releasing a piece of information is far more critical than the actual intel itself.
Applying this principle to the announcement from Iran that has succeeded in enriching uranium to 60 percent purity we must consider why is Tehran telegraphing it to the world like this? Normally, developments like these are the most highly guarded state secrets.
Such behavior is all the more bizarre if you factor in how Iran’s nuclear sector is the target of sophisticated intelligence ops. Not to mention that no country that acquired nuclear weapons capability did so by telegraphing it to the world.
This is not to say that Iran is not seeking nuclear weapons. It is but there is something that it wants far more badly than nukes. And that is respite from sanctions and much more immediately.
The most important imperative for the Iranian regime is to get back to the nuclear deal in some shape or form. Tehran cannot continue an ambitious foreign policy and maintain political economic stability at home without it.
This announcement is part of the Iranian strategy to shape US and western perceptions that they need to hurry up and negotiate version 2.0 of the 2015 nuclear deal or they are headed to a point of no return.
If they were really getting close to the nuclear finish line they would do everything in their power to make sure that no one found out. But that is their longer-term objective. Not something they need at this moment.
For now the clerical regime is weaponizing its pursuit of nuclear technology to obtain the badly needed reprieve from a dire financial situation - all the while maintaining the ability to pursue nukes at a future date.
In addition to the strategic objective of trying to get back to the JCPOA there are other tactical benefits to saying....oh look, we are only 30 percentage points away from weapons-grade U-235.
First, it serves as a response to the increasingly frequent attacks on its nuclear sector. Tehran gets to say that they are not having any effect on its program.
Second, such telegraphing helps maintain credibility at home and among allies that the regime is able to absorb shocks to its system.
Third, it serves what is perhaps the most important tactical goal is that it is a way to try and steer the conversation away from the real threat that the regime poses; its efforts to alter the regional security architecture.
The Iranians know that Biden is under pressure to needs go beyond the Obama nuclear deal and force Tehran’s hand on its regional power projection agenda. By appearing to be upping the ante on the nuclear issue Tehran hopes to keep the negotiations limited to nukes.
Perception-shaping is of course fraught with risks especially when it involves flirting with escalatory actions. There is always the possibility that you invite air strikes, especially when leverage becomes more zero-sum in nature.
Was recently discussing this issue with my friend @faysalitani who made a brilliant point that the Biden admin's move towards JCPOA 2.0 is based on the fact that the U.S. does not want a conflict with Iran. The Iranians know this and are trying to exploit it to their advantage.
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1st took place in Baghdad on April 9 about the Houthi attacks.
Saudi side led by intel chief Khalid bin Ali al-Humaidan & Iraqi PM facilitated
2nd round next week. No mention of who represented Iranian side. Intel Min Mahmoud Alavi? ft.com/content/852e94…
If confirmed, this diplomacy is likely part of the Biden admin’s strategy to dealing with Iran’s disproportionate regional influence while it tries to restore the nuclear deal.
Hard to believe that Team Biden was only working on a return to the JCPOA without addressing the bigger Iranian regional threat. That was the whole criticism against the Obama deal that it provided the cash Iran needed to become further aggressive in the Middle East.
Extremely difficult negotiations. For the simple reason that the Taliban want to alter the current Afghan state to a Sunni Afghan version of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Whereas the other side wants to preserve as much of the current setup as possible.
The Taliban know that they can't go back to their old emirate and will need to compromise. But their desire to dominate a post-American Afghanistan is only getting stronger, especially given battlespace dynamics and the US desire to get the hell outta dodge
Meanwhile, the other sides represents a divided state + an array of regional factions, which have come to the table from a position of relative weakness. Their desire is to concede as little as possible but lack military leverage to drive a hard bargain.
Militarily, the Turks are playing an interesting game. Their goal is to show that the Russian level of engagement works against rebels but not them. In this way, Ankara is forcing Moscow to either get more deeply involved in Syria or come to the negotiating table.
For the Kremlin, Syria has been a relatively low cost intervention. Not too many troops. Limited deployment of fixed wing aircraft. Focus on air support to Assad regime forces and Iranian-mobilized irregulars. The Russians do not want to increase their footprint in country.
Moscow has been able to sustain this level of commitment because the Turkish intervention was limited and encumbered by a number of factors: 1) US alignment with Kurds; 2) Turkish inertia; 3) Rebel rout; 4) Astana process.
The head of the Haqqani Network - a terrorist group with close ties to al-Qaeda - gets an op-ed in the NYT to speak on behalf of the Taliban (as opposed to its central leader Mullah Haibatullah) - ahead of the signing of a peace agreement with the US. nytimes.com/2020/02/20/opi…
Sirajuddin Haqqani does not mention his longtime ally al-Qaeda by name. Instead uses vague language (“disruptive” and “foreign” groups) to refer to the transnational jihadist entity. He even terms its presence in Afghanistan as exaggerated. See this bit👇
Of course, the vague language about not allowing Afghan soil to be used by transnational jihadists as a launchpad for int’l attacks is designed to satisfy a long-standing US demand. It comes from a man whose faction within the Taliban is the closest to al-Qaeda.