Thread by @KamranBokhari

1st took place in Baghdad on April 9 about the Houthi attacks.

Saudi side led by intel chief Khalid bin Ali al-Humaidan & Iraqi PM facilitated

2nd round next week. No mention of who represented Iranian side. Intel Min Mahmoud Alavi?
ft.com/content/852e94…

If confirmed, this diplomacy is likely part of the Biden admin’s strategy to dealing with Iran’s disproportionate regional influence while it tries to restore the nuclear deal.

Hard to believe that Team Biden was only working on a return to the JCPOA without addressing the bigger Iranian regional threat. That was the whole criticism against the Obama deal that it provided the cash Iran needed to become further aggressive in the Middle East.

JCPOA v 2.0 will empower Iran to consolidate and further build upon the gains it has made in the region. How not to allow that unintended outcome while restoring the nuclear deal has been the biggest strategic conundrum for the US.

A terribly difficult circle to square, especially given the lack of any good options. Then there is the major imbalance of power in the region with Iran in a net strategic sense having the proverbial upper hand vis-a-vis the Arab states.

Considering the strategic hollowing out effect that the Arab world has experienced with regime-change in Iraq + the Arab spring there is no way for the US to restore a semblance of balance of power. On the contrary, a new nuclear deal would further exacerbate matters.

An outcome utterly unacceptable to Saudi Arabia and the Arab states, which is why they favored the Trump approach of max pressure. Obviously the Biden admin could not throw KSA et al under the bus and twice. It is already struggling to allay Israeli concerns.

Israel has options to secure itself against an Iran empowered by sanctions relief and those are not necessarily at odds with US interests. In fact, they help the US contain Iran while it scales back some of the pressure off of Tehran.

In sharp contrast, KSA & the Arab states are deeply reliant on the US to secure their national & regional security interests. They are also all too aware of the serious limits on the dividends of the Abrahamic Accords with Israel vis-a-vis countering Iran.

There is a reason why they quickly adjusted to a post-Trump Washington. KSA et al were very loud in their opposition to Obama’s move towards Iran. This time around we aren’t seeing the same level of noise. I may have missed some statements but they have been awfully quiet.

This is despite the fact that the Biden WH has been aggressive against MbS on the Khashoggi murder. The only explanation is that they have reassurances from Biden that it can walk and chew gum at the same time.

This is why this Iraqi-hosted Saudi-Iranian diplomacy makes sense. I am hesitant to call it Iraqi-mediated. Baghdad is too weak to be a mediator. Besides the Saudis won’t trust an Iraqi state that has long fallen into the Iranian orbit. Riyadh wouldn’t be involved unless DC was.

The US/Saudi/Arab interest in such Riyadh-Tehran diplomacy is to stem the hemorrhaging on the Arab side. Short of a major war there is nothing that can be done to roll back Iran’s influence in the Arab world. Certainly not in the short-term.

What they can do though is try to prevent further Iranian inroads. The principle is the same as that behind the nuclear deal. Place limits on how far Iran can go. To quote Picard from Star Trek First Contact: “....this far, no further!”

In diplomacy, however, drawing those lines are anything but solid moves. For now the goal is to try to lock Iran down in a regional diplomatic framework. It is akin to buying time.

The Arab states cannot deal w/ their internal political problems while at the same time insulate themselves against an Iran that continues to deepen its geopolitical ingress into the region.

Like the nuclear deal, any Saudi-Iranian detente will be a kicking of the can down the road. Just as the JCPOA only temporarily slows down the Iranian march towards nukes an understanding with Saudi Arabia is a stop-gap measure.

As I argued in my recent @newlinesmag essay Iran has all but won a 40-year conflict with Saudi Arabia. The kingdom’s northern flank has been compromised but it can still secure the one to its south. In fact, KSA needs to badly end the war in Yemen. newlinesmag.com/argument/the-c…

That entails acknowledging Iran as a stakeholder in Arab affairs. This is something that for the longest time has been a redline for KSA. It would appear that the Saudis are now conceding on that.

This is precisely what the Iranians have been wanting. Their entire fp strategy since the ‘80s has been to convert faultlines into conflicts in order to set themselves as eventual peacemakers and consolidate influence.

It is the method to their madness and the m.o. to gradually alter the regional security architecture. The Saudis know this well. Hence their opposition to talking to the Iranians other than via proxy as has been the case in Lebanon.

It seems that KSA has been forced into cutting its losses. The plan is to tie up Iran via diplomacy to slow down the rate of decay. This could help if the Saudis then work hard on improving their domestic & regional situation. But it will require both delicate & deft handling.

The wild card in all of this is Turkey. The Saudis can definitely use Turkish pressure on Iran. But not at the cost of empowering the Turks. An out of the frying pan into the fire type of situation.