What I keep coming back to is that the modern 'conservative' ideological framework -- crystallized under Reagan -- more or less collapsed during GW Bush's second term. (1/n)
By 'ideological framework,' I have in mind the conservative elite consensus behind Reaganism: laissez faire economics, muscular foreign policy, and traditional values. (2/n)
The Great Recession and its aftermath (along with long-term growth in inequality as a function of education, professional status, etc) discredited the small-government ethos, which has struggled to contend with the resulting challenges. (3/n)
In turn, the Iraq debacle and forever-war fatigue has discredited the militant American-led interventionism favored by older GOP elites. (3/n)
Lastly, exogenous cultural changes have made core elements of religious conservatism less palatable than they used to be (e.g., hostility to LGBT folks). (4/n)
But a lot of the mass factors behind GOP identification are still efficacious: racial resentment, white identity politics, anti-cosmopolitanism, and sheer negative partisanship. (5/n)
Indeed, an entire media industry exists to constantly inflame and prime these sentiments, and its most prominent figures are more powerful opinion leaders on the right than many GOP elected officials. (6/n)
So, you have this combination of an old elite conservative consensus that is like an iPhone at 1% right now and a GOP mass electorate that is more motivated by various media-inflamed cultural resentments than by ideological concerns, e.g., small govt. (7/n)
Both elite constituencies (e.g., business leaders, military elites) and mass constituencies (e.g., educated middle class whites) that would typically be attracted to center-right politics are turned off by the chaos and controversy. (8/n)
Business, in particular, is being forced to choose between the nominally business-oriented party and keeping itself free of associations with intolerance and anti-democratic sentiment that are bad for branding. (9/n)
It's sort of like we are stuck in a long period of disjunction (centered on the right) that's been unfolding since 2008 -- a point folks like @julia_azari and others have commented on. (10/n)
What now comprises 'conservatism' is deeply motivating to a minority of the population whose power is amplified by our institutions (and that is big money to the right-wing culture industry), but too alienating to many others to generate a broader coalition. (11/n)
What you get from this is that an entire segment of the political culture looks like a root-finding algorithm that's stuck in a saddle point, endlessly and fruitlessly iterating in one window while the rest of us doom-scroll in another. (12/12)
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Here are some results for the white subsample only. Note that the ideology measure = ideological self-placement, so symbolic rather than operational ideology in these models and the earlier ones. (1/n)
Been digging into the new 2020 ANES release this week, and I got curious as to what might predict negative attitudes toward increasing ballot access. So, I took a look at the ANES items on early voting, voter ID, and felon disenfranchisement. (1/n)
The following analyses look at the full sample, with dummies for racial group. I was especially interested in the role of racial attitudes, so I ran 4 sets of models -- each using a different racial attitude. (2/n)
Bottom line up front: racial attitudes predict opposition to ballot access, even after controlling for ideology, PID, authoritarianism, and perceptions of whether votes are counted fairly. For example, here's what we see for racial resentment: (3/n)
There's nothing wrong with this article; the last line is perhaps the most important. But in terms of the Broader Discourse on this point, a lot of folks seem to have unrealistic expectations of what education & knowledge accomplish. (1/n) washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/0…
The general idea is that fancy Ivy League educations mean that folks like Cruz and Hawley should "know better." Putting aside the elitism involved in accepting that premise, there are a number of ways that it us not consistent with what we know about education & knowledge. (2/n)
Following Converse (1964), we've known for a long time that variables like education and knowledge are associated with a stronger rather than weaker tendencies to hew to an ideological worldview. (3/n)
Since we're now in another period of center-left hand-wringing about What The Election Results Mean (absent complete data on what actually happened, of course), let me note a few things I believed on the basis of research even before the election. (1/n)
Americans are operationally liberal, but symbolically / philosophically conservative, per Ellis & Stimson and Free & Cantril before them (2/n). amazon.com/Ideology-Ameri…
To some extent, this means that the symbolism of the left -- as valued by elites and activists -- is not what Democrats should lead with or put up front. In a sense, that symbolism is esotericism that many people do not relate to. (3/n)
There some decent (though very general) words of caution in this thread. My concern is that people are already drawing big strategic and ideological conclusions from aggregate returns, (flawed) exit polls, and anecdotes. (1/n)
It's possible that Ds suffered downballot & localized losses because a few Dems in Congress call themselves 'socialists' or because 'defund the police' was an ill-advised slogan, but we don't know that yet. (2/n)
This could be as simple as the electorate being diff when Trump is on the ballot ('16, '20) vs when he is not ('18). A lot of the House seats Ds got in '18 were pretty marginal/red, and Trump's presence could have shifted things just enough to make things tougher for Ds. (3/n)
This article's framing is a testament to the weird way elite political actors and commentators talk about religiosity, effectively as a brand that has utility to some & disutility to others. (1/4) nytimes.com/2020/10/11/us/…
For all the thematic talk here of a 'new conservatism' that is 'rooted in faith,' the article pretty clearly notes that the dominant influence on Barrett's actual jurisprudence is the same 'originalist' philosophy as most other right-leaning judges. (2/4)
I mean, there's a whole section in there where she more or less talks about her discovery of originalism the way the college-rock artists of my generation talk about the time they first heard the Velvet Underground or something. (3/4)