2/ I’ve always believed that the skillset required to work with seed companies is on some dimensions fundamentally different from working at the later stages.
3/ Everything about seed companies is ambiguous: the people, the data, the level of product market fit, the GTM, the brand and messaging.
4/ It takes a silly amount of time and attention to detail to move from an idea to a company.
Premature scaling, formulaic thinking, over reliance on early data, people mistakes are super common.
5/ Large funds have brands and resources but it’s structurally improbable for a GP to spend meaningful time with a company.
6/ Then you have the éléphant in thé room which is misalignment on the next round. The larger follow-on check is the one that matters for larger funds.
7/ @AngelList correctly identifies that the optimal investment strategy at seed is to index the market (regardless of who’s in).
The question for a founder is: “why on earth would you want that?” (... unless you’ve got a “network asset” to offer like YC).
8/ Being a seed founder is a lonely job. Getting great investors who can help out and who you can talk to makes that journey less lonely and hopefully more successful.
9/ Whether they’re angels or VCs or both is a different question ;-)
But building a tribe around you is a good first step on the journey of moving from idea to company.
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“In toxic environments such as Paris, traditional venture capital has in fact become a rent-seeking business: you don’t need strong performances to make a reasonable living and enjoy your power over desperate Entrepreneurs.”
2/ This is the source article - a fab deep dive into the history of VC from @Nicolas_Colin that I highly recommend reading.
3/ Nicolas, in the line with the pirate ethos of @_TheFamily, does not hesitate to break through the veil of silence that protects the more mediocre ecosystem participants
The journeymen of VC who treat it as a relatively glam lifestyle business.
1/ Breaking news. I’m absolutely thrilled to partner with @cleo_sham to build @stride_vc going forward. We’re just getting started and incredibly excited about what’s to come.
2/ Cleo is a consummate operator: built Uber China as an early GM, and Guanghzou as the first Uber city to hit 1M trips a week, before being promoted to Director of Operations for Uber China and later leading platform integration for Uber’s 45 EMEA territories post Uber/Didi.
3/ She got poached by a number of the original Uber investors to build Spotahome as COO.
But she’s not just an operator; she’s also an investor and a founder.
She started life prop trading and has invested in over 60 startups as angel; she’s also founded two startups.
They were neck and neck with @YouTube until about 70M UU per month.
2/ DailyMotion was started by two brilliant creative minds: @robertderosny and @Olivier_Poitrey. The guys were blazing new features at speed and leading the way. A real grassroots story.
3/ The product was great, users loved it and we were growing fast.
One of the early good decisions we made was to delay monetisation. We didn’t want to burden a company whose success was predicated on achieving massive scale.
1/ Is your board becoming unwieldy as you scale past Series B?
That's probably because you're trying to fit too much into the same format. Some ideas on how to solve that.
2/ Problems: you don't know who to invite. Exec team benefits from being involved but investors hesitate to be direct. A number of issues can't be discussed openly. Engagement isn't great and it all feels a bit theatrical. Takes too long to prep and most comments are generic.
3/ Diagnostic: you're running too many meetings as one. In a COVID world with everyone in remote locations, there's no need for that. Break it up!
1/ By definition, VC partnership are only as good a their decision making.
Let’s explore 👇
2/ In venture as in startups, there are only decisions, never any certainties. It is the nature of our game that good decisions combined with good execution can lead to poor outcomes. In other words, a poor outcome does not mean you took the wrong decision. What to do?
3/ The first step is to collectively get as close to the truth as you can.
This means gathering opinions and facts until you have built a mental model of the decision you are taking and assessing the nature of the risks you are taking.