'Transactional law' practice (venture, M&A, etc.) is fundamentally broken, marked by an evil convergence of self-perpetuating bad incentives that make it almost impossible to reform or even incrementally improve.
Yes, it's the lawyers' fault.
In any rational world, a deal would just be a checklist of standard terms, and the parties would argue about which boxes to check instead of their lawyers spending weeks trying to trick each other through bespoke verbiage spread out across 10 different docs.
Honestly can't believe I've wasted 11 years of my life on this stupidity. After I wrap up my current slate of deals I will no longer engage in this charade.
*I know some people will complain--yes of course at times there is a legitimate need for novel drafting. But after 11 years of deals, I firmly believe the vast majority of terms for vast majority of transactions could easily be standardized & simplified if not for overlawyering.
Standardization is good, but unfortunately the legal industry even gets standardization wrong.
A great example of bad standardization is the "NVCA forms": a giant mess of old-timey drafting, almost purpose-built to maximize obfuscation and the risk of discrepancies. The VCs unilaterally set the standard & there is no git or version control.
The SAFE might be the most successful example of standardization (other than some commodities contracts), but its success is also illusory. Faced with client pressure to follow a simple form, lawyers adapted by serving up bespoke 'SAFE side letters' to be signed in parallel.
&, like with NVCA itself, the issuer side is basically unrepresented in the standard setting process & there is no consensus mechanism for changes; thus, a few lawyers & VCs can just decide 'ah, it should all be post-money now' & that automatically becomes "market"
the key things that the legal world needs to learn from the software world is free open source software development and the idea of protocol governance
protocol governance has a lot of flaws even in the software world, but at least it's acknowledged as an important issue to grapple with, one where questions of representation & minority impact can matter
in contrast, for example, the idea that changes to the UCC or NVCA should be documented, transparent & subject to the comment & consent of all relevant constituencies would not be taken seriously by most lawyers, least of all the committees who rule over these standards
despite the lawyerly snark (which is partly justified), sloppy and inchoate arrangements like 'just throw everything into a multisig and give the keys to cool people' are an absolutely legitimate rebellion against the comparative insanity offered by 'tradLaw'
people can go pay 2+ law firms to draft rules based on poorly defined standards & principles, culminating in an indecipherable and ambiguous output that delegates power to unknown future judges and juries, or they can instead just trust the majority discretion of people they know
the 'sloppy multisig' cuts ex ante (& possibly ex post) transactions costs, keeps power with the parties rather than shifting it onto overpaid, no-skin-in-game professionals, & is fast--from a certain POV, it's clearly superior
most lawyers just refuse to understand this
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Here is a new @iearnfinance governance proposal by @tracheopteryx and me. We worked on it on & off for months, with @tracheopteryx putting in especially heavy time.
I will say a few words about my own thinking on it (speaking only for myself).
there are a lot of ideas & narratives out there about DeFi/protocol/DAO/community governance, but they often don't match up to the reality of what happens on the ground:
narrative: if there is a governance token, that means the token holders are in control of 'the protocol'
reality: governance token holders lack off-chain authority & thus rely on a fragile deference-by-rough-social-consensus upheld by devs & users who help define the protocol
what still seems odd to me is that mere functionality of the token / network takes it out of the securities laws; I do think that's inconsistent with current U.S. securities law, so unless Congress approves that, I would delete clause (ii) of the definition of "Network Maturity"
An interesting response from LBRY to the SEC's lawsuit. LBRY tokens might be securities, but it's been almost 4 years since the DAO report and there is still no viable compliance path for launching a cryptonative token--truly unjust and unfair.
The context from the LBRY team shows that at least some SEC staff see LBRY tokens as being securities and essentially all transactions in LBRY tokens as being securities transactions. The SEC's filed complaint is more narrow and focuses on capital-raising LBRY sales by LBRY Inc.
The SEC is not helping the crypto industry figure out a way to comply with the securities laws. Recent SEC settlements have required the team to abandon the project & essentially make the token worthless. It seems LBRY was offered a similar settlement, but declined.
The hard legal problems with DAOs are not entity formation. They are:
*getting states to grant limited liability to anon members of stateless unincorporated DAOs
*establishing norms of contractual code deference
*taxation
*carving DAO shares out of securities laws
In order to be doing good legal innovation in the blockchain area, you have to honor its roots & purposes, which are fundamentally libertarian and anarchist.
Lawyers should not be coopting & repurposing anarchist concepts to preserve the lawyers' relevancy.
As for DAO/entity mashups, the best shot at getting states to recognize & enforce them lies not in badly drafted prescriptivist technophilic legislation but in experimenting with private contracts in jurisdictions with high respect for freedom of contract.