LOGISTICS (Part 1)
“You will not find it difficult to prove that battles, campaigns, and even wars have been won or lost primarily because of logistics.” – Eisenhower
Logistics is involved with every part of the military. The core functions include supply, maintenance, deployment and distribution, health services, logistic services, engineering, and operational contract support.
Logistics includes planning and executing movement and support of forces and all aspects of military operations.
US Army Logistics embodies the attributes of agility, survivability, responsiveness, and effectiveness. These are critical elements in building and maintaining an army and ensuring readiness. @ChiefofOrdnance @OrdnanceCSM
We actually didn’t use the term “logistics” much until closer to WWII. But the concepts have always been important.
In order for Alexander the Great to move his army from Greece to India and back again, and conquer adversaries throughout Europe, Asia, and Africa, he established functioning outposts along the way, showing that he had the logistical foresight to plan ahead.
Modern Logistics in the @USArmy include the Ordnance, Transportation, and Quartermaster Corps.
Over 75 years ago, the fundamental issues that concerned WWII Logisticians – how to know what you need and how to get it where you need it when you need it – are the same problems that our current Army logisticians face today. @703rdBSB @SpartanBrigade @3rd_Infantry
Logistics in the European Theater of Operations (ETO) is a massive and complicated subject, one that accounts for thousands of pages in the official histories of the war.
The article “Materialschlact: The Materiel Battle in the European Theater” considers the themes of Strategic and Operational Logistics. WWII logistical considerations constrained strategic possibilities, and strategic decisions drove the theater logistics requirements.
In defining strategy, Allied leaders had to constantly be mindful of the delicate balance of ends and means.
In implementing strategy, logisticians were always on the end of a game of strategic “crack the whip” as each modification to strategy would require adjustment to logistics.
Complicated command relationships and the nearly constant state of flux in the European Theater had a significant impact on logistics. “Confusion and contention concerning who was responsible for what function was commonplace.”
And this is just talking about the European Theater. We were also fighting in the Pacific, and for a while in North Africa too.
General Marshall recognized the antiquated structure of the War Department and knew it would hinder capabilities later. Through a bit of reorganizing he gave us three separate commands: Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, and Army Service Forces.
This reorganization better facilitated delegation of responsibilities & decision processes, allowing lower levels to handle things at their levels and freeing up the Chief of Staff to focus on policy and strategy. He centralized responsibilities & decentralized decision-making.
The Army Ground Forces and the Army Air Forces would be tasked with organizing and training combat units for military operations.
The Army Service Forces were considerably more diverse and given the mission “to provide services and supplies to meet military requirements” for the other commands. This was a key step in acknowledging the importance of integrating procurement and supply responsibilities.
This move also acknowledged that logistics was expected to play an essential role in the coming war. There was a problem though.
This Army Service Forces command contained pretty diverse elements of the @USArmy and they had to find a way to effectively coordinate efforts, all while the Army was rapidly expanding. @SCoE_CASCOM @CASCOM_CG @CASCOM_7
We have a lot more to share about Logistics but this seems like a good start 🙂

If you're just tuning in or you've missed any of the previous threads, you can find them all saved on this account under ⚡️Moments or with this direct link twitter.com/i/events/13642…

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with Combined Arms Center

Combined Arms Center Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @usacac

27 Apr
DOCTRINE & TRAINING (Part 2)
We’ve talked a bit about Army training and how the history threads in this series are helping set the stage for the 1941 GHQ Maneuvers, which we will discuss later this year. But we haven’t talked much about changes to Army Doctrine.
The 1941 GHQ Maneuvers in Louisiana and the Carolinas were used to help develop and test Combined Arms Doctrine. @usacactraining @TRADOC @USArmyDoctrine @USARMYMCTP @MCTP_OGAlpha @MCTP_OGBravo @MCTP_OGCharlie @USArmy_CALL @ArmyUPress
Read 36 tweets
24 Apr
ARMY TRAINING (Part 1)
While serving as Chief of Staff from 1939 to 1945, on several occasions GEN George C. Marshall would press for two major US Army advancements. The first is more prolonged and systematic training than the Army had ever seen before.
Every soldier would be trained well, as an individual, and then trained in small units, and as members of divisions, ultimately tested in field maneuvers.
Read 50 tweets
17 Apr
THERE’S JUST NO MONEY
Even as late as 1939, Congress (reflecting the sentiment of the general public) did not fully understand that there was a need for new weapons.
The War Department asked for $646-million for Fiscal Year 1939 and about 30% of that was for non-military expenses like the costs associated with the Panama Canal or for work on harbors and rivers.
Read 20 tweets
13 Apr
THINGS WE DIDN'T HAVE BUT NEEDED Image
Before WWII, the US was not “war-minded”, it was barely “defense-minded”. Convincing the government that we had to prepare for war was a challenge and a half for the military.
In 1940, the Army requested 166 airplanes and Congress approved only 57. The Army wanted 4-motor bombers and none were approved. Congress explained that those were “aggressive” weapons and thus not appropriate for the defensive posture the US was assuming.
Read 23 tweets
10 Apr
The Air Corps Finds a Way
The persistent disagreements over the Air Corps’ desire to develop long-range bombing capabilities were a concern for years. They had to find another way to make the advances they knew would be necessary.
In 1938, the US Army Air Corps made a request for $500,000 that would be used for development toward the following objective: a 35-ton aircraft capable of reaching 30,000ft altitude and capable of carrying a 4000-lb bomb-load for 4000 miles.
Read 16 tweets
6 Apr
Rearming for Defense Only
The Interwar Years involved a series of agreements that would ultimately place limitations on the United States (and others, but we’re not discussing them right now) with regard to what was and was not acceptable for the armed forces.
In 1922, the Washington Treaties reinforced the idea that armed forces should be for defense purposes only, not for offense at all.
Read 15 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Too expensive? Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal Become our Patreon

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us on Twitter!