Thread by @BonicMichael

"[T]he nuclear deterrent is a deterrent. It’s an effective deterrent, and that its rationale - to defend the national security of the DPRK and the security of the Kim regime and the Korean Workers’ Party. So the root of this is North Korean insecurity."

2/Excerpts & Commentary:
Soo Kim (11:24): “So I don’t think the regime is going to need an external impetus to embolden its resolve.”
[Hasn’t the DPRK already “resolved” that since the US continues to remain “hostile”, it has to beef up its nuclear deterrence? Yes, it has. They

3/are watching every move Washington makes. Ms Choe Son Hui of DPRK's Foreign Ministry has spelled out clearly where DPRK currently stands:
“We already clarified that we will counter the U.S. on the principle of power for power and goodwill for goodwill.”
38north.org/2021/03/return…

4/

https://twitter.com/BonicMichael/status/1389632243698585600?s=20

5/“We have already declared our stand that no DPRK-U.S. contact and dialogue of any kind can be possible unless the U.S. rolls back its hostile policy towards the DPRK. Therefore, we will disregard such an attempt of the U.S. in the future, too.”
▪ “In order for a dialogue to be

6/"made, an atmosphere for both parties to exchange words on an equal basis must be created.”
So DPRK's "resolve" is like a well-crafted playbook replete w/ strategies, plays, countermoves & contingence plans. Choe's remarks given in concurrence w/ the completion of the Biden

7/Admin's NK policy review are a heads-up to D.C. defining DPRK's parameters & preconditions for negotiations w/ Washington to be even possible. The table is now set, it's the Biden Admin's move, what is the US going to offer? If, say, US offered to accept a nuclear DPRK, DPRK's

8/"resolve" would turn on a dime and be applied to setting permanent limits on their nuclear & ICBM programs. However if the US comes off as "hostile" making unruly demands then their "resolve" will be applied to beefing up their deterrence. Their "resolve" in other words is

9/a variable force, not a unidirectional impetus focused solely on building up their deterrence.]

Soo Kim ctd: “I think the resolve has already been there. Any US action or inaction I think can also serve as justification for Kim in pursuit of his nuclear weapons and other

10/"provocations. And this is because of course the regime has…yet to see the measures from the US and the international community that’s going to veritably reign in Kim’s nuclear ambitions.”

[How exactly will Kim's nuclear ambitions be "veritably reigned in"? What's the

11/implication? Let me repeat it for emphasis:

“the regime has…yet to see the measures from the US and the international community that’s going to veritably reign in Kim’s nuclear ambitions.”

If this is indicative of D.C.’s thinking then the Biden Admin’s mindset must be:

12/“We’re trying to play nice DPRK. But if you’re going to keep developing your nuclear program until you have delivery capability and threatens our shores, the the US & our allies will have no choice but to put a stop to your threat.”
How exactly will “the US and the

13/international community…veritably reign in Kim’s nuclear ambitions”? By inncreasing sanctions? Or by threatening DPRK w/ a decapitation strike, regime change or preemptive nuclear first strike? Such thinking 1) results from a complete lack of understanding of the tension

14/dynamics of the Mexican standoff.

https://twitter.com/BonicMichael/status/1385127998160982016?s=20

Everyone knows what a Mexican standoff is right? Are we not in a Mexican standoff w/ DPRK? So the VERY LAST THING YOU DO in a Mexican standoff is make a move TOWARDS escalating tensions b/c it could be the tripwire

15/that blows the tensions sky high and we all find ourselves knocking on heaven's door.

& 2) Such thinking will be properly characterized as "MISCALCULATION" - if the attempt to "reign in" DPRK's NATIONAL DEFENSE deterrence capability backfires and

16/results in MILLIONS of people - South Koreans, Americans, North Koreans & who knows who else - Chinese, Russians, Iranians & the French - unnecessarily dying.

For DPRK to have 0% deterrence is untenable to DPRK.
For DPRK to have 100% deterrence is untenable to US.
50% is the

17/magic number where both sides compromise and agree to "split the difference" to reach a security guarantees deal. D.C. clinging to its pipe dream of 0% will only push DPRK to its nightmare 100%. That's the nature of tension dynamics in the Mexican standoff. It is wise then to

18/"avoid extremes" and abandon both pipe dream & nightmare.]

Oh Soo-young (12:04): “John, back in 2017 you emphasized the need to design a security guarantee package for real progress to actually be made. Do you still hold that view and what do you think would be the practical

19/"starting point for progress to take place?”

John Delury: “Well I still hold that view to the extent that the core of this issue is a security dilemma in which North Korea for good reason feels threatened in its neighborhood and, you know, at root the thing that we’re most

20/"concerned about, or certainly the US is most concerned about, the nuclear deterrent is a deterrent. It’s an effective deterrent, and that its rationale - to defend the national security of the DPRK and the security of the Kim regime and the Korean Workers’ Party. So the

21/"root of this is North Korean insecurity and they’ve kind of solved that problem with a nuclear deterrent. And therefore if we are serious about denuclearization we have to substitute an equal or better sense of security on the part of the North Korean leadership that they

22/"genuinely are both safer and…It’s easier to make the argument they can be more prosperous but it’s harder to make the argument that they are safer as a regime without that nuclear deterrent. And so, yes, I’m still of the view that you have to address the security elements.

23/"I think that simply offering sanctions relief is insufficient, although that’s obviously part of a path forward. But you’re going to have to - the US and South Korea are the key partners, and then considering Japan ’s security as well - you’re gonna have to change the

24/"architecture of the region and change the political relationships in a way that North Korea does not feel threatened. And so that means things that we don’t like to talk about. Like the joint military exercises. Like the force presence of USFK in South Korea…But it means

25/"fundamentally changing the way that North Korea sees those pieces on the chessboard. And that is very very difficult work but I’m afraid it will have to be addressed in so far as we’re serious in making progress toward ultimate denuclearization.”

26/"OH Soo-young: “So…making North Korea feel that it no longer needs its nuclear weapons for its security.”"

[IMHO the Biden Admin should act upon John Delury's recommendation to "design a security guarantee package for real progress to actually be made". B/c at the core of

27/of this this Mexican standoff is DPRK perceiving and believing it needs its nuclear deterrent to deter US threats in order to survive.

"And therefore if we are serious about denuclearization we have to substitute an equal or better sense of security [so that]...the North

28/"Korean leadership...genuinely [feel] safer...". We must "change the architecture of the region and change the political relationships in a way that North Korea does not feel threatened.'

Offering a security package like this👇would replace "strategic

https://twitter.com/BonicMichael/status/1330971671893721088?s=20

29/ambiguity" w/ "strategic mutual security guarantees" that could accomplish what Delury says must occur. You often have too "meet the other half-way" to make real progress. Give a little to get a little. No pain, no gain.

CAN THE US & ALLIES LIVE W/ A DPRK HAVING 50% NUCLEAR

30/CAPACITY?

I always see the full glass👇(metaphorically speaking, not as 100% DPRK nuclear capacity in thread) as "That would be nice but in an imperfect world I'll do OK if I just don't wind up w/ the empty glass. So I'll take the glass half-FULL!!" But that's just me.✌️

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