[Thread] 🇪🇺 Member States adopted today conclusions on security and defense, one year after the last ones (June 2020). A 🧵 on this 20-page long document which gives us an interesting glimpse of the upcoming 'Strategic Compass' 👇
1/ The ambition: Instead of using the sometimes controversial terms of "strategic autonomy" or "European sovereignty", the document simply underlines Europe's ambition to "take more responsibility for its security" and "act autonomously" to become a "global security provider".
2/ The Strategic Compass: The conclusions confirms that the 'Strategic Compass' will define concrete policy orientations for the next 5 to 10 years in four areas : crisis management, resilience, capability development and partnerships.
A first draft of the 'Strategic Compass' will be discussed in November 2021 with a view to its adoption in March 2022, under the 🇫🇷 Presidency.
The call for regular EU threat analysis, on the basis of the first-ever document adopted last year, is also worth-noting.
3/ Mutual solidarity: The work on article 42(7) TEU continues through table-top exercises with a view to reach a "common understanding" of its implementation. Lessons learned from these exercises will be discussed by the end of the year.
4/ Missions and operations: Member states want 🇪🇺 missions and operations to be more robust and flexible. The conclusions underline the need to improve force generation and decision-making process (notably through article 44 TEU).
5/ Sahel: The conclusions underscore the "regionalization" of civilian and military 🇪🇺 missions in the Sahel, underlining the importance of the centre of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. The increased engagement of 🇩🇪 in EUTM Mali is also welcomed.
6/ Libya: The conclusions welcome the extension of the mandate of Operation IRINI until 31 March 2023. @EUNAVFOR_MED will continue to implement the UN arms embargo on Libya and stands ready to train and support the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy.
7/ European Peace Facility: The conclusions welcome the establishment of the EPF which will enable 🇪🇺 to provide military and defense-related support to partners. Strong safeguards will be in place. First assistance measures are expected to be adopted next July.
8/ PESCO: New PESCO projects will be presented by November 2021. Member states welcome the invitation to 🇺🇸🇨🇦 and 🇳🇴 to participate in the military mobility PESCO project.
9/ Defense industry/new technologies: The conclusions welcome the adoption of the European Defense Fund and look forward to the Commission's roadmap on key technologies for security and defense. The role of the European Defense Agency in fostering defense innovation is underlined
10/ Cyber: The conclusions underline the need to strengthen EU's cybersecurity through the EU cyber diplomacy toolbox, scenario-based discussions, cyber defense capabilities or secured communications systems within the EU and its member states.
11/ Maritime security: Member states stress Europe's ambition to become a "global maritime security provider" through coordinated maritime presences, regular port calls around the world and cooperation with partners.
12/ Space: The importance of space for the autonomy of 🇪🇺 is underlined. Further work of the security and defense dimensions of EU Space program is expected.
13/ Military mobility: Further progress on military mobility is expected through investments in dual-use projects (funded by the Connecting Europe Facility) as well as dedicated exercises.
14/ EU-NATO: In a *long* paragraph, member states call for a strengthened EU-NATO partnership, in particular in the areas of exercises, operations (notably between IRINI and MARCOM), military mobility, cyber or capacity building.
15/ EU-US: The declaration ends with an interesting para on EU-US cooperation on security and defense. Member states call for discussions between Washington and Brussels on disarmament/non proliferation, new tech/cyber, crisis management, disinformation or strategic competition.
Member states conclude by reaffirming that "a stronger EU in the field of security and defence will also make the transatlantic partnership stronger".
The end !
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First, this is the 8th strategic concept adopted by NATO since 1949. This key document aims at describing the security environment but most importantly at setting NATO’s core tasks for the years ahead.
The previous concept was adopted 12 years ago at the Lisbon summit. A *lot* happened in the meantime and an update was more than necessary. The process was officially launched at the 2021 Brussels summit, even though the work already started w/ the NATO 2030 reflection process.
"Your stakes are also our stakes." Important and strong speech by France's new defense minister Sébastien Lecornu (@SebLecornu) today at @IISS_org Shangri-La Dialogue (#SLD22). A thread with some highlights👇
"France is a resident nation of the Indo-Pacific. This means that our engagement in this vast region is one of the intangible elements of our sovereignty and of our security and defense policy."
"This is the reason why our Presidency of the Council of the European Union strongly promoted concrete actions for the benefit of this region [on] maritime security, connectivity, cybersecurity, or the fight against disinformation."
Ce jeudi 2 juin, comme nombre de mes collègues, je ferai grève contre la suppression du corps diplomatique. Réflexe corporatiste? Non. Un fil pour expliquer la réalité de notre métier. #diplo2metier
1/ Les diplomates ne forment pas une caste où règne l’entre-soi. Notre ministère est composé d’hommes et de femmes de tous horizons, aux expériences uniques et aux compétences plurielles.
Dans mon ancienne sous-direction (affaires stratégiques et cyber sécurité), se côtoyaient des collègues parlant arabe, russe, chinois ou turc et venant du secteur privé, de l’armée de terre, du ministère de l'économie ou du monde universitaire.
[Thread] There has been a lot of debates, and distorsions, about France’s position on #Ukraine and #Russia lately. While concerns are legitimate given the gravity of the situation, many arguments I’ve heard are off-base. A thread to debunk some misconceptions:
1/ "France is pushing Ukraine to compromise": this controversy started from an interview given by President Zelensky to the Italian press. A quote from the 🇺🇦 leader was misleadingly reported, giving the false impression that President Macron urged him to cede territory.
This is entirely false. The transcript of the itw clearly shows that Pres Zelensky was not explicitly speaking of the 🇫🇷 President. More importantly, Pres Macron has always been cristal clear that it is up to the 🇺🇦 to decide the terms of their negotiations with the 🇷🇺.
1/ Introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, the "mutual assistance clause" of article 42(7) of the Treaty on EU states that if a member state is the victim of “armed aggression on its territory” other states have an “obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power.”
The clause does "not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States" (neutral countries), and is "consistent with commitments under NATO, which remains [for its members] the foundation of their collective defense."
[Thread] New 🧵 on the #StrategicCompass. Let’s explore another measure of the Compass: EU-backed coalitions of the willing (under article 44 TEU).
1/ What the #StrategicCompass says: "By 2023, we will decide on practical modalities for implementing Article 44 of the Treaty on EU to allow a group of willing and able Member States to plan and conduct a mission/operation within the EU framework".
So, the basic idea is to better use the flexibility offered by the EU treaties (article 44) to quickly launch 🇪🇺 operations undertaken by a group of willing and able European countries.