The Terra UST stablecoin could collapse in a bank run effect. UST is backed by an endogenous collateral Luna. Current Luna marketcap has fallen to arguably < outstanding UST. We are now in a dangerous spiral: as users panic out of UST, this reinforces the Luna crash further.
The Terra design is based on endogenous collateral, or seigniorage shares: the value of Luna derives in a ~self-fulfilling way from the anticipated usage of UST. While this brought benefits on the upside, it is now materializing in dangerous spirals on the downside.
Is the system underwater? It's hard to say precisely. On paper, Luna FDNV is still ~2x the 2b UST supply, but measures of circulating marketcap are only ~0.8x. Even the optimistic 2x number would be very unhealthy though given the spiral effect on endogenous collateral.
In our research, we've consistently warned about risks in endogenous collateral, like what is materializing now. It's why I'm highly skeptical of seigniorage shares designs for a primary mechanism.
Finally caught up on crypto twitter 😅 A few thoughts on this AMM debate:
1) The math itself seems plausible based on volatility harvesting results (though I haven't checked the details). The interpretation is a little optimistic though imo. 1/7
2) Kelly criterion (max E[log V]) makes sense in context of an entire portfolio and effectively heavily penalizes possibilities of portfolio wipeouts. But when only modeling a component of a portfolio, it makes less sense. 2/7
To illustrate, a Kelly optimal portfolio could very well be: keep x% in safe assets w/ the rest spread over very risky bets. You wouldn't want to Kelly maximize each of the very risky bets. In effect, the safe x% removes the heavily penalized wipeout possibilities itself. 3/7
For non-custodial stablecoins, it's more complex. Where they rely on central governors, they may have fiduciary risks. But where non-custodial stablecoins aim to align incentives of agents decentrally and remove custodial and fiduciary points, then the risks are very different
Non-custodial risks are more like blockchain and market manipulations, which are issues outside of any given stablecoin. Makes more sense to pursue such manipulators for attacks, hacks, frauds as opposed to the smart contract coder (unless they're the same!)
#CropRotation: Since the new governance change, the most profitable $COMP farming is now to borrow and re-deposit #Dai. With multiple layers of borrow-redeposit, you can get >40% yield still. The $BAT positions have massively unwound (w/o incident!) and replaced by Dai
As with $BAT before, this leads to concerns about deleveraging effects. Demand for Dai is high with price close to $1.02 and Dai interest rates are already low. Dai issuance is struggling to keep up with COMP farming demand in this otherwise 'normal' time