1/ Every week, I have mentorship sessions w/ students/others interested in getting into the “field” of countering influence operations, disinformation, misinformation. Having all these conversations, I realize it might be helpful to share the advice and tips more broadly: a 🧵
2/ Normally, I break down the “field” into several different categories: investigations, policy development, advocacy, and resilience/literacy. For many of these categories, you can do this work in government, at tech companies, multilateral institutions, or in civil society.
3/ Within government, certain agencies are responsible for technical investigations, some responsible for deterrence and response, and others policy or regulation. Same often goes for tech companies. The question is what folks are most interested in spending their time doing
4/ As for the advocacy and resilience/literacy pieces, this is what I normally describe as dealing with the “demand” rather than “supply” side of the IO equation. Here, there are literacy programs, education, cognitive science research, policy development, and more.
5/ One common theme I find is that mentees often have a lot of angst around the word “technical.” I regularly hear “but I’m not technical” or “I don’t code” -- people self-selecting out. My answer is: not every area is technical, but also aim to understand how the internet works
6/ Common sense doesn't require technical prowess: if you know how a “troll farm” operates in the “real-world,” for example, you'll know there may be shift work, employees perhaps using the same computers. Now, think about what that might tell you about their online presence.
7/ Many of the best investigators in the field didn't start out as coders. The most important attribute isn't being able to run a Python notebook. That's something you can teach yourself. In fact, many IO researchers are self-taught. All you need to have is Intellectual curiosity
8/ Other advice I give (and colleagues like @markhansontoo agree) is that a great “in” to understanding tech is experience in operational roles. Students & mentees often gravitate to words like “policy” b/c that is what they know. Ops work is crucial and often helps shape policy
@markhansontoo 9/ I also have found myself lately telling folks to (1) sign up for the @IOpartnership newsletter, which regularly lists IO roles across tech, academia, and civil society, and (2) check out the @tspainfo website/job board for roles in trust & safety
cc @helloyouths @tweetclarita
@markhansontoo @IOpartnership @tspainfo @helloyouths @tweetclarita 10/ Last but not least, read everything you get your hands on. The last few yrs have yielded a lot of scholarship on every aspect of the IO space, from detection to deterrence. I first got into this field by reading everything I could read & talking to anyone who would talk to me

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More from @olgs7

26 May
1/ Excited to share our 2017-2020 IO Threat Report! It looks back at the last 3+ years of our work at @Facebook to counter influence operations and analyzes the 150+ CIB takedowns we've done since 2017: about.fb.com/wp-content/upl…
2/ Back in 2017, we published our first IO white paper where we described how we conceived of this problem at the time:
about.fb.com/wp-content/upl…

I got to work with @jenrweedon @alexstamos @Will_Nuland on that paper and today feels like a million yrs later
3/ We've come a long way since 2017 - our investigations teams have grown, our knowledge of threat actors has expanded, and our understanding of the influence ops problem has evolved. Today's report is a chance to take a step back, reflect on what we've seen, and to look forward
Read 17 tweets
15 Apr
1/ Interesting to see @USTreasury explicitly spell out role of Russian Intel Services, front orgs, outlets in global influence operations. And for those of us tracking this space, it’s helpful to map these to CIB disruptions we’ve done over the yrs, a 🧵 home.treasury.gov/news/press-rel…
@USTreasury 2/ So let’s break this down. In this graphic, @USTreasury links RU intel services (FSB, GRU, SVR) to websites/outlets InfoRos, Newsfront/SouthFront, Strategic Culture Foundation. Respectively, our teams have disrupted networks linked to these in Aug '18, April ’20, Sept '20
@USTreasury 3/ In Aug 2018, our IO team took down a network attributed to "Russian military intelligence services" -- InfoRos was linked to that network about.fb.com/news/2018/08/m…

Based on what FB shared with SSCI, more by @noUpside @shelbygrossman @stanfordio: cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/publication…
Read 8 tweets
28 Nov 20
In week 7 of “Lies & Disinformation” @Georgetown, we focused on role of media, state media/overt propaganda in the info ecosystem & toolbox of influence ops. What role can journalism play in inadvertently amplifying IO campaigns or conversely finding them?
@Georgetown One of my favorite pieces of all time on this subject is “Oxygen of Amplification" from @wphillips49 @datasociety which looks at how the coverage choices of editors and reporters play a role in the amount of oxygen supplied to falsehoods and manipulations datasociety.net/wp-content/upl…
@Georgetown @wphillips49 @datasociety A useful visual for our discussion in class was the “trumpet of amplification” from @cward1e @firstdraftnews which shows the journey of disinformation through the information ecosystem
Read 10 tweets
27 Nov 20
After a few months of a hiatus, reviving this tweet thread to cover the remaining material from weeks 6-14. Thanks to everyone for your patience waiting while work and other priorities got in the way.
In week 6 of “Lies & Disinformation” @Georgetown, we focused on Myanmar and the Philippines as case studies into (a) domestically aimed influence operations; and (b) how digital harassment, the silencing of activist voices can play a role in influence activities.
@Georgetown The week’s readings included the fascinating “Architects of Networked Disinformation” from @jonathan_c_ong and Jason Vincent A. Cabañes: newtontechfordev.com/wp-content/upl… and “How Duterte Used Facebook To Fuel the Philippine Drug War” from @daveyalba @BuzzFeed buzzfeednews.com/article/daveya…
Read 12 tweets
4 Jul 20
Happy 4th of July, class! Appropriately, week 4 of “Lies & Disinformation” @Georgetown was about modern Russian influence operations. You’ll notice that we spent 2 wks on Russia this semester. That’s b/c Russia is one of the most prolific IO actors, from Soviet period to this day
@Georgetown The propaganda poster I chose for the week was this one from the 1984 elections in the USSR, which basically reads “Let’s choose the most worthy,” to go along with some of the electoral interference themes we cover in this lesson.
@Georgetown To kick off the week’s readings, I had students listen to Episode 2 of the @bellingcat MH17 podcast “A Pack of Lies,” which details Russia’s “carefully staged media event” and theories thrown out to distract from the evidence, confuse the info environment: bellingcat.com/resources/podc…
Read 14 tweets
20 Jun 20
Okay class. In week 2 of “Lies & Disinformation” @Georgetown, we took a look at the evolution of propaganda & influence from analog to digital, how advancements in technology, democratization of info from the Gutenberg Press, to radio and television, the internet changed the game
The first recommended reading was an audio clip @NPR on how new technology (printing press) helped Martin Luther change Christianity (h/t to @markondefense for that idea) npr.org/transcripts/50…. @ICFJ also has a great overview on the history of info ops: icfj.org/news/short-gui…
In class, we covered how Gutenberg’s invention led to Luther’s 95 theses going “viral," but also to some extreme regulation like the death penalty in France for the use of the printing press in 1535 to “prevent the spread of misinformation and false news.”
Read 11 tweets

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