In an early post, we briefly touched upon high velocity, shallow arc and lower velocity, higher arc guns.
While discussions on muzzle velocity are typically examined from a range, accuracy, or penetration angle, one other factor existed that played an equal if not larger role.
This factor is barrel wear. Something that influenced naval design for several navies.
The forces required to force a heavy naval shell through a barrel are tremendous. The intense heat and pressure places a great deal of strain on the barrel
Each shell that is forced down the barrel strips a tiny bit of the barrel along with it. This damage is typically towards the breech of the gun, concentrated towards the start of the rifling. However, successive shots allow the damage to extend further down the barrel..
Eventually, the wear extends throughout the entire barrel.
Barrel wear can severely impact the performance of the gun. As the barrel wears away, the shell is not properly sealed inside. Gasses from the propellants can leak around the shell, reducing velocity.
As velocity decreased, it led to a further decrease in penetration power and accuracy.
Barrel wear, and its impact on performance, became a major factor for several navies and influenced how they began developing their naval guns.
For the Royal Navy and the United States Navy, their battleships would typically be deployed far away from their shores.
Operating across the globe, the ships did not have easy access to ports that had the equipment capable of handling the process of replacing gun barrels.
During times of war, it was also an issue to have warships out of service to have barrels replaced, reducing effective units at sea.
This issue was further compounded by the fact that even ships outside of combat were using their weapons for training and gunnery practice.
For the Royal and United States Navies, this was a key factor in the adoption of lower velocity guns. The lower muzzle velocities preserved barrel life, allowing the ships to fire more rounds before having the need to return to port for replacement and other repairs.
Most of the typical guns of the US and UK navies enjoyed substantial barrel lives. For example, look at the following:
US 16" Mark 7 - 300-350 (2500fps)
US 16" Mark 6- 395 (2300fps)
US 16" Mark 4 - 350 (2,600fps)
UK 15" Mk 1 - 335 (2460fps)
UK 14" Mk 7 - 340 (2483fps)
In contrast to the US and UK, several navies opted for higher muzzle velocity guns. These powerful guns provided for superior range and power at the cost of a shorter barrel life. Italy and Germany are two such navies that opted for higher muzzle velocities.
Compared to the previous figures, look at the barrel lives for the heavy guns of the Germany and Italian battleships:
German 15" 190-210 (2700fps)
Italian 15" 110-130 (2850fps (Later reduced to 2790fps))
A substantial difference.
With that being said, the difference was not that important.
The US and UK had to accept a slight performance penalty to maximize barrel life. This allowed them to operate across the globe. Their battleships might partake in several engagements before the need to return to port
On the other hand, German and Italian battleships would always be relatively close to port. German ships might make brief forays into the Atlantic but would quickly return to port. Italian battleships would rarely, if at all, operate more than a day's journey from port.
This allowed the German and Italian ships to sacrifice barrel life in favor of superior ballistics, a luxury that the US and UK could not afford.
It was a trade-off, one that was heavily influenced by the logistics of a navy as well as the intended theatre of operation.
Yet another lesson in the intricacy of battleship design and operation!
In another post, we will dig a bit deeper and look at the methods used to further preserve barrel life.
One of the more interesting claims that I have heard recently is that Italy and Germany relied on spaced armor because they could not use high-quality armor plate.
So far as Italy goes, the opposite is true. Spaced armor allowed them to utilize the highest quality armor plate.
The difficulty in manufacturing armor plate increased congruently as the thickness of the armor increased.
It was hard to make make an armor plate of 305mm thickness. It was significantly harder to manufacture one that was 356mm and harder yet for 406mm armor.
How did this apply to Italy?
Italian designers were aware of this when designing the spaced armor array of the Littorio class.
The Littorio class had a 280mm armor belt with an outer 70mm decapping layer.
I wanted to talk about plunging fire and super-heavy shells, but I realized that they are but a small part of the equation.
So, this post will be broken into two pieces, the second part focusing on shell design and shape.
Super Heavy Shells.
The wonder weapon of the United States Navy that everyone acknowledges but does not seem to understand the rationale behind.
So what are Super Heavy Shells.
Super Heavy Shells are, for the most part, the result of a panic in the 1930s.
When Japan announced that it was withdrawing from the Washington Naval Treaty, there was a moment of panic in the United States Navy. With the North Carolina class still being planned, there was a belief that the United States might have a deficiency in battleships.
While most Navies made the pursuit of greater speeds in their dreadnoughts a priority during the First World War, the United States remained happy with maintaining a speed of 21 knots throughout their series of superdreadnoughts.
Much has been written about the great leap in capability that was brought about by faster battleships such as the Queen Elizabeth class. This premium on speed has led the casual reader to discount the US Navy's Standard-Type battleships or even the entire battleline.
However, the reasoning for the emphasis for a 21 knot speed was not an inability to produce faster ships. Rather, it was a calculated decision to have all of their battleships standardized to the same speed throughout the entire navy.
The United States "Standard-Type" Battleships are something of an oddity so far as naval history is concerned.
They are typically overlooked by the casual observer and are seen as smaller, slower, or perhaps less visually impressive compared to their European contemporaries.
However, there was a good reason for the Standards and why they were designed the way they were.
They were, along with the strategic thinking of the US Navy, heavily influenced by Alfred Thayer Mahan.
Mahan's 1890 book, "The Influence of Sea Power upon History", had an effect of navies around the World.
The US Navy on the hand, began designing its entire navy around Mahan's theories.
One of the biggest being the concept of a decisive battle between capital ships.
We talked about the Lexington class battlecruisers, what they might have looked like had they been built, and how they might have been upgraded.
Now let's see how they might have operated in the US Navy.
I imagine they would have spent the interwar years split between the Atlantic and Pacific Fleet, generally following the distribution of the battleships. Most of them likely would have been sent to the Pacific along with the Battleline by the late 1930s to contain Japan.
Any battlecruisers left in the Atlantic would have likely supplemented or even replaced the three battleships covering the Neutrality patrols at the outbreak of the Second World War.
The higher speed and great range likely would have been invaluable in covering more territory.
So let's assume that the US Navy did produce it's Lexington class battlecruisers in their original configuration.
How might they have influenced the US Navy during the interwar years and into World War 2?
There likely would have been no Alaska class cruisers for one.
With six large capital ships to patrol the sea lanes, there would be less impetus for the development of the large cruiser proposals in the 1930s.
As a side note, this might have even caused Germany to hesitate on the Deutschland class.
The Renown class/HMS Hood were known to be the major threats to the class due to their speed and power. Having the threat of the Lexington class in the Atlantic would be added to this.