Long thread w/ color commentary of IMCO amendments to draft #DMA. I focus on what struck eye, leaving aside the small stuff 1/n
Tightening of clause allowing presumptive gatekeeper to escape designation => “exceptional circumstances” and “compelling” evidence 2/n
National authorities also to receive information on gatekeepers acquisitions 3/n
Anti circumvention now phrased in object and effect terms. Good luck w/ that. Lawyering alert w/ open crack for litigation here 4/n
Prohibition of data combination implies duty to supply alternative service w/ equivalent quality to end users 5/n
That’s interesting: is this suggesting that gatekeeper can lawfully restrain business users distribution practices when end users have not been fully monetised 6/n
Ref to conflict of interest makes more explicit the theory of harm behind self preferencing 7/n
Now this is quite substantial. We see here a requirement of functional separation. Can of worms, bc unclear at what level of software integration this cuts: OS/app stores; market place/hardware; app stores/apps???? 8/n
Shout out to my friend @georgionomix whose idea of in situ access makes the cut here 9/n
Fairness conditions for all CPS, not just app stores 10/n
No need to specify a test of non compliance, perhaps to avoid lengthy arguments w/ gatekeepers’ lawyers 11/n
Invitation to include voice assistants in near future. Advisory role mainly. No much 🦷 but necessary concession to Member States I guess 12/n
A new BEREC/EDPB for the digital markets 13/n
Great national courts explicitly mentioned, as if there were doubts, and clear mention to cooperation mechanisms with EC 14/n
Stand alone cloud and messenging services no longer in DMA scope 15/n
Need for speed. Fast procedure requires to consider 1 month enough to issue designation decision 18/n
Article 3(2) is becoming an absolute presumption 19/n
Multi homing is a relevant factor in art 3(6) analysis 20/n
Speed again 21/n
Big cuts to article 6, and transfers to art 5, limiting opportunities for dialogue on implementation 22/n
Requiremement of functional separation for search engines’ verticals. This is big. 23/n
Again, in situ access to gatekeeper data 24/n
The object and effect provision 25/n
Another cut on time limits 26/n
Duty to inform MS authorities of proposed concentrations by gatekeepers. Welcome to multi filing land. Non Brussels practicing lawyers say 🙏 too 27/n
More need for speed 28/n
Ok so no breakups provided for, but amendment seeks to eliminate the principle of structural remedies as last resort 29/n
No space for commitments under the DMA => it’s all self executing. Why negotiate a tailored application? 30/n
Say hello 👋 to new HLEG of digital regulators 31/n
Essentially a concertation body w/ advisory role and dissemination of best practices 32/n
Little inconsistency here. Amendments provide for formulation of guidelines but said before that all was self executing under DMA 33/n
Important addition in Annex I => specification of CPS-specific indicators of gatekeeping 34/n
More 36/n
And more 37/n
Bottom line: shorter timelines, less opportunities for dialogue in administrative proceedings - mandatory presumptions, larger art 5, narrower set of admissible justifications, suppression of commitments -, bigger role, yet soft one, for Member States authorities and courts END
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Last week, one of our papers was mentioned by none other than Nobel Laureate @DAcemogluMIT. I want to take the opportunity to engage critically with the points he raised in his recent "Remaking the Tech Sector" thread. I write here as an econ-friendly antitrust lawyer🧵 1/N
To begin, I take issue with the introduction's critique of the common description of the digital economy as "made up of competitive small companies rushing to innovate." This characterization is more accurate than not. 2/N
The notion of numerous small firms competing in places like the Bay Area is largely true. Our paper, Gatekeepers, Landlords, or Superstars (w/ Bo Heiden & Sotiris Georgoudios), examined this phenomenon. 3/N papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cf…
The great @StiglerCenter conference yesterday showcased what @ZephyrTeachout called a series of ‘history panels” on antitrust #StiglerAntitrust24. A thread on why so much focus on history in US antitrust debates 1/n
That intense emphasis on history is a fascinating intellectual phenomenon. In contrast, European discussions about antitrust reform are more focused on present-day issues such as concrete policy impacts, legal administrability, and economic soundness 2/n
So why the focus on history in the US antitrust convo? I see three possible reasons. One, the neobrandeisian movement needs history to rescue itself from a legitimacy trap it 3/n
The arrival of a new kid on the block in social media holds three lessons for competition in digital markets. A thread on @Threads 1/n
1⃣ A theory of 'broad-spectrum' competition amongst monopoly platforms has strong descriptive power. As I wrote in my book, each dominant tech firms exerts a degree of competitive pressure on the other 2/n https://t.co/jNNP9VhMYaamazon.it/Big-Tech-Digit…
My theory doesn't predict where moligopoly competition hits, but it correctly shows the existence of new channels of competition across markets that current laws incorrectly treat as fraught with monopoly illnesses @Cernaksj reviewed the argument there 3/n https://t.co/SztcRde8Aramericanbar.org/content/dam/ab…
The General Court (GC) was asked for 2nd time to review legality of an EUCommission setting a > €1 Bi fined against chip maker Intel for abuse of dominance. 2/n
When GC looked the 1st time, it gave the EC a satisfecit. The case was appealed to the upper EU Court (CJEU), which appeared more uncertain 3/n
Now the law. Annulment proceedings can be understood as a « procès fait à un acte ». EU law does not follow the adversarial model of litigation of anglo-american legal systems. « We » is inappropriate 2/n
And the law again. In continental law systems, judicial control of administrative decisions is a safeguard against excessive encroachment of executive power on the will of the people, as expressed in congressional legislation or constitutional principles and texts 3/n