Long thread w/ color commentary of IMCO amendments to draft #DMA. I focus on what struck eye, leaving aside the small stuff 1/n
Tightening of clause allowing presumptive gatekeeper to escape designation => “exceptional circumstances” and “compelling” evidence 2/n
National authorities also to receive information on gatekeepers acquisitions 3/n
Anti circumvention now phrased in object and effect terms. Good luck w/ that. Lawyering alert w/ open crack for litigation here 4/n
Prohibition of data combination implies duty to supply alternative service w/ equivalent quality to end users 5/n
That’s interesting: is this suggesting that gatekeeper can lawfully restrain business users distribution practices when end users have not been fully monetised 6/n
Ref to conflict of interest makes more explicit the theory of harm behind self preferencing 7/n
Now this is quite substantial. We see here a requirement of functional separation. Can of worms, bc unclear at what level of software integration this cuts: OS/app stores; market place/hardware; app stores/apps???? 8/n
Shout out to my friend @georgionomix whose idea of in situ access makes the cut here 9/n
Fairness conditions for all CPS, not just app stores 10/n
No need to specify a test of non compliance, perhaps to avoid lengthy arguments w/ gatekeepers’ lawyers 11/n
Invitation to include voice assistants in near future. Advisory role mainly. No much 🦷 but necessary concession to Member States I guess 12/n
A new BEREC/EDPB for the digital markets 13/n
Great national courts explicitly mentioned, as if there were doubts, and clear mention to cooperation mechanisms with EC 14/n
Stand alone cloud and messenging services no longer in DMA scope 15/n
Need for speed. Fast procedure requires to consider 1 month enough to issue designation decision 18/n
Article 3(2) is becoming an absolute presumption 19/n
Multi homing is a relevant factor in art 3(6) analysis 20/n
Speed again 21/n
Big cuts to article 6, and transfers to art 5, limiting opportunities for dialogue on implementation 22/n
Requiremement of functional separation for search engines’ verticals. This is big. 23/n
Again, in situ access to gatekeeper data 24/n
The object and effect provision 25/n
Another cut on time limits 26/n
Duty to inform MS authorities of proposed concentrations by gatekeepers. Welcome to multi filing land. Non Brussels practicing lawyers say 🙏 too 27/n
More need for speed 28/n
Ok so no breakups provided for, but amendment seeks to eliminate the principle of structural remedies as last resort 29/n
No space for commitments under the DMA => it’s all self executing. Why negotiate a tailored application? 30/n
Say hello 👋 to new HLEG of digital regulators 31/n
Essentially a concertation body w/ advisory role and dissemination of best practices 32/n
Little inconsistency here. Amendments provide for formulation of guidelines but said before that all was self executing under DMA 33/n
Important addition in Annex I => specification of CPS-specific indicators of gatekeeping 34/n
More 36/n
And more 37/n
Bottom line: shorter timelines, less opportunities for dialogue in administrative proceedings - mandatory presumptions, larger art 5, narrower set of admissible justifications, suppression of commitments -, bigger role, yet soft one, for Member States authorities and courts END
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The great @StiglerCenter conference yesterday showcased what @ZephyrTeachout called a series of ‘history panels” on antitrust #StiglerAntitrust24. A thread on why so much focus on history in US antitrust debates 1/n
That intense emphasis on history is a fascinating intellectual phenomenon. In contrast, European discussions about antitrust reform are more focused on present-day issues such as concrete policy impacts, legal administrability, and economic soundness 2/n
So why the focus on history in the US antitrust convo? I see three possible reasons. One, the neobrandeisian movement needs history to rescue itself from a legitimacy trap it 3/n
The arrival of a new kid on the block in social media holds three lessons for competition in digital markets. A thread on @Threads 1/n
1⃣ A theory of 'broad-spectrum' competition amongst monopoly platforms has strong descriptive power. As I wrote in my book, each dominant tech firms exerts a degree of competitive pressure on the other 2/n https://t.co/jNNP9VhMYaamazon.it/Big-Tech-Digit…
My theory doesn't predict where moligopoly competition hits, but it correctly shows the existence of new channels of competition across markets that current laws incorrectly treat as fraught with monopoly illnesses @Cernaksj reviewed the argument there 3/n https://t.co/SztcRde8Aramericanbar.org/content/dam/ab…
The General Court (GC) was asked for 2nd time to review legality of an EUCommission setting a > €1 Bi fined against chip maker Intel for abuse of dominance. 2/n
When GC looked the 1st time, it gave the EC a satisfecit. The case was appealed to the upper EU Court (CJEU), which appeared more uncertain 3/n
Now the law. Annulment proceedings can be understood as a « procès fait à un acte ». EU law does not follow the adversarial model of litigation of anglo-american legal systems. « We » is inappropriate 2/n
And the law again. In continental law systems, judicial control of administrative decisions is a safeguard against excessive encroachment of executive power on the will of the people, as expressed in congressional legislation or constitutional principles and texts 3/n