This law really does two things. 1) It formalizes the process for sanctioning foreign govt officials who implement sanctions as well as their families and perhaps think tanks, NGOS, or people who advised on those foreign sanctions). E.g. the recent sanctions on EU
The other thing the new law does is prohibit any companies operating in China from complying with EU or US sanctions and expose them to civil lawsuits for damages caused by such compliance. E.g. the XPCC could sue HM, etc.
This second part of the law essentially copies the EU Blocking Statute, which is also aimed at nullifying the effect of US sanctions (like on Iran). ec.europa.eu/info/business-…
Like the EU law, the Chinese law has a provision allowing companies to seek permission to comply with US sanctions out of necessity. This might be a large loophole, depending on how the govt applies this provision. (I expect well-connected Chinese companies might use this)
The Chinese govt cd have just enacted the second part (e.g. the blocking statute) and I don't think anyone (certainly not the EU) wd have been troubled. The first part, which potentially exposes think tanks to sanctions just for supporting sanctions on China is the crazy part.
To show how broad the scope of Chinese counter-sanctions might be, did I indirectly participate in the formulation (间接参与制定) of US South China Sea sanctions by publishing this Lawfare post? lawfareblog.com/its-time-south… Probably not, but who knows?
I mean, the law could apply counter sanctions to spouses and immediate family members, so I guess my wife will have to cancel that trip to China (or even HK)?
The more normal reading of this statute would limit counter sanctions to those who actually formulated the sanctions on China (e.g. govt officials). But the recent EU counter sanctions went after scholars, think tanks, etc. So the scope of the law is probably broad.
(Whoops, I was too fast with this reading. the Chinese law suggests but actually doesn't explicitly say you can apply for an exemption. Art. 15 is a little mysterious to me. so I will withdraw this part of the take for now).

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with Julian Ku 古舉倫

Julian Ku 古舉倫 Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @julianku

25 Mar
Saudi Arabian leader Mohammed bin Salman "firmly supports China's legitimate position on affairs related to Xinjiang and Hong Kong." This kind of support from a leading majority-Muslim country is why pushing China on Xinjiang is so difficult. globaltimes.cn/page/202103/12…
Interestingly, GT reports China's FM Wang will also be meeting with Turkish diplomats. Curious whether the Turkish will endorse China's Xinjiang policies as well.
In any event, the Arab League support for China's Xinjiang policies is exactly the kind of international support that China needs when it pushes back against US/EU sanctions. China is winning this diplomatic contest so far. ecns.cn/news/society/2…
Read 4 tweets
25 Mar
Nike's statement on Xinjiang is actually carefully written to avoid condemning or accusing the Chinese govt of doing anything bad. It just says there are no Uighurs in our supply chain so we are fine. Apparently, this is not good enough. purpose.nike.com/statement-on-x…
Moreover, in the Department of Ingratitude, these companies being targeted in China seem to have lobbied successfully against the Uighur Forced Labor Ban in Congress. Still not good enough apparently. msn.com/en-us/money/ma…
The PR folks who have to write the Nike/HM apologies on Weibo for not using forced labor products from Xinjiang are going to really earn their paycheck this week.
Read 4 tweets
20 Mar
Even @globaltimesnews correctly differentiates the “one China principle” from the US “One China POLICY”. Now all we have to do is convince @politico of the same! cc: @jessicadrun globaltimes.cn/page/202103/12…
More nuggets from the Chinese side. The CCP’s ruling status is not just a redline, it is the “ultimate redline.”
One real outcome: “They will establish a joint working group on climate change.”
Read 4 tweets
19 Jan
This could be a big deal, although it has some potential downsides. "U.S. Says China’s Repression of Uighurs Is ‘Genocide’" nytimes.com/2021/01/19/us/…
A US govt legal designation of something as a "genocide" has traditionally been a difficult bureaucratic and legal task. See, e.g., the fight over the 2004 US designation of Sudan's actions in Darfur as "genocide" theatlantic.com/international/…
The Clinton Administration in 1994 appeared to have barred the use of genocide w/r/t Sudan for legal and policy reasons. The Bush Admin did quite a lot of fact finding and legal analysis, and was still not sure the evidence was strong enough.
Read 8 tweets
31 Aug 20
This is quite a speech on Taiwan by @USAsiaPacific
Chief Stilwell. It says almost everything Taipei would want the US to say: E.g.: China is the problem, not Taiwan; Taiwan needs more international room. US will keep selling arms to Taiwan. state.gov/The-United-Sta…
@USAsiaPacific It declassifies cables related to the 1982 "Six Assurance" given by the US to Taiwan, and reaffirms US commitment to those assurances. The Assurances run from the US to Taiwan, but were meant to clarify the limits of what the US would do w/r/t Taiwan when negotiating with China.
@USAsiaPacific To the extent there was any ambiguity on the US position on Taiwan's sovereignty, this speech clarifies that "The U.S. takes no position on sovereignty over Taiwan." which directly contradicts China's claim that the whole world (incl the US) agrees that Taiwan is part of China.
Read 8 tweets
30 Jul 20
Here is @RepTedYoho's "Taiwan Invasion Prevention Act", which would authorize US military force in the event China uses force against Taiwan. yoho.house.gov/sites/yoho.hou…
@RepTedYoho The key language in the bill is similar to other congressional authorizations for the use of force, like the famous Sept. 11 AUMF. This bill's language is similarly broad, but does impose some conditions on when the President can use force to defend Taiwan.
@RepTedYoho POTUS can use force if 1) China attacks Taiwan's military; 2) China attacks territory under Taiwan's 'effective juris'; 3) China endangers lives of TW civilians or military.
Read 10 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Too expensive? Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal Become our Patreon

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us on Twitter!

:(