THREAD: Simulating an RCV election in Alaska, we see that running a Democrat probably helps Kelly Tshibaka more than anything. But the value Lisa Murkowski provides to a Democratic majority is minimal, and the expected value of running a Democrat is still higher, IMO
Let’s construct a grossly simplified scenario where we have Tshibaka (R) at 40%, Galvin (D) at 30%, Murkowski (R) at 30%, and Murkowski loses the second spot by a hair to Alyse Galvin. Now you go to the H2H...
Does Galvin get 66% of Murkowski’s voters to back her as the second choice? Possible...but a tall order...so you’ve just given Tshibaka a huge boost here.
Conversely, would 66% of Galvin’s voters rank Murkowski as a second choice? That’s much easier to imagine.
The picture gets worse for Democrats when you toss in ballot exhaustion. For the example, let’s construct a scenario where you have 20% of Murkowski’s ballots not ranking another candidate. Galvin needs to win ~71% of the rest. The higher the exhaustion rate, the higher this % is
So Galvin needs a high % of votes to begin with before Murkowski’s theoretical elimination. And it can be done (maybe an easier lift than, say, Iowa), but it is not easy by any means.
And now comes the key question: is a < 15% chance of a Democratic Senator worth more than a 40% chance of a “better Republican”? I’d say yes, quite clearly, and it’s not really up for debate. When has Murkowski actually been critical to anything for a Democratic majority?
Murkowski will never be the 50th or 60th vote on legislation. Her election does nothing in terms of helping Democratic priorities. Her only value would be for a Democratic minority, and that’s fine if you’re convinced you’ll lose the Senate in ‘22 and need that friendly vote.
But if you’re playing for a majority, funding her makes no sense, especially when you have a chance at getting a safe D vote. You could argue that she helps you if Trump wins in 2024, but that’s not something to plan around if your goal is to pass legislation these next two years
And lastly, with how rapidly Anchorage is trending Democratic, Tshibaka would be a hell of a lot more vulnerable in 2028 than Murkowski would be, so it’s a better long-term play too.
TL;DR: RCV opens up a lane for a Democrat to win, but that lane spikes the Trump candidate odds as well, and that’s fine because the value over replacement that Murkowski gives is minimal in terms of policy progress for Democrats.
(If I had to hazard a guess, I actually think it’s like ~10% chance *max* that the Democrat wins even in a scenario like this, so I really put in a wider bucket than I needed to)
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If the goal of the Democratic Party is to retain the majority in 2022, then funding or helping Lisa Murkowski makes absolutely no sense, because the value-over-replacement she provides to a Senate Democratic majority is minimal.
If Democrats think they've certainly lost the Senate in 2022, then helping to keep Murkowski might make a lot of sense.
If they think they've got a good chance to retain the Senate (as they do, given the map they're playing in), then keeping Murkowski provides no utility at all.
Any bill Murkowski goes for, all Democrats would have already supported, including Manchin. There is no use to a Democratic *majority* here, especially when you have a lane to elect Galvin, who'd be at the party median and cut the reliance on Manchin/Sinema by a fair bit.
Murkowski's 2022 odds are honestly not nearly as high as everyone thinks they are and I think it's not unreasonable to say that come November, she may not be the favorite to make it out of the field.
You can call Alaska likely/safe R, but it's not likely/safe Murkowski.
.@EScrimshaw breaks it down here, but because of the way RCV works, Tshibaka poses a very, very serious threat, especially given the amount of campaigning Trump will do for her against Murkowski. scrimshawunscripted.substack.com/p/2022-murkows…
That *does* open up an outside lane for a Democrat (I think @ElpisActual has discussed it as well) in which you could have Tshibaka (R) at 40%, Galvin (D) at 30%, Murkowski at 25%, and a random Independent at 5%.
And Galvin could edge out Tshibaka in a H2H there with RCV.
Also if you like things like this go follow @notkavi and our bot @bot_2024 — kavi does a lot of great modeling and work and programmed the bulk of that bot.
As I said in the replies to the original thread, I think the lack of demographics available to our bot (because of a lack of data) makes this estimation a bit susceptible to favoring Dems too much in some elections, but the overall picture is largely correct.
The two-way vote share, per Catalist, was ~R+12 with white voters in 2020. The white vote in a midterm would probably be ~R+10 or thereabouts, if we adjusted for voting propensity and assumed zero vote switching.
That *does* help Democrats a bit! But to take advantage of it, you need to make sure your base turns out, and this is still prone to the issue that white college voters who are Democratic may turn out at different rate from white college voters that are Republicans.
This is not meant to be a hard and fast quantification of everything. It's just meant to show that there is a real, somewhat quantifiable educational turnout edge based on recent history for Democrats, and that they could certainly use this to their benefit.
A very rough estimate, but I'd say that Democrats probably have a ~1.5%-2% education turnout edge in the midterm electorate among *white voters*, using 2020 support numbers from Catalist and 2018/2016 turnout data (filtered for state house districts that are >75% white).
Important to note a few things here:
(1) there is a clear correlation between education and turnout, especially among white voters, and that was only magnified in 2020. (2) This is a rough estimate because the granularity of data available here doesn't support anything more.
It's pretty critical to note that persuasion is far more important in influencing the electoral environment. That is to say that voters changing their mind is generally way more influential than a 1.5% turnout edge in *margin* (which is what this estimate is measuring in!)
(1) People underestimate how much time most bills take to get anywhere. The GOP didn't get their healthcare vote until the last week of July.
(2) Biden's not going to abandon everything they wanted in the compromise bill when they've already hinted at reconciliation for the rest
I keep seeing the "Manchin and Sinema" argument, and my answer to this is that the opposition to a lot of things is almost never just Joe Manchin, as the Post said the other day. This caucus isn't as liberal on every issue as Twitter likes to think it is.
Suffice to say that when Manchin has already said that they should go to 4T for infrastructure previously, it's not like he's just abandoned the idea of $$ flooding into WV. And I would be very, very surprised if the Democrats didn't use reconciliation for the rest like they said