1/11
In the second part of his important speech, Zhou Chengjun, the PBoC’s head of research, argues that “an international currency’s exchange rate arises from the large number of transactions conducted by currency holders around the world.
2/11
It is not decided by the central bank that issues the currency. Aside from that issuance, the central bank has no decision-making power.” He goes on to conclude that “we have no choice but to acknowledge that in the context of RMB internationalization, we can’t control...
3/11
its exchange rate, and the PBOC would ultimately relinquish any hopes of determining its exchange rate.”
This is an important point in a heated debate within China about the extent to which Beijing will allow international considerations to trump domestic ones.
4/11
The PBoC, the financial regulators, many of the most prominent economists, the extremely wealthy, and, I suspect, the major banks all want to see increasing internationalization of the RMB, (as do many less-informed officials in the foreign affairs and military...
5/11
establishments), but they may be underestimating the risk to a country like China, with its extremely unbalanced economy, soaring debt, embedded moral hazard, mismatched balance sheets and systematically overvalued financial assets (Galbraith’s “bezzle”).
6/11
China can impose financial stability domestically only because its financial system is closed and regulators control the liability side of domestic balance sheets. The point Zhou makes about RMB internationalization is that Beijing will have to get used to giving up control.
7/11
These by the way are the same groups that pushed for the internationalization of domestic financial markets in Mexico in the early 1990s, and in Brazil, Russia and the East Asian “Tigers” in the mid-1990s. In many of those cases (and this has also long been rumored to be...
8/11
the case in China), one reason financial authorities pushed for financial liberalization is because they worried that this was the only way to force through much-needed reforms in the domestic financial system that had otherwise been politically too difficult to implement.
9/11
But relying on external factors to force domestic reforms is a risky strategy. In each of those earlier cases, what seemed like manageable risk during times of rapid growth and capital inflows subsequently turned out to be unmanageable when conditions suddenly...
10/11
changed, often for external reasons over which domestic authorities had little control. See the very good piece last week by Duvvuri Subbarao, a former governor of the Reserve Bank of India on just how hard it is to control this risk.
11/11
I would add that Zhou’s explanation later in his speech about why Japan’s experience after the Plaza Accord was so different from that of Germany’s is very different from mine, and I think underestimates the corresponding risk to China.
"According to monthly BIS data, the nominal EER of the Chinese yuan climbed 1.12 percent to 122.01 from April 2016 to May 2021. The real EER edged down from 127.17 in April this year to 127.08 in May."
1/8 From a very feisty 1933 FDR letter: “A financial element in the largest centers has owned the Government since the days of Andrew Jackson. The country is going through a repetition of Jackson’s fight with the Bank of the United States – only on a bigger and broader basis.”
2/8 Although the account by Feis of the events of that time is not always disinterested, he does a great job of showing just how politically complex financial policymaking can be. What really strikes me is the intellectual dissonance between FDR and his financial advisors.
3/8 While FDR wasn’t always sure about what he wanted when it came to US monetary policy, he had a pretty clear vision of what he didn’t want, and for him stabilizing the value of the USD dollar in international markets was simply not nearly as important as managing...
1/4 Consumer spending accounted for 54.3% of China's GDP last year, compared with an average of 53.4% between 2011 and 2019, according to the NDRC. This compares to 70-80% typical of developed economies.
2/4 In a recent speech Zhi Shuping said that Beijing will continue to focus on ensuring the recovery of consumption. More efforts are needed to boost the purchasing power of consumers, he said, and to improve consumption policies and the overall consumption environment.
3/4 Local policymakers have made a big show of Improving consumption polices and the consumption environment, whatever that means, but in fact these things don't matter much except to reapportion spending. They don't have much impact on rebalancing spending.
1/14
Zhou Chengjun, the PBoCs head of research, points out the inevitable conflict that major reserve-currency status brings (what I call "the exorbitant burden": "On one hand," he says, "are the goals of domestic monetary policy, on the other are...
2/14
the responsibilities and obligations as issuer of the global reserve currency. It is nearly impossible for the monetary authority to consider domestic goals and international roles at the same time."
3/14
Zhou is right, of course, but he then argues that this dilemma is why USD's role must decline in favor of RMB. He doesn't seem to recognize that in fact China faces a much more damaging form of this very same dilemma, which is why for all the talk in the past 15 years...
1/4 I disagree. They couldn't as long as they set unrealistically high GDP growth targets, and that's precisely the point. This has been a problem for years, and was made clear by some astonishing statements a few years ago by the Ministry of Rails.
2/4 What is more, for years Beijing has been promising to cut back on property and infrastructure spending, and on the debt associated with it, but they have always expanded or contracted it as needed to achieve the GDP growth target.
3/4 This investment has been, in other words, a residual that expands when what they call "high-quality" is lower and contracts when high-quality growth is higher. Last year for example when high-quality growth was negative, it expanded to represent nearly 200% of total growth.
2/4 invest in risky assets or extend loans to highly leveraged companies, such as property developers. A chief goal of the government’s new WMP rules is to ban banks from guaranteeing returns on investments, a long-standing practice that encourages investors to dump money...
3/4 into risky, high-yielding assets while expecting state protection if the underlying investments fail."
Because banks earn WMP fees by investing depositors money in risky assets while protecting them from any associated loss, this seems a reasonable enough goal, one that...
1/6 While it is true that 99% of what anti-MMTers say about MMT is nonsense, it is also true that 90% of what MMT proponents say about MMT is also nonsense. The tweet below is a typical example of the latter. Academic economists have long focused on the real economy while...
2/6 ignoring balance sheets and money, and MMT was one of the ways in which to redress this, but it seems that some of its more naive proponents have now decided that MMT means you can ignore the real economy. That's one of the reasons why Hyman Minsky was so important:
3/6 he insisted that the real economy must be understood in terms also of balance sheet constraints.
The mistake that the most naive MMTers make is their failure to understand that there is always a real constraint to borrowing — real debt-servicing capacity — even for...