Thread by @AriCohn

1/ We are locked and loaded. Welcome to the livetweet of the preliminary injunction hearing in NetChoice v. Moody, where the court will hear arguments about whether Florida should be enjoined from enforcing its unconstitutional social media law #SB7072.

https://twitter.com/AriCohn/status/1409537239495892994

2/ We (@techfreedom) filed an amicus brief urging the court to do just that, and expect the arguments we anticipated in our brief to play a large role in today's hearings: techfreedom.org/wp-content/upl…

The hearing will start in just a few minutes, so hold on to your hats, folks.

3/ Judge Hinkle is here, and plaintiffs are up.

4/ Plaintiffs properly frame this as a First Amendment issue, noting that platforms' business models are expressive and it is vital that they be allowed to make editorial decisions, which is protected by the First Amendment.

5/ Plaintiffs: 7072 directly suppresses editorial discretion and makes the *state* the determiner of what editorial standards should be.

This is not conduct regulation, these regulations are on speech.

6/ Plaintiffs note that these regulations will stifle the ability of platforms to make decisions that make their products usable by blocking harmful content.

Prunyard, FAIR, and Turner cases involve nothing like this ( I pointed this out here:

https://twitter.com/AriCohn/status/1407449993879957506

)

7/ Florida doesn't even argue that it could defeat strict scrutiny. And these policies are expressly content-based, both on their face, and because 7072 on its whole must satisfy strict scrutiny because it singles out certain speakers (platforms) for special speech regulation.

8/ Florida didn't even address this speaker-based discrimination in their brief, plaintiffs tell the court. We have an act that inexplicably exempts theme park owners, and is based on arbitrary size and criteria. As in NIFLA, this indicates the intent to disfavor certain speakers

9/ We don't even have to speculate about that. The bill's proponents expressly said they wanted to go after big tech for supposedly "censoring" certain viewpoints.

The state admits this in their brief by attacking the bias of content moderators.

10/ There is no valid government purpose that has been advanced.

FL argues that the law is necessary to protect free speech. But the state's claim inverts the relevant First Amendment interest. They can't cite a case where the First Amendment restricts editorial discretion.

11/ The state argued that Section 230 made platforms state actors, but that argument misunderstands everything, and courts have rejected it. (I pointed that out here:

https://twitter.com/AriCohn/status/1407449993879957506

)

12/ The Supreme Court has made clear that you can't infringe on the First Amendment rights of some in order to enhance the speech of others.

13/ The state could start its own online forum, but what it can't do is chill and suppress the speech of private platforms.

14/ Turning to "inconsistent" moderation, plaintiff tells the court that this is in no way about consumer protection.

15/ The state's asserted power to determine whether certain rules are being applied consistently is invalid. These rules are value-laden, they are matters of opinion and judgment. (Exactly).

16/ If an individual platform believes certain content is hate speech or bullying as it understands those terms, the state doesn't have the right to come in regulate just because they disagree.

17/ If you look at the state's examples, it *shows* you how complicated, subjective, and value-laden these judgments are. That's why the First Amendment protects them.

The state can't be the arbiter of the consistency or fairness of editorial judgment.

18/ 7072 has no tailoring whatsoever, imposing blunt and broad requirements without backing it up.

19/ The state doesn't explain why it's necessary for platforms to provide thorough explanations of literally every content decision they make.

20/ Over a billion of comments were removed by YouTube in 3 months, most as spam. Florida wants YouTube to have to send a detailed notice as to EACH one of those decisions.

Whatever one might say, this is not the least restrictive means.

21/This will enable the worst actors on the internet by giving them a detailed roadmap to evade content moderation policies.

Precision of regulation is necessary when it comes to speech restrictions.

22/ Judge: There's reference to mathematical algorithms. Are all algorithms mathematical?

Counsel: All are programs, so they do have a certain logic to them.

23/ Judge: Are the antitrust provisions on the table today?

Counsel: We're asking for an injunction as to the statute as a whole, antitrust too because they also single out certain speakers for special treatment without any explanation of its interests.

24/ Judge: If you win, how big a bond do you think you should have to post?

Counsel: We haven't thought about that, but I think it would be a matter of what Florida wants to propose. I don't think a huge number is necessary but we'll put up whatever is appropriate.

25/ Judge: The government's ability to regulate is different with respect to telephones and telegraphs. Certainly the government can regulate the telephone part of modern phone services. The phone company doesn't even find out what the content is (answering his own question)

26/ Judge: some of these services offer private messaging. Can the government regulate at least *that*?

Counsel: All the members of plaintiffs' org are nothing like conduits or common carriers. They have done intensive individualized moderation. They aren't telecom services.

27/ Counsel: I think there are questions with respect to pure internet conduit services, but even there the FCC recognized net neutrality wouldn't apply to social media, or even email.

28/ With respect to our members, we're talking about core information services, which are defined by extensive editorial control.

29/ Now co-counsel is up to discuss the common carriage stuff.

There is an extensive body of case law. The FCC has held that telephone companies are indifferent to the content, and a number of courts have picked up on this case law and both sides cite the same cases!

30/ The polar opposite of content indifference is individualized decisions.

Social media aren't indiscriminate conduits for the transmission of any content by any and all users.

31/ Florida's whole rationale was that platforms *do* moderate, so it inherently recognizes they aren't common carriers.

This isn't even a common carrier statute, which do things like regulate prices and imposes nondiscrimination requirements. This imposes *favoritism*

32/ Just saying the magic words "common carrier" doesn't make the First Amendment problem goes away.

In Pacific Gas the Supreme Court noted that regulating a public utility doesn't just obviate all the First Amendment concerns.

33/ Even Justice Thomas has recognized that common carriage doesn't get rid of First Amendment issues.

And even if the court finds intermediate scrutiny applies, the law still fails.

34/ If you look at the Senate committee hearing, the lead sponsor complains that social media platforms hide behind Section 230 and take down content they disagree with.

This is a clear expression of what this law is about. The interest the state is invoking is prohibited by 1A.

35/ In Minneapolis Star, there was a tax statute, and the Court said that if you are targeting newspapers for a tax but nobody else, that's a First Amendment problem.

So the antitrust issue is very much impacted by the First Amendment issues.

36/ Counsel rightly points out that literally everything in the statute flows from singling out social media platforms, so it all must fall. Notes the ridiculous theme park exemptions. Additionally, there are underinclusivity problems caused by the revenue/user floor.

37/ Judge: There's no immediate harm from the antitrust provisions, right? So just for the injunction, this is really about prohibiting those content moderation provisions.

38/ Counsel: We do have immediate concern about how this would apply though. Florida has been very clear it wants to aggressively enforce, and that has the chance to chill speech by platforms. That's a real concern and the court should act on that. We want to preserve status quo

39/ Compliance isn't as easy as flipping a switch. You need a lot of lead time to be able to comply with these impossible regulations. E.g., moderation decision notices. This doesn't all just magically happen. So it makes sense to preserve status quo.

40/ Another co-counsel appears, speaking to vagueness.

7072 is unconstitutionally vague in a way that the 11th Cir. has said is particularly problematic in First Amendment cases.

41/ The consistency provision is focused on heavily by Florida, claiming they just want platforms to adhere to their own standards. But these are all subjective decisions.

42/ It's also unclear how the post prioritization regulations can be implemented. Those require platforms to not put content above, below, etc. when it comes to a service that is inherently ordered and prioritized based on content policies.

At its heart, this is about judgment

43/ Now the defense is up. This should be fun. Not too many questions to plaintiffs. I expect more here.

44/ Plaintiffs barely touched on the Rumsfeld case, and Florida thinks this is a controlling case because it disproves that there's a First Amendment right to silence particular voices.

(This is nonsense)

45/ Judge: if the law school put a sign up saying "we disagree with DADT," the law school would have been free to do it.

But Facebook cannot do it under this statute, right?

46/ Florida: not quite. I think you're referring to the provision about not posting an addendum to posts. But it wouldn't necessarily prevent putting a disclaimer at the top of a *page*.

47/ Judge: Would it be OK for Twitter to put right next to a *post* saying "this is contrary to science, or something"?

Florida: I don't. (bad answer, buddy)

48/ Florida says that Twitter could put it on a user's *page*, but it couldn't attach it to the specific post of the user.

He now tries to draw in PruneYard, arguing that shopping center couldn't have made the speakers wear dunce caps because it wasn't time, place, manner regs

49/ Judge: But the shopping center could have put up a sign saying we disagree. It didn't restrict the actual speech.

Florida tries to argue that addenda to posts changes the speech of the user, which is not going well.

50/ Florida notes the severability provision, so wants only specific problematic provisions struck.

51/ Florida goes back to FAIR, arguing that it definitively disproves that there is a per se rule that any time someone selectively chooses what someone else can say, that it is subject to strict scrutiny. The law schools were trying to limit the speech of certain recruiters.

52/ N.B. Florida is again ignoring the actual facts in FAIR, including who the speakers were and the entirely different government interest at stake.

53/ Florida claims plaintiffs make an analytical error in saying that the locus of analysis is on editorial decisions. They think that the distinction between this and Tornillo is that the end product was an expressive output of the newspaper's own.

54/ Judge: This is why I asked the other side if this was similar to telephones. Can't I divide up what the platforms are doing into (1) what common carriers do, and (2) their speech, such as addenda to posts.

FL: Yes, addenda are speech. So that has to be viewed as a TPM reg

Judge, incredulous: THAT is a time, place, and manner restriction? You literally have to READ THE CONTENT.

56/ Judge: isn't the provision about candidates expressly content-based?

FL: Convoluted argument that there is no First Amendment right to exclude anyone, so the candidate part doesn't even matter.

57/ Florida wants to talk Tornillo. Florida says editing a newspaper is different because there's an understanding that newspapers stand behind its content to some extent.

58/ But platforms, Florida says, don't adopt the speech of its users, citing ToS that says "we're not responsible for user speech."

59/ N.B.: Newspapers often proclaim that they don't adopt op-eds. So that distinction is questionable.

60/ Judge: It seems to me that is a distinction, but I don't think it's 100% on each side as you suggest. Any newspaper worth its salt runs opposing views. So it's content chosen by the paper, but some of it they disagree with.

61/ Judge: Platforms also have their own speech, so there's an element of both. Where do you think the line is?

62/ Florida would draw the line between what platforms produce vs. what they host. Citing Turner, arguing that cable operators said there was some stuff that they couldn't run as a result of the regs.

63/ Judge: I thought part of what the court said in Tornillo was that even if newspapers weren't forced to omit some content because of the must-carry provision, the decision would have been the same.

64/ Judge points out that Tornillo said that market power was irrelevant, and that First Amendment concerns had not changed because of concentration of newspaper ownership.

FL thinks Turner I controls.

65/ Judge: during the legislative process, people were talking about social media being monopolies. I scratch my head at that. Compare, during a mayoral campaign, the Miami Herald's control over news about the election, over Facebook's control over a mayoral election today.

66/ Judge: The Herald had MUCH more control than Facebook has today. I read your appendices but I don't think it said 70% *only* got their news from Facebook.

67/ Judge: I was alive back then. The right to reply thing was a big deal, because there was one newspaper in Tallahassee. Getting their endorsement had much more influence than Facebook has today.

68/ Florida wants to explore that in discovery, but their *understanding* is that social media has a lot of control.

You should probably have fleshed that out before passing the bill, guys.

69/ Florida: Another difference is that newspapers select content, as opposed to platforms, which let everyone post and *then* moderate. Florida thinks this makes Tornillo less applicable because it's more difficult to infer a message by the platform itself.

70/ FL also claims a newspaper is a single speech product, because you can read it cover-to-cover and there's an overarching set of ideas or themes (N.B., uh only in the sense that it's all "news")

71/ Finally, Florida argues that newspapers are limited in size. But social media platforms aren't prevented from carrying material because they have to carry other material.

(Again, Tornillo said that didn't matter)

72/ Florida moves on to a net neutrality comparison, asking if AT&T could block access to Facebook. They argue that plaintiffs would suggest the DC Cir's decision in US Telecom was wrong.

73/ (Florida misapprehends US Telecom, where the court said ISPs would NOT be subject to net neutrality if they were open about the fact that they were edited services)

74/ Judge: Doesn't it block content moderation if the user is a journalistic enterprise or by or about a candidate.

75/ FL: There's no limitation against censorship *per se*, it just blocks platforms from deplatforming or post prioritization.

(A distinction without a difference)

76/ Florida agrees that the law curtails moderation of journalistic enterprises. But it only applies based on moderation due to content. Florida thinks that this wouldn't apply if it was because, say, the jouranlistic enterprise had ties with a foreign govt.

77/ Judge: But if such an enterprise was just parroting disinfo from a foreign govt, Twitter couldn't take it down?

FL: Right, but users could still opt-out of that information (which really is neither here nor there with respect to the constitutionality)

78/ (quick bathroom break)

79/ Judge: If you have bad guy who wants to groom a child, can they tell the platform to not post-prioritize, shadow ban, etc.

FL: I read the statute as putting that opt-out option to the viewer.

80/ FL: There are a couple different ways to read that. That makes it ambiguous, not vague (snort)

81/ Judge: How can this apply to all media companies but not ABC (due to the theme park carveout).

FL: I haven't seen evidence that entities that operate theme parks also have social media platforms.

82/ Judge: ABC does. Doesn't every station have a place where you can go and post things? (probably talking about their websites)

FL: We don't have any evidence that any of those enterprises have social media platforms.

83/ Judge: Why is the answer to sever and strike down part?

FL admits that this is a problem of leveling up or down, but says the court should infer what the legislature would have wanted because the law wasn't passed based on that.

84/ Judge: Everyone HAD TO KNOW that this exception for theme park owners posed a constitutional issue. I should infer that they would have wanted to put theme park owners under this law instead of that they didn't want those entities to be regulated by it?

85/ Florida appeals to the overall "problem" that the law was aiming to remedy and says that just the exception should be struck if necessary.

86/ Judge: I'm looking at the definition of "user." How is my hypothetical bad guy not a "user" under the statute?

87/ FL the court is correct that the bad guy is a user.

Judge: So that bad guy user CAN tell the platform to not "censor him!"

88/ Florida says you have to construe the law in a way that makes sense.

Judge: There's nothing in the statute that allows other users to opt-IN to prioritization, etc.

89/ Judge: Here's one problem. The FL Supreme Court more than maybe any other court says "just read the words. Don't talk to me about context or legislative purpose. Just read the words."

90/ Judge: What is or is not a social media platform? Walmart, Target, etc.: they all have a website where you can go on and search, you can leave comments/reviews.

Why isn't their website a social media platform as defined by the law?

91/ Florida: I think it might be. The law is centered around users, who have accounts and a capacity to post. I'm not sure the Home Depot website clears that bar (why not? people have accounts and can leave reviews)

92/ Judge: They *do* have accounts and they do let you post comments. They do a lot of moderation because when I search for a ladder, they get me to a ladder. (Savvy point).

93/ Judge: What about those companies' intranets where internal discussions happen. Why isn't that a social media platform?

94/ *awkward silence* Florida doesn't think most of the substantive provisions would have force (not what was asked though).

Florida also says the ladder listing was hosted by Home Depot. (BUT, you can filter and sort reviews!)

95/ Judge: an executive says on an intranet you should vote for this candidate. The company doesn't want to allow such political posts. Don't they have to allow it now?

96/ Judge: What if a person on the company intranet wants to run for office on a pro-choice message. The company is pro-life. Can that company fire the employee (and thus kick him off the intranet).

97/ Judge: Do they have to give that person access for 60 days? No company in America would give access for 60 days after termination of employment. "Really?! Why are we doing this?"

98/ FL: I don't know if the intranet user would have an "account" (what? do you know how this stuff even works?)

Judge, incredulous: you think it would be unfair to say they don't have an account on the intranet?

99/ Florida: I think that would be fair, but it's also fair to read the statute that they don't have an account on a social media platform.

Judge: But that depends on what social media platform means, which is what I've been asking!

100/ Florida: This kind of absurd application wouldn't likely be held to fall under the statute.

101/ Judge: I go to Orlando and need to find somewhere to eat and open up an app. I want an Italian restaurant nearby. But the hamburger stand on the other end of town told the platform not to post-prioritize. Can the app still give me the close by Italian place?

102/ Florida: the poster doesn't have the right to opt-out of post prioritization, it's the viewer.

103/ Florida: If you go to a search engine, there are options to get chronological results, which is what we understand to be the law's gist. The option should go to the user.

104/ Florida: The user always have the right to say that they don't want to see certain materials.

Judge: How does that work practically? When ISIS was at its heyday, Americans were decapitated on videos that were posted. How would I make sure that doesn't show up in my feed?

105/ Florida: The platform can give you an option to opt-out.

Judge: Of what, though?

Florida: like YouTube's child protection (what?! The point of the question is that there's no way to do that for everything)

106/ Judge: Wouldn't it be better if I just didn't have to worry about seeing something like that on Facebook?

107/ Florida: the court is focusing a lot on algorithmic presentation, but the law also touches on the complete removal of materials or users. I don't think these questions are necessarily applicable in those contexts.

108/ Judge: What about the 30 day requirement. What if something like this gets posted, they have to wait that long to change the rules? Why does that make sense.

Florida: platforms generally have rules that cover this kind of stuff.

109/ (But of course the judge was asking about new types of content that would require new rules, which Florida doesn't quite seem to understand)

110/ Judge: There are two posts by different people. Both say "there is no COVID. It's all a hoax." Does the platform have to treat them the same? But one of them is posted by a candidate. What do they do?"

111/ Florida: I don't think that the law regulates candidate censorship. The law could allow them to pull it down consistently with their rules.

(But they couldn't *ban* the candidate for it)

112/ Judge: So they can't put the candidate's post ahead or below of other users, but they *could* do that to the other users.

If they can't put it ahead or behind other content, where do they put it?

113/ Florida: we read the requirement to be a chronological order requirement.

114/ Judge: That makes sense, but it's not what the statute says.

115/ Florida: A couple points that weren't fully developed in our brief.

The statute says "consistent manner." Plaintiffs say that this is a strict liability statute that imposes liability for mistakes. We don't understand that statute because of "manner."

116/ The process just must be faithful to rules and in good faith. So if someone in moderation says "I know what the rules say, but any posts that uses the F word and criticizes Joe Biden must stay up" even though the F word is banned.

117/ People disagree on interpretations, but if everyone can agree on the "manner," that's good enough.

Judge: When I get it wrong, nobody says I owe a quarter million dollars.

118/ Florida argues that hard cases aren't necessarily inconsistent under the statute

119/ Florida says that the plaintiffs' argument about common carrier is that you have to hold yourself out to the public at large.

Florida cites to Regulatory Utility Commissioners from the DC Circuit in the 70s.

120/ Florida: there the court said we don't need to decide if they hold themselves out in this way, because there's a regulation that forces them to.

121/ Judge: I think that's right. The key point *here* is that common carriage is different from the First Amendment argument. Common carriage is just an analogy that's used to show that government can regulate certain businesses. It doesn't get rid of the First Amendment.

122/ Florida disagrees that regulatory classification as a common carrier isn't important to First Amendment analysis because it diminishes the First Amendment issues

Judge: It's not dispositive, but it is relevant

123/ Florida: O'Connor wanted more 1A protection for cable companies, but said it would have been a different matter if they were regulated as common carriers.

124/ Florida again argues that U.S. Telecom says that common carriers are different, again completely misstating the case.

125/ Judge: What business does Florida have regulating posts made by a Florida domicilliary living elsewhere.

Florida: I don't think there's extraterritorial application.

Judge: How does the platform know, though?

126/ Florida: platforms know where you are (N.B. not if you're using a VPN!)

127/ Judge: What if a visitor posts from Florida? Does the statute apply?

Florida: I don't think it does.

128/ Judge: Why doesn't it say that instead of saying things the way it does?

Florida: Every FL statute has to be read to not apply extraterritorially.

Judge: But a GA resident who commits murder in Florida *is* subject to the statute. Why not the same here?

129/ Florida: There's also an issue of personal jurisdiction

Judge: Clearly someone hasn't read the recent Supreme Court cases on general jurisdiction. I won't put you on the spot by asking if you've ever dealt with a worsely-drafted statute.

BIG YIKES.

130/ Florida: we should *start* with Section 230, it's not an afterthought.

Judge agrees.

131/ Florida: Plaintiffs need to show that there's no set of circumstances under which the statute could be applied?

Judge: Didn't the Supreme Court do away with that?

Florida: I don't believe so.

Judge: It may be limited to the First Amendment context.

132/ Judge: If we hit 230, I still have to go to the First Amendment?

Florida: Correct, I have to win on both

133/ Florida tries talking about Section 230 and immediately doesn't understand what it's talking about, saying (c)(1) only applies when publishing, not taking it down. He's aware that "a couple" other courts disagree (like, all of them) but thinks his read of 230 is better

134/ Florida thinks that this is different because it's not about holding platforms responsible for content it has left up. So they don't think (c)(1) preempts.

Judge: What FL apparently believes is that we'll just have different social media in this state than elsewhere.

135/ Florida: These platforms already comply with different state laws with respect to user data (boy is that very very different in scope from content moderation and I hope the judge pushes back)

136/ I have lost audio

137/ And I'm back

138/ Florida back on "newspapers" vs "social media giants," saying that newspapers have declined and gone out of business and an ascension of social media with power to impact events (N.B. Tornillo LITERALLY said that exact reasoning is irrelevant)

139/ Florida thinks that platforms aren't impacted by most of the content moderation evils they complain about because they're protected under Section 230.

Yes, this lawyer just ADMITTED THAT THE LAW IS PREEMPTED BY SECTION 230.

140/ He also starts saying ahistorical nonsense and misstatements about 230(c)(2)(A).

141/ Florida: The statute is explicit in embracing Section 230 (lolololololololol no)

142/ Judge: So if you think some content can be removed under Section 230, it is OK under FL's law?

Florida: Under the Supremacy Clause, the answer would have to be yes.

Judge: But "good faith" under 230 doesn't mean the same as the FL Law.

Florida: *stammers* well true

143/ Judge: Otherwise objectionable is pretty broad, no?

Florida: I don't think it was supposed to be that broad (guffaw)

This guy is just embarrassingly clueless.

144/ Plaintiffs: Florida argues to look at the legislative concerns, but that is *exactly what makes this unconstitutional.*

The fundamental misunderstanding of the First Amendment on the other side is that the First Amendment *DOES* protect editorial judgment.

145/ As the court pointed out, it's not that the content of the newspaper would be different that swayed the Court, it was intrusion into the function of editors that gave rise to the 1A violation. The exercise of editorial discretion IS SPEECH. Florida doesn't understand that

146/ There's good reason for that: those judgments are inherently expressive. They articulate content standards, values, opinions, about the speech it will or will not tolderate. That is fundamentally what we're talking about.

147/ Plaintiffs: That brings us to FAIR, which has absolutely nothing to do with editorial speech. It had to do with access to campus for military recruiters. It would have been different if the law said the schools had to host certain contents on campus or using message boards

148/ The nature of the burden was also different: it was an equal access law. This law provides special rights for candidates and journalists, and involves the government in regulating the day-to-day editorial decisions of platforms. FAIR is completely different case.

149/ It is particularly objectionable that the law prohibits addenda on speech. That clearly regulates our speech. But you can't just sever that because the entire statute regulates our speech.

150/ Florida argued that the law doesn't prohibit content moderation. But this law DOES do that. Under this law we couldn't remove the beheading posts if posted by a journalist. Florida must be reading a different statute.

151/ This is a statute that is incredibly broad and unclear. This isn't bean beg. This is a statute with heavy penalties with a private right of action. The precision of regulation is vital. The discussion you had with Florida shows that this has no such precision.

152/ Plaintiff co-counsel is on. The state is propounding a view of the First Amendment stuck in the pre-digital area that ignores that those principles apply in the same way online, as the Court said in Reno v ACLU.

153/ Florida ignores the cases we cite that say these principles do apply to moderation of user-generated content.

On "no set of circumstances," where content restrictions are involved, courts go directly to strict scrutiny.

154/ There is no question that on the First Amendment claim, we don't need to meet "no set of circumstances."

There's not much to the constitutional avoidance argument. Florida wants to talk about 230, but in the end the court must decide the First Amendment issue (as I noted)

155/ With respect to attribution of user speech to platforms, abstract debate is beside the point. We have pointed to specific incidents of advertiser boycotts, for example, that show platforms do get held responsible for speech that appears on platforms. There's real world proof

156/ Judge: But the fact that some advertisers don't want to stick around doesn't think that the advertisers think it's the platform's speech. A user might be confused, but the advertisers won't.

157/ Counsel: Whether or not the advertisers have that belief, there is evidence that the *users* attribute it.

Judge: Some people boycott a state because of a law. It's not that they think the hotel shares the view. But I get your point.

158/ When it comes to U.S. Telecom, go back to PG&E: just saying "common carrier" doesn't get rid of the First Amendment.

159/ Judge: asks state what kind of bond should be imposed if the injunction is granted

Florida: we probably wouldn't insist on a bond, but I will file something shortly

160/ Judge anticipates a ruling by the end of the day on June 30, but isn't going to try to write a huge opinion. "Once I rule, the 11th Circuit rules and nobody cares what I wrote."

161/ Now just moving on to general scheduling stuff. This is concluded, substantively.

Thanks for following along. Live tweeting is freaking HARD, and I didn't get to interject as many of my own thoughts as I'd have liked, but be assured that I have them and eventually you will hear them.

But for a moment, my fingers are taking a rest.

/END

A statement about today's hearing: