1.This is the second thread on my @HJS_Org paper Nord Stream 2, Myths, Illusions and realities. Today we are focussing on the (Germanic) illusions. For the previous thread see here:
https://twitter.com/profalanriley1/status/1410481151727357953
2.There are three Germanic illusions underpinning NS2. These are guilt, the myth of eastern riches and Ostpolitik.
3. Let’s start with guilt over Nazi atrocities during WW2. This is illustrated by German President Steinmeier’s recent comment that for Germany NS2 is not just about fuel sales. There is another historical dimension dw.com/en/germanys-st…
4. He noted that June 2021 marked 80 years since the launch of Barborossa He did say that the history “does not justify any wrongdoing in Russian politics today” but added, “we live in the presence of a difficult relationship, but there is a past before and a future after
5.This view of the Ger/Rus relationship amounts to a substantial misplacement of Ger guilt. As Prof Timothy Snyder makes clear in Bloodlands, the force and brunt of Nazi atrocities fell upon Poland, the Baltics Ukraine and Belarus – the “bloodlands”of Soviet and Nazi terror
6. It was these states within the USSR, or adjacent occupied territories that experienced brunt force of the Nazi terror. If Ger wants to account for the moral burden of its past through its current foreign policy relations, it should surely also address the “bloodlands” states
7. On this point of Germany overlooking its historical responsibilities for Ukraine it is worth watching Prof Snyder's lecture given in the Bundestag in 2017
8.There is also a further German (and Western European) overlooking of responsibilities for Ukraine which postdates WW2. This is where during the Cold War the Westerners were drawing gas from the USSR while Ukraine was being left short of heating for its homes and factories.
9.The grand ceremonies in October 1973 to celebrate the new gas flows from the USSR to West Germany did bring on time and delivered gas in huge quantities to the Federal Republic and other Western states.
10. However, this was at the price of significant gas cuts within the USSR. As Thane Gustafson says in his master work on the EU-Russian gas relations says, ‘the Soviets made their export deadline to Western Europe-barely and chiefly at Ukraine’s expense’. hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?is…
11.Gustafson illustrates the suffering from caused by the focus on sustaining gas supplies to Germany and other parts of Western Europe from communications from the Soviet archives. 
12. As Gustafson points out at the time the issue of Ukrainians being sacrificed to keep Germans and other Western Europeans warm was unknown in Western capitals. However, since the dissolution of the USSR this ‘gas sacrifice’ been known but remain overlooked.
13.The second illusion is the illusion of eastern riches. The deep belief in the potential opportunities of the riches of Russia is deeply embedded in German culture. It goes back at least to the days of Catherine the Great and her encouragement of Germans to emigrate to Russia
14. In the 19th century, the scale of German investment in Imperial Russia was the focus of much German hope and interest. This myth of the promise of Russia lives on in Germany’s prioritisation of its relationship with Russia and the prospects of commercial opportunities there.
15.This is despite the fact that there is no modern basis for such prioritisation. Ger exports far more to Pol, the Czechia and Hun than it does to Rus. In 2020 Ger exports to Pol were €64b, Czechia €39b & Hun €24b. By contrast 2020 exports to Rus were just €23b
16. One could argue that ‘eastern riches’ is really code for oil & gas imports. Oil however is a fungible international commodity. There is not much Rus specificity here. Furthermore, the demands of climate change & the EV revolution will undermine its role in global markets
17. Equally, notwithstanding current European temporary shortages, natural gas is now a plentiful commodity available from multiple sources and able to be traded internationally and also facing significant market shrinkage due to the demands of meeting climate change targets.
18.The third illusion is the memory of Ostpolitik. This was the process of normalising and improving relations with the former East Germany, other states within the Warsaw Pact and the USSR. Ostpolitik also plays a part in the legitimating German support for NS2.
19. However Ostpolitik was based on conditions that no longer apply. It was guided by Ger interests in making the division of Germ'y more bearable and keeping the prospect of eventual reunification open. For the USSR , it was a matter of achieving recognition of Yalta.
20. The problem with Ostpolitik in 2021 is that the Rus Fed is not the USSR. In the late CW period, the USSR within Europe was a pacific power whose aim was to just hold on to its territorial gains from WW2, this led to it renouncing the use of force in the Helsinki Final Act.
21. By contrast, the Rus Fed today is a disruptive power that seeks to overturn the European post-CW settlement, with Georgian conflict & continued occupations & occupations of both Crimea & eastern Ukraine. How is any of this consonant with Ostpolitik & the HFA?
22. It is far harder to develop co-operation projects with a power that seeks to overturn the existing European settlement. Offers of co-operation are far more likely to be used to further the objectives of creating division and undermining the stability of European democracies
23. We can see this clearly with NS2, it has successfully divided Germany from most of the rest of Europe and Germany from the US, all to Russia’s advantage. This is not Ostpolitik.
24. These three Germanic illusions sustained by guilt, the myth of eastern riches and Ostpolitik together also hide the extent of damage to Germany’s own real interests.
25. Currently Russian gas arrives in Germany from three routes. The Yamal pipeline (33bcm), NS1 (approx. 27bcm, can carry 55bcm) and the Ukrainian transit network (40bcm can carry 146bcm). This gives Germany three diverse supply routes.
26. If NS2 comes online then the Rus objective is to terminate the Ukr transit route (and if it cannot terminate the route the aim is reduce flows to an absolute minimum). Without a significant gas flow through the network it will be impossible to sustain much of the network
27. So in one step Germany will have managed to undermine its own route diversity. Instead of having three distinct supply routes, it will have reduced the number of routes from three to two. NS1 & NS2 for most of their distance take the same route.
28. Worse still because of the huge capacity of the Ukrainian network (146bcm plus 32bcm of storage). Ukraine provides the means to rapidly ramp up supply in cold winters, times of peak demand or in emergency. Germany (&EU) will lose that energy security hedge.
29. From the perspective of the Green Deal the loss of the Ukrainian network is also problematic. More renewables will require significant balancing capacity which the Ukrainian network with its immense surge capacity would be well placed to deliver
30. Given that NS1/NS2 together have less capacity than the Ukrainian network and limited storage availability they cannot provide the surge capacity to balance renewables in the same way as the Ukrainian network. Power generators will be forces in all likelihood to turn to coal.
31. It is also questionable from a physical security perspective as to how Berlin can think it is a good idea to place 110bcm of capacity pipelines (NS1 & NS2) running for most of the route along parallel lines in a shallow sea.
32. These pipelines are vulnerable & exposed and more difficult to fix if something goes wrong. There remains a real risk of accident, pipeline malfunction or terrorist attack-while having undermined the energy security provided by the vast capacity of the Ukr transit network.
33. These Germanic illusions provide cover for the undermining of Germany (and the EU’s) supply security. They damage the energy transition and help Russia to divide Europe.
34. Next week after the myths, and illusions, the realities of NS2, ends.
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