1. Digital Markets Act: I wonder in my latest Competition Law Insight article whether the US and EU should consider adopting a digital markets treaty. competitionlawinsight.com/competition-is…
2. One of the problems with the Digital Markets Act (DMA)is asymmetry. In essence the 'gatekeeper' platforms are likely to be all or substantially American. This does raise the issue of at least perceived bias. It also makes it unlikely the EU would ever use its break-up powers
3. However, it is clear that US opinion has shifted over the last few years in respect of the operation of the markets, culminating in the last few weeks in series of FTC, DOJ and state-initiated suits against the main US tech platforms.
4. Furthermore, the EU appears to be willing to consider wide-ranging co-operation with the US post-election, including on tech and digital markets according to the Communication the Commission published just before the US election: ec.europa.eu/info/sites/inf…
5. Given that the incoming Biden Administration are also interested in greater US-EU cooperation and there is a growing US-EU consensus on the need to regulate the major tech platforms there appears to be the political and policy space for a digital markets treaty.
6. From an EU perspective it removes the problems of asymmetry, from a US perspective it removes fears of bias and discrimination against its own platforms. For both, it opens up the prospect of open transatlantic digital market and a new growth engine-particularly for tech SMEs
7. Potentially the US & EU could go further and negotiate a digital treaty with all OECD states-the aim would be to create a global standard for the operation of digital markets. Such standards would inevitably become the global standards for tech companies and all tech markets.
8. One could also ask the question as to whether it would take any longer to adopt a treaty than enacting the DMA? It is likely to face delay in Brussels & a major battle before enactment for less impact than an OECD wide digital markets treaty would have. Ends.
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NS2 a response to Mr Wolfgang Munchau. Although I agree on a number of points with WM in his recent @spectator piece-I disagree with his central contention that NS2 is about more gas for Germany. There is no more gas & what gas there is not for Germany. Lengthy thread to follow.
1.WMs @EuroBriefing article has swallowed a huge dose of Russian (and indeed German) propaganda. Throughout the article WM refers to Nord Stream 2 as being vital to Germany because of the need for more Russian gas. This is incorrect.spectator.co.uk/article/biden-…
2.The key point about NS2 is that it is a diversionary pipeline. There is no new gas. This huge political effort by Russia and Germany to deliver NS2 will not bring a single extra molecule of gas to Germany.
1.The European Commission’s commitment to the energy transition is not in doubt. However, some of its proposed green measures are counter-productive. One good example is in respect of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). see my latest CIDOB article here: cidob.org/en/publication…
2. The ECT is the only multilateral investment treaty. It is a key mechanism to mobilise the immense amount of private capital necessary to deliver the global energy transition.
3.Yet the Commisson has indicated that unless its own green 'reforms' are accepted it will seek to withdraw the EU & its MS. This is positively counter-productive to the energy transition. The EU should be seeking to increase the number of states joining the ECT not reduce them
1. What do the latest sanctions contained in Section 6231 of the National Defence Authorisation Act 2021 mean for Nord Stream 2? What are the likely next steps for the US & EU in protecting European energy security?
2. As I explained recently in my CEPA article the new sanctions are likely to prove fatal to the pipeline. Laying undersea pipelines requires scarce technical skills & services-the sanctions target those skills & services. cepa.org/eu-us-energy-s…
3. The new sanctions target a broad range of pipe-laying services on which NS2 needs to rely for the delivery of the pipeline, including tech upgrades, insurance & certification. The key point here is that they focus on services where there are only a small number of suppliers
2. In @GeorgePeretzQC incisive article, he makes the often overlooked point in the UK debate that without a serious & enforceable UK state aid regime, the UK will be able to free-ride on the EU state aid regime...one cannot really expect the EU-27 to accept such a result
3. He also hones in on another overlooked point in the UK debate (at least political debate, the lawyers have noticed) that the effect of Arts 10 &12 of the Protocol where any UK measures that have an effect on trade between NI and the EU is still subject to EU State Aid regime
2. There is a lot of wailing from Gazprom lobbyists about the prospect of huge liabilities for Germany if the project is cancelled. However, it almost inconceivable that the Western energy companies financing NS2 did not receive direct or indirect forms of indemnification
3. If they did not do so it was wholly irresponsible for them to no to do so given the controversy and scale of opposition to NS2 across the EU, from 8 EU heads of gov opposing it to resolutions for cancellation in the European Parliament supported by large majorities.
1. Nord Stream 2: Can the EU or Germany (or indeed US, UK) be sued if sanctions are imposed on the pipeline? The short answer is no. The longer answer is below.
2. G lobbyists have said that if sanctions are imposed on NS2 there is not going to be a ‘snowball’ of litigation..no doubt the lobbyist team will be making all sorts of blood curdling noises of billion dollar claims
3. If damages claims were to be brought by NS2 they would either be direct actions the EU (as Germany is almost certainly going to seek sanctions via EU measures). Or damages claims under the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) against the EU.