Judges have arrived. Farmer QC et al for Borrowdale; Solicitor-General et al for govt (good to see SG appearing herself); NZLS intervening. Gallery full — except the broken seat (my favourite at the back right).
Housekeeping about order, timing and 10min non-interruption rule. Court takes different views on when NZLS should appear. Court suggests argument could be done in 1 day — but Farmer doubts. Wisely, Farmer engages 10min rule.
Farmer points to counter-factual of speedy enactment of legislation on eve of lockdown to give authority for stay-at-home orders. Instances of doing so on eve of lockdown pointed to, plus vaccination approval validation.
Farmer invites plain interpretation of section 70 of Health Act, augmented by principle of legality. Power, he says, didn’t allow DG to shutdown like he did.
PS I would make an awful court reporter. In the opening flurry, I didn’t manage to scribble down Farmer’s encapsulation of the parties’ cases — but, no surprises, it’s as per the snippets I posted earlier this morning.
Common law principle of legality gets rolled out. Worth reading my colleagues on this method — Geiringer on Hansen (esp interaction of s6 Bill of Rights version with purpose) and Wilberg on Borrowdale (esp whether subject to reasonable limits).
The basic imperative demanded by principle of legality (rights-consistent meaning) won’t be any surprise to these appellate judges. It’s their bread+butter. The action here is all about limits to that interpretive principle (text, purpose, reasonable limits).
I have a soft spot for this courtroom, even if it is very much “of its time”. So much warm wood and carpet. Square box-like wooden furniture for judges and counsel. Comfy disco lounge-type seats at the back for the trainspotters.
Cooper J seems to like this line. That is, first job is to properly construct legislation — in accordance with usual interpretative principles such as principle of legality.
In other words, orthodox common law interpretation happen before — and separate from — Bill of Rights Act interpretation. Ultra vires argument stands separate from Bill of Rights considerations.
IMV this doesn’t really help Borrowdale. The Bill of Rights analysis mimics common law principle of legality. And, ofc, s 5 of Interpretation Act 1999 directly throws purpose into the (ordinary, common law) interpretative mix too.
Hmmm. Any friendly coffee elves lurking out there? We break at 11:30am but there’s barely time for the dash to Greenland for a cheeky flat white. In Dicey’s name etc… ☕️
PS All this talk of Hansen reminds me the Supremes still haven’t released their ruling in Fitzgerald. I suspect the Bill of Rights methodology will be renovated there, esp — perhaps — a diminished role for purpose in the mix. All relevant to today’s argument.
The retro clock on the wall — just arms and dots embedded in the wooden wall panel — is also a favourite. Cutely juxtaposed just above the green emergency exit sign.
Extraordinary if that question was reopened and court required to appraise overall merits of lockdown. No wonder the Crown resisted (memo was filed objecting to attempt to roll back “concession”).
Cooper J points out his rights were no differently affected whether health order requiring him to stay-at-home whether made by minister or director-general of health.
Farmer is hanging a lot on the fact the C19 Public Health Response Act was amended to explicitly direct minister to satisfy themselves about Bill of Rights-consistency (s9(1)(ba)). Implication is rights consistency/protections weren’t in play without it.
This is an unreal submission! 1. S 13(2) expressly deals with substantive Bill of Rights Act consistency. 2. The purpose of Act nods to “proportionality”, which is key Bill of Rights calculus. 3. Bill of Rights consistency is hard-wired into govt mentality. #BorrowdaleRound2
The implication is that the govt — or, rather, the Director-General — didn’t grapple with rights-implications when making the health orders, because legislation didn’t so direct. That suggestion I very much doubt. 🤦🏼
Argument is that the text and purpose suggest that the special powers re infectious diseases are “targeted” powers, even in their long-standing history.
Curious, too, that Farmer Jr is reciting practice about how power has been exercised in the past (and is under C19 Act too) as factor relevant to how scope of power should be exercised. 🤷
Of course, as a good Christchurch chap, he wears a tie to court — unlike some of the local riff-raff…
Oops. That was lunch.
And now we’re back.
If I was Ian Smith or Danny Morrison, I might comment on the delicious ham-cheese-and-pickle toasted sandwich from @vicbks during the luncheon adjournment.
FWIW I’ve never thought this ground had legs — esp because, in fact, the closure was of *all-subject-to-exceptions* which doesn’t really differ to *some*.
Farmer Jr seems to be drawing a distinction between delegation for operational purposes and legislative purposes — a distinction Joseph makes in his text I understand (and a point I don’t quite understand why it matters).
I don’t get this argument. But then I’ve been used to the standard practice of reserving matters to be determined by officials by reference to standards in resource consents. Newbury etc.
The problem is that this argument is being made in the abstract — without direct challenges to way exception was applied in practice in particular cases. I suspect there were some rough and messy calls made. But that’s a different type of challenge and evidence. #BorrowdaleRound2
Farmer Jr complains “essential to the provision of necessities of life” is a hard standard to apply — such that it lets officials make up their one mind.
I don’t buy this — it’s clearly a standard of some moment and necessarily constraining.
There may have been instances where the exception definition was misapplied in practice — but I don’t think that upsets the framing of that definition/exception.
NZLS is only taking points not raised by others. 1. whether s70 power subject to implicit temporal limitation (agreeing with govt/HC that it does); 2. whether delegation to officials inapprop incorp by reference (differing from HC / agreeing with Borrowdale). #BorrowdaleRound2
We’re now onto High Court’s “comma” reasoning, ie stop reading exemption definition at comma — and not “as specified on the website”.
Honestly, I’ve never really been convinced by that, even if front-end part is capable of doing all the heavy lifting.
Collins J ponders a counter-factual — should the officials committee have made individual recommendations to DG for him to sign off on. (Wise approach but not the one done in practice.)
Stephens takes Court through the rather awkward printed list of essential businesses from website as at 26 March 2020 — argues that the reasonable impression would have been that the list is authoritative.
I was moved in awe at what a massive exercise it was to parse which businesses were essential and those that were not. While the walls were falling down around them. Amazing.
I suspect govt folk would frame that work in different ways if done again — it’s legally messy (and could well be criticised in this appeal) but they were standing up an entirely new regime overnight.
Apologies to my fellow trainspotters but core uni duties (our first LAWS213 classes on admin law and judicial review) trump spectating today — so I’m dipping in-and-out of the hearing
I’ll try and catch up on events at the tea break. But the NZLS has finished and now the Solictor-General, Jagose QC, is on her feet leading the govt’s case.
The legal challenge to New Zealand’s C19 lockdown in Mar/Apr 2020 continues in Court of Appeal today, after Borrowdale challenges two grounds he lost before High Court (scope of health orders; essential businesses list). Snippets below explain background. #BorrowdaleRound2
Snippets are from a note of mine:
“Stamping out Covid-19 in New Zealand: legal pragmatism and democratic legitimacy” [2021] Public Law 241.
Whether the Health Act power to “isolate or quarantine” people allows a medical officer of health to issue a stay-at-home order for the entire country, regardless of suspicion of infection, is key issue IMV.
High Court declines to grant interim orders stopping vaccine roll out in New Zealand, in wide-ranging judicial review challenge to provisional approval of Pfizer vaccine and roll out.
However, Court observes that it is "reasonably arguably" that provisional approval is "problematic" because s 23 of the Medicines Act 1981 contemplates provisional approval only for "treatment of a limited number of patients" (~ all those 16+ prob not limited number).
That question will ultimately be decided, in the usual way, at the substantive hearing of application for judicial review. The judge's comments about whether there is a *reasonably arguable* case are not definitive, ie only for interim purposes after limited argument/evidence.
Our #laws522 postgrad class @VicUniWgtn convenes today to dive into and critique some hot public law scholarship — ideas, anatomy, argument and context. Always an exciting (and heady) day! 🤓
First up @PeterTMcKenzie, grappling with McLean’s sketch of NZ’s political (“insider, elite”) constitution - and the threat from legalism. #laws522
Next, @HannahReynecke dips into Harlow’s piece on the (redundant?) public—private divide — and challenges in bridging the spheres, esp in context of digitisation. (But what of te Tiriti?)
A quick recap on New Zealand’s constitutional brouhaha this week about the election date, as requested by some abroad. /1
Election day was scheduled for 19 Sep 2020. In accordance with a developing convention (?), the PM had announced this date well in advance, in late January. /2
Despite the pandemic, progress towards that date was going full steam ahead — esp as NZ had avoided community cases of Covid for several months. Campaigns were launched. Arrangements were made for campaigning and voting etc. /3
Some are suggestions there might be a constitutional imbroglio today around PM’s call on whether election should or should not be deferred due to the lockdown in Auckland etc. I reckon it will probably turn out to be a bit of a fizzer! 🤷🏻♂️
PM has sole right to advise GG to dissolve Parliament for election. The previous process to do so was paused just prior to formal ceremony due to alert level change. We’ll know at 10am today what the PM’s intends to do — or, if she sticks with dissolution, perhaps has done.
Dissolution for an election is not subject to usual Cabinet decision-making deliberation (I understand) but PM will be mindful of views of others - incl views of coalition partner NZ First which wants it delayed. It’s still her sole call though.