Thread by @ThreshedThought

Events are moving very fast in Afghanistan. Time for another thread:

What is the role of China now and in the future?

(Apologies to those expecting some thoughts on counter-narcotics but events are moving very fast)

Some basics:

- Afghanistan and China share a 76km border between Badakhshan and Xinjiang Provinces;
- There is no official border crossing point, and the route is mountainous;

and ...

Like all of Afg's borders it was drawn during the geopol tensions in the 1800s known as the great game. The Wakhan Corridor (the finger-like bit of Afg that points to China) and the Chinese border were created in order to keep the British and Russian spheres of influence separate

Yet despite sharing a border, Afghanistan and China seem to have shared a fairly low key relationship over the years.

I guess this is a result of the Afghan government first aligning with the Soviets (roughly 1970-1994) and then the West (2001-?). The Chinese weren't particularly friendly with the Taliban government in between for reasons that we will explore below.

(And before this, there was a group of Afghan Maoists in the 1960s, but they never really came to prominence. The Afghan communists were dominated by those with links to the Soviets. The Chinese were very internally focussed during the 1960s which may have contributed to this).

But China has been looking at Afghanistan. It has concluded that it has real interests there.

Many could argue that China's interests in Afghanistan are greater than ever the West's were.

Broadly those interests fall into 3 themes:

- The Chinese see Afghanistan as a key route for its Belt and Road Initiative.
- Afghanistan has largely untapped mineral wealth including lithium, cobalt, copper etc. All stuff that will become increasingly important

TBC

Cont'd

- Islamist terrorism, and particularly links between Uighurs (that China call terrorists) and the Taliban (whom many have called terrorists over the years).

In a sense, China has benefited from the macro security and stability that the US provided to pursue a few small natural resource projects:

e.g. the Mes Aynak copper mines near Kabul ($4.5bn paid for a 30yr lease in 2007) and the $300m Amu Darya petroleum project in the north

It has also got several BRI plans that it is actively considering

Afghanistan sits upon the actual route of the still-at-feasibility-stage central belt (running from China to the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean, also known as the ‘Five Nations Railway’).

China also announced earlier in 2019 that Afghanistan will be linked into the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, a US$62bn series of infrastructure projects originally designed to link China to Pakistani seaports.

(Initially, the plan is to increase road and rail connectivity between Pakistan and Afghanistan, but eventual plans could include connecting Pakistan to Central Asian energy markets.)

Finally, Afghanistan borders the planned northern ‘belt’ (running through central Asia to Russia/Europe).

Leaving aside terrorism for a moment, all of these plans require a more stable Afghanistan that there currently is (and Afghanistan is becoming more unstable).

A really unstable Afghanistan could even threaten the stability of neighbouring countries.

Look at what happened at the w/e:

pajhwok.com/2021/07/05/ove…

My impression was that since the US announced its withdrawal / signed the 'peace deal' with the Taliban in Feb 2020, China has been assessing the situation, meeting with as many people on multiple sides, and generally formulating its plan.

See here for some thoughts on the 'peace deal'

https://twitter.com/ThreshedThought/status/1388466855396798464?s=20

But events are moving fast than anyone expected.

Tens of districts have fallen from Afg Gov control, in many cases due to ANSF not being supplied, or pro-gov militias switching sides.

See here for an excellent round up:

afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/war…

It is clear that the Afghan government, or many within it, had not prepared for the US to follow through and actually leave.

nytimes.com/2021/07/02/wor…

Suffice it to say, the US have also acted pretty despicably during the withdrawal. There appears to have been no coordination with the UN, nor with the Afghan security forces / government.

Inexcusably it appears to have also manifested in stuff like this, which is a disgrace.

https://twitter.com/ThreshedThought/status/1412131639870705668?s=20

In strict military terms, it is professional to withdraw in 'good order'. This is anything but. In political terms, it is a disaster for the US and its allies.

But what about China?

My feeling is that the speed of events unfolding have forced them to think harder about their planning.

How do they intend to realise these geopolitical interests that they have in Afghanistan?

And they are definitely thinking about it, otherwise you wouldn't have pieces like this on the Chinese state broadcaster:

news.cgtn.com/news/2021-07-0…

And after recent talks, the Afghan government is planning on building a road towards China, up the Wakhan corridor. It will take 18 months apparently.

arabnews.com/node/1863386/w…

(One wonders if the Afg Gov is using US money to build a road to China)

But this happened before the events of this weekend, where most of Badakhshan Province fell to the Taliban after (it is rumoured) the pro-government militias simply switched sides.

See here:

https://twitter.com/bsarwary/status/1411589248885657603?s=20

Previously China has said that it is training a 'mountain brigade' for the Wakhan Corridor ('for', not 'in', it stressed).

I wonder if any Chinese-trained troops switched sides?

This 'mountain brigade' is meant to help in counter-terrorism efforts

See here:

reuters.com/article/china-…

So this brings us to the crux of China's dilemma, and almost impossible set of decisions it has to make (welcome to being a 'super' power I guess):

China has geopolitical aims in Afghanistan. Yet it can't realise them without establishing basic (framework/macro) security.

How does it also balance relations with the Taliban, whilst it is also suppressing Uighurs in Xinjiang, just across the border?

Historically the Taliban worked with and fought with the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) - these are Uighurs from Xinjiang. In fact, the Taliban even refused in the 1990s to hand over some Uighur fighters to the Chinese government.

(It is not clear what the current links are between the Uighurs/ETIM and the Taliban, but the history is there).

This is one delicate balance for China.

Another is Pakistan.

Now, on the surface, the China-Afg-Pak triangle could be a friendly one. But this has the danger of drawing in India into Afghanistan (long-standing links and relationships there), and Pakistan has a habit of not being anyone's proxy.

Not as difficult as the first balance, but something to consider.

But the most difficult thing is how China achieves its aims without any security in Afghanistan.

And it may be tempted to get involved. Thinking that it can do better than the US and its allies.

(There is barely disguised contempt in Beijing for the US which it views as totally decadent and collapsing)

There is another word for this: hubris.

This is what normally causes people to make mistakes.

And this hubris will be reinforced by plenty of people in the Afghan government, and outside it, like @KarzaiH who will be whispering into Chinese ears ...

'we never like the Americans, we're so glad your interested in getting involved; oh if only the Afghan Maoists had been successful in the 1960s etc etc.'

Like @KarzaiH here

news.cgtn.com/news/2021-07-0…

China may well find itself in an ever increasing intervention in the name of terrorism, or trade, or whatever. It may think that it can avoid the pitfalls that others have fallen into.

I doubt this very much - Socialism with Chinese Characteristics is one of the most statist approaches to government in the world. I don't think that is going to wash in Afghanistan (look at how China is doing with integrating its own minorities).

But hubris is hubris, and it is very powerful. It will be fascinating to see what China will do.

I wrote an article on some of this a while ago

unherd.com/2020/01/will-c…

And a book on southern Afghanistan a longer while ago

amazon.co.uk/Intimate-War-H…

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