Thread by @profalanriley1

1.This is third thread in respect of my @HjsOrg paper on Nord Stream 2: Myths, Illusions and Realities (the two earlier thread links can be found at the end of this thread)henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/upl…

2. This final thread focuses on the realties of NS2. There are three realities, German, European and British.

3. Starting with the German realities. Aside from the gas supply & security issue (there is actually no new German gas from NS2 and it reduces Germany’s route diversity from three to two pipeline routes-for more on this see threads 1 and 2) there is the reputational issue

4. Berlin has promoted a project that undermines the actual supply security of EU/NATO member states. It has pursued this project over the opposition the opposition of many EU states & the US, and the European Parliament which has supported its cancellation in four separate votes

5. This has made Berlin very unpopular in EU Council. Germany even could not find a blocking minority of states to stop the EU adopting legislation formally extending the EU’s energy liberalisation regime to import pipelines such as NS2.

6.None of this EU & transatlantic opposition has deterred Germany from continuing with the project. The consequence has been a significant loss of trust in the German political establishment across the West.

7. It is an open question as to whether Brexit or NS2 done more to damage EU Member States trust in the UK and Germany respectively.

8.The British Brexiters may by unhinged and/or ideological but at least they did not work hand in hand with a hostile power to undermine the security of other European states

9. Worse still this reputational damage is likely to persist as NS2 moves into its litigation phase and Germany finds itself defending its regulatory decisions in respect of the pipeline before the EU courts.

10.NS2 has also damaged Germany’s green reputation. Berlin did not undermine its reputation in the EU/US to deliver a massive roll out of electric cars or a hi-tech grid to manage renewable power. Instead it took on all that loss of reputation for yet another gas pipeline!

11.The second reality involves recognising the damage that NS2 has done to the hopes for the development of European Strategic Autonomy (ESA).

12.The recent impetus for ESA revolves around the growing influence of China, Russian aggression and the destabilising effects of the Trump presidency.

13.However, the controversy over NS2 has had a very negative impact on the development of ESA. Berlin’s behaviour over NS2 raises the question of whether Germany, the EU’s richest and most powerful state is willing to recognise and respect other EU states key security interests.

14. This is particularly concerning where Germany is seeking to do a deal with an authoritarian third state that has hostile intentions towards a number of EU states and to the EU itself.

15.This concern extends to Germany’s relationship with China where it may be more concerned with protecting its €22 billion trade surplus than the security interests of other states or the values of the EU.

16.The most recent example is the steamrollering of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment with China through EU Council in the last days of the German Presidency.

17. Unfortunately for Berlin subsequently the CCP suppressed HK’s liberties, saw more evidence emerge as to the terrible treatment of the Uyghur population in Xinjiang province and to top it all the CCP sanctioned 5 MEPs resulted in the whole CAI process being frozen

18. Germany’s preference for its perceived commercial interests with Russia and China over the security interests of the Member States and values of the EU raise serious doubts as to how a credible ESA can be developed.

19. At best it is likely that the Union will be left with seeking to strengthen the capabilities of the EU by deepening the single market; enhancing its regulatory power & improving supply chain resilience which will give it more room to manoeuvre against other powers.

20. A broader ESA which allows the EU to develop its own foreign and security policies is now much less likely, and one major factor is Berlin’s approach to NS2. Any attempt to move in this direction would need very firm guarantees to protect the interests of other EU MS

21. The third reality is British. Brexit or no Brexit, Britain cannot remain in splendid isolation on its island looking across the Channel. Its own security is intimately connected to the continent and expressed in its acceptance of its NATO Article 5 obligations.

22. If NS2 succeeds in being brought into full operation the supply security of several NATO states will be undermined and Russian influence enhanced. Worse still the success of NS2 will further embolden the Russian state.

23. From the Kremlin’s perspective despite US opposition and that of a number of EU states, and in the teeth of its invasion of Georgia and Ukraine the Kremlin would see that it could push the project to a successful conclusion

24. The lesson that the Kremlin will draw from a successful conclusion to the NS2 project is that the European states are weak, or can be co-opted, and that the Americans are losing their influence on the continent.

25. A successful conclusion (from a Russian perspective) to NS2 will indicate to Russia that it could, with relative impunity, increase the pressure on NATO states on its eastern edge, all of which the UK is pledged to ultimately defend under Article 5

26. The UK also has a significant security interest in Ukraine. As long as Ukraine remains an independent sovereign state, Russia’s capacity to attack NATO states, by military or hybrid means, remains much more limited.

27. This security interest has already been recognised in the Comprehensive Political, Free Trade and Strategic Partnership signed by Prime Minister Boris Johnson and President Zelenskyi in October 2020.

28. Notably, the package included military support including a £1.25 billion in foreign export credit for a naval shipbuilding programme constructed to NATO standards to include a missile cruiser and frigates for the under-powered Ukrainian navy.

29. The hard reality here is that the cost of engagement now with NS2, and the manifold other security threats emanating from Moscow is much lower than ignoring them only to then have to repel these threats later at a much higher cost.

30. The UK can work with the states of CE Europe, Ukraine, the EU and the US to enhance regional security. For instance, whatever happens with NS2, the West should be looking at developing a proactive energy security strategy to disarm Russian energy power across the region

31. This would involve further integration of EU/Ukrainian energy markets in the gas sector, including LNG. It would also involve providing alternatives to Russian gas by completing electricity synchronisation, strengthening the grid networks, and rolling out more renewables.

32. Given the UK’s historic role and experience in energy liberalisation across Europe, its experience in the renewable sector and its range of experienced energy investor funds, London could play a significant role in improving regional supply security.

33. The UK can also play a major role across several other fronts, including by promoting the rule of law, anti-corruption and anti-disinformation policies across the region. All such engagement in co-operation with key allies will reduce the scale and number of security threats

34. Proactive engagement is surely a much cheaper strategy than the alternative of reacting after the security situation has already dramatically worsened

35. The previous two threads on this paper can be found here. The first myths thread can be found here

https://twitter.com/profalanriley1/status/1410481151727357953

The second illusion thread can be found here

https://twitter.com/profalanriley1/status/1411976233013940227

Ends.