COVID-19 meant devastating shortages of personal protective equipment (PPE), like masks, gowns and gloves. What happened to trade, the unprecedented trade and industrial policy to emerge, as well as lessons learned for future preparedness.
When COVID-19 struck China first (in Wuhan, Hubei province), China's immediate demand for PPE took a lot off of global markets.
Take hospital masks and protective garments.
International markets at the time worked as expected: China imported more, and exported less... 4/
COVID-19 was a PERFECT STORM of events for some pieces of PPE.
The pandemic arose in Hubei, the largest exporting PROVINCE, in the largest exporting COUNTRY, of the protective garments to be needed globally by hospital workers.
Including in the EU and the United States... 5/
Now, by April, China's PPE exports resumed and then took off.... 6/
Realistically, from April through the rest of 2020, China's PPE exports to the world were amazing.
In volume terms, China's PPE exports were enormous, likely saving thousands and thousands of American lives
(The massive price increase shows scarcity still a problem... 7/)
March and April were the beginnings of EXTRAORDINARY trade and industrial policy.
Start in March with the European Union. PPE shortages led it to impose export controls... 8/
PPE shortages in the United States resulted in the April 2020 invocation of the Defense Production Act (DPA).
Part I: US directs 3M to ship more N-95 respirators to the US from its plants in China (Shanghai)... 9/
PPE shortages in the United States resulted in April 2020 invocation of the Defense Production Act.
Part II: US uses DPA to impose export controls on masks, respirators and gloves. INITIALLY, the limits applied to exports going to Canada and Mexico, before being revised... 10/
PPE shortages led to INDUSTRIAL POLICY.
Department of Defense made $1.2 billion of subsidies over the next year to directly expand domestic PPE production capacity for masks, respirators, gowns, gloves, and key inputs along the US supply chain.
AMAZING! 11/
My takeaways:
In the face of a global pandemic that created a surge in demand for PPE, an optimal policy mix for a major industrial economy should have involved three (3) components... 12/
(1) Incentivize domestic industry to quickly add capacity and surge production.
COVID-19: WHAT TOOK SO LONG?
The US did this, but for most products expansion subsidies did not start until second half of 2020.
What supply chain information is needed to do better?
13/
(2) For the period in which surge capacity is not yet available, rely on stockpiled PPE...
TO DO:
a) Determine socially optimal stockpile SIZE
b) Regulators ensure hospitals, distributors, and states—in addition to the federal government—MAINTAIN inventory of that size
14/
(3) For the period in which surge capacity is not yet available, rely on IMPORTS...
TO DO:
US and partners must have a more diversified portfolio of foreign production for PPE.
Trade can be a tool for preparedness only if there is trust between the importer and exporter
15/
How COVID-19 medical supply shortages led to extraordinary trade and industrial policy
Lots of lessons to be learned to help us do better next time.
In my 10 years as a professor, I struggled to find material on contemporary policy issues for my SYLLABUS.
The speed & novelty of today's policy changes impacting trade make the challenge **YOU** face even greater.
Here is a small attempt to help... 1/🧵
Here are four (IV) papers. Each...
• contains a positive explanation of what happened
• leans heavily (and makes available) data
• admittedly raises more questions than it answers
(though, since the policy issues remain unresolved, perhaps that is a feature, not a bug...) 2/
I. COVID-19 VACCINES: How dozens of companies at nearly 100 geographically distributed sites came together to form supply chains to manufacture billions of doses from Pfizer/BioNTech, Moderna, AstraZeneca, Johnson & Johnson, Novavax, and CureVac... 3/
CureVac's COVID-19 mRNA vaccine may not be salvageable. However, the company's brand new manufacturing supply chain - capable of delivering 1 billion doses - should be. But doing so requires creative industry / policymaker collaboration.
On April 15, CureVac had announced its supply chain was on track to manufacture 300 million doses of its mRNA vaccine by the end of 2021 and another 1 billion doses in 2022, upon regulatory approval.
How in the world did we end up with billions of doses of COVID-19 vaccines manufactured by Pfizer/ BioNTech, Moderna, AstraZeneca, and Johnson & Johnson?
Roughly 4 billion doses of COVID-19 vaccines have now been administered worldwide. Most required a two-dose regimen—if that trajectory continued, close to 14 billion shots would be needed to inoculate the global population. 2/
Getting a new vaccine from beginning to end — from concept to delivering shots into the public’s arms — requires five steps associated with five, largely separable, sets of fixed costs. 3/
Chip shortage! The Biden administration and US allies have now committed to work together on semiconductor policy. That will prove hard. Why it's needed, and where to start.
The chip shortage facing automakers heightened the issue's seriousness. But the supply of semiconductors was at risk long before the pandemic, and COVID-19 is only partly to blame for today’s problems.
One of the biggest culprits was a sudden shift in US trade policy... 2/
Trump imposed 25% trade war tariffs on semiconductors beginning in July 2018. The US now imports **half as many** semiconductors from China as it did pre-trade war. (That's billions of fewer chips).
Those missing chips have NOT been replaced by imports from elsewhere... 3/
March: White House and European Commission set up a liaison between Jeffrey Zients and Thierry Breton to help overcome input shortages facing vaccine makers on both sides of the Atlantic... 2/10
April: CureVac CEO complains about lack of access to inputs, blaming the Defense Production Act:
“Be it chemicals, equipment, filters or hoses: US manufacturers are obliged first to meet American demand, and that means we are slipping down the list” 3/10
"Now that borders are opening up, and all the manufacturers have been trying to increase their capacity- whether it's for filters, whether it's 2000 L bags or media...
This is an industry-wide problem.
...And we're getting better availability of product. It's still tight.
In normal times you would want six months worth of raw material inventory in a production plant, and we don't have that.