How in the world did we end up with billions of doses of COVID-19 vaccines manufactured by Pfizer/ BioNTech, Moderna, AstraZeneca, and Johnson & Johnson?
Roughly 4 billion doses of COVID-19 vaccines have now been administered worldwide. Most required a two-dose regimen—if that trajectory continued, close to 14 billion shots would be needed to inoculate the global population. 2/
Getting a new vaccine from beginning to end — from concept to delivering shots into the public’s arms — requires five steps associated with five, largely separable, sets of fixed costs. 3/
When you think about vaccines, perhaps Big Pharma comes to mind.
Big, integrated pharmaceutical companies certainly played a role during the pandemic. But Big Pharma was far from the dominant model for how COVID-19 vaccine manufacturing scaled up... 4/
Contract development and manufacturing organizations (CDMOs) could be hired to handle just the production, covering the third or fourth steps of the process of figure 1.
CDMOs like Lonza and Catalent played incredibly important roles in manufacturing during the pandemic... 5/
How exactly did the COVID-19 vaccine manufacturing supply chains of Pfizer/BioNTech, Moderna, AstraZeneca/Oxford, Johnson & Johnson, Novavax and CureVac emerge in 2020 and 2021?
Most started from scratch, long before their vaccines were authorized by regulators... 6/
For Pfizer and BioNTech, production initially took place through a web of existing plants, most of them belonging to Pfizer.
But when demand boomed, they quickly expanded their supply network... 7/
FUN FACT:
In March the Financial Times reported that UK exports of lipid nanoparticles to the Pfizer/BioNTech plants in the EU was the input dependence that kept the European Commission from imposing export restrictions on AstraZeneca vaccines.
The data confirm this... 8/
Moderna took a very different approach from Pfizer and BioNTech to create its manufacturing supply chain.
Unlike those companies, it had to start from scratch, contracting Lonza and other CDMOs to scale up as demand for its vaccine also grew... 9/
FUN FACT:
Data confirm a substantial increase in exports of vaccines from Switzerland to first Spain and then France in 2021, consistent with Moderna’s drug product being exported to those two countries for fill and finish... 10/
AstraZeneca was at the heart of four controversies—each a case study of vaccine manufacturing problems.
AstraZeneca built a very different global supply network from, say, Pfizer.
It coordinated multiple CDMOs, rather than operating as an integrated pharma company... 11/
One AZ controversy involved the Serum Institute of India (SII).
SII curtailed exports to COVAX. Its CEO also accused the US of imposing an “embargo of raw material exports".
Although input shortages likely affected SII, there was never a US export embargo...12/
AstraZeneca’s most public spat was perhaps with the European Union. It was caught in the crossfire of Brexit, the departure of Britain from the European Union that was finally nearing completion after five years of acrimonious, on-and-off negotiations...13/
Johnson & Johnson developed its supply chains through a network of CDMOs, in addition to its Leiden plant.
Despite a seemingly successful supply chain setup, the Johnson & Johnson vaccine ran into challenges, none bigger than the Emergent BioSolutions plant in Baltimore... 14/
Novavax developed a supply chain strategy similar to the AstraZeneca model.
However, despite promising clinical trials, regulators have not yet authorized its vaccine for use.
Was Novavax tying up facilities that could be used for other vaccines...15/
CureVac is a German biotech that developed a promising mRNA COVID-19 candidate similar to BioNTech/Pfizer and Moderna.
But in June, CureVac reported devastating Phase 3 data.
What to do with that supply chain capable of producing 300m doses in 2021 and 1b doses in 2022? ... 16/
Then, there were the policy interventions. Billions of dollars of government support
• US Operation Warp Speed and the Defense Production Act
• United Kingdom
• European Union, Germany, other governments
• CEPI
This is how the global supply chains for 6 different COVID-19 vaccines emerged to quickly scale up production during the pandemic.
But these experiences raise six (6) additional questions... 18/
1) Were at-risk investments sufficiently large, diverse & geographically distributed?
2) Was there excessive concentration of input suppliers & insufficient public investment upstream?
3) In the face of scarcity, were inputs & available capacity reallocated efficiently?
... 19/
4) How did learning by doing arise? Within firms? Across plants? Across firms?
5) How did CDMOs and the modular, fragmented structure of the industry affect scaling up?
6) Did international interdependence prevent worse outcomes from arising?
...20/
That's where we are.
US and EU increasingly administered the mRNA vaccines. Take-up of Johnson & Johnson was much more limited. In the EU, AstraZeneca peaked in mid-April at roughly 22% percent of all doses administered. (The US did not authorize AstraZeneca for use.)
...21/
Elsewhere the story was different:
• India's vaccinations were dominated by SII’s local production of AstraZeneca
• China administered only domestic vaccines from Sinovac & Sinopharm
• Africa administered only about 60m doses, covering about 3% of its population... 22/
As increasingly detailed data emerge, additional research must shed light on two critical questions:
Could more vaccine doses have been manufactured more quickly some other way?
Would alternative policy choices have made a difference? ENDS/
Chip shortage! The Biden administration and US allies have now committed to work together on semiconductor policy. That will prove hard. Why it's needed, and where to start.
The chip shortage facing automakers heightened the issue's seriousness. But the supply of semiconductors was at risk long before the pandemic, and COVID-19 is only partly to blame for today’s problems.
One of the biggest culprits was a sudden shift in US trade policy... 2/
Trump imposed 25% trade war tariffs on semiconductors beginning in July 2018. The US now imports **half as many** semiconductors from China as it did pre-trade war. (That's billions of fewer chips).
Those missing chips have NOT been replaced by imports from elsewhere... 3/
March: White House and European Commission set up a liaison between Jeffrey Zients and Thierry Breton to help overcome input shortages facing vaccine makers on both sides of the Atlantic... 2/10
April: CureVac CEO complains about lack of access to inputs, blaming the Defense Production Act:
“Be it chemicals, equipment, filters or hoses: US manufacturers are obliged first to meet American demand, and that means we are slipping down the list” 3/10
"Now that borders are opening up, and all the manufacturers have been trying to increase their capacity- whether it's for filters, whether it's 2000 L bags or media...
This is an industry-wide problem.
...And we're getting better availability of product. It's still tight.
In normal times you would want six months worth of raw material inventory in a production plant, and we don't have that.
US government was accused of banning exports of vaccine-making supplies, most notably to India. New supply chain data reveals there was never a US export ban. But the episode highlights a problem demanding new policy.