For the people who have been following the search for the #OriginsOfCovid the House Science Committee hearing is now discussing questions on the matter (opening remarks by each expert just concluded).
Live video available here!
1st question is about setting ground rules or treaties for the country of origin/first detection to share data in the event of outbreaks.
There are currently only ad hoc international collaborations. One of the best is @ProMED_mail that notifies global members of outbreaks.
@ProMED_mail 2nd question is about @TheLancet@NatureMedicine letters dismissing lab origin hypotheses as conspiracy theories or saying no lab-based scenario is plausible. Were these statements of scientific fact, consensus, or opinion?
In response, @DavidRelman answers that the letter had a chilling effect on certain elements of public discussion but understands where many of the letter writers were coming from; it was a reasonable assumption that SARS-CoV-2 also had a natural origin based on prior pandemics.
But he adds that when scientists make these statements, we must make clear the basis and remaining uncertainty, and what we need to do to disprove the counter argument or prove our own. There was much too little of that.
It's possible that a natural virus may have infected research personnel during fieldwork or in the lab without them even being aware that they have encountered this virus.
But we haven't had a proper discussion about where there may be risk in a subset of pathogen experiments...
In the study of viruses poised for emergence in human beings, sometimes chimeric viruses are built to characterize new genes and viruses found in nature.
There needs to be more deliberation on this type of work before undertaking more of it.
And now someone else is reading a statement from President Trump... Why? This is a House Science Committee hearing.
And, a question about how to prevent new SARS2 variants from emerging... again, why? Isn't this hearing about the #OriginsOfCovid?
Ok, now a question about how trust is built among scientists, to know they're getting accurate information.
Dr. Price says the host country is the one that invites other scientists in and is the one that takes the lead. Scientists outside that country are just consultants.
Back to origins, question on how the #OriginsOfCovid can be investigated without collaboration from China. And how US federal agencies can collaborate to investigate.
Why is it so important to investigate?
Relman says there are 4 benefits:
1. Devote resources and design strategies to prevent future pandemic
2. Learn how to better investigate outbreaks
3. Deflect recriminations
4. If lab origin, compel discussions of research risks
Every place, including outside of China, that has data or information related to the virus and early events needs to make these transparent.
Next question: We've just seen a biological threat bring the world to its knees. As we prepare for natural pathogens, we need to also think about manmade pathogens that intentionally or unintentionally emerge.
US should sponsor international discussions, involving not just scientists in the field, but also other experts to carefully regulate research on biological threats.
@DavidRelman Question on the WIV's live virus work at a low biosafety level & photos of researchers handling bats without appropriate PPE. Does this warrant investigation?
Relman says this type of work was approved by their own government, emphasizing the need for international coordination.
@DavidRelman Next question: given Peter Daszak's ties to the Wuhan lab, are there credibility issues with the WHO study on the #OriginsOfCovid?
A question for Stanley Perlman, if he still stands by the 2020 @TheLancet paper.
Perlman said the world was different back then and the world was divided into manmade vs natural origin. Now everything is more nuanced.
Question: How can an investigation be conducted free of CCP influence?
Dr Suzan Murray says the more we can develop a robust dataset independent of governments, the more we can gain a better understanding.
Question: what is the gain of making chimeric viruses?
Dr Relman says we can study new genes found in natural viruses in less risky ways without generating chimeric viruses with unpredictable outcomes.
Question to Perlman about @TheLancet letter again, influencing media and big tech that banned discussion on lab origin.
Perlman said the letter was based on the notion that the virus was made from scratch, but that was not defined well enough in the letter.
Question: How can we uphold the highest biosafety standards not just in the US but internationally?
Relman says the finest regulations alone are not sufficient, need incentives to bring attention to this issue.
Relman elaborates the 2 properties that matter most in defining risky pathogen work: the pathogen's ability to do harm and the ability to transmit easily.
Does not like "gain-of-function" ie a confusing term used in confusing ways.
Discussion of risk assessment of spillover whether in nature or in the lab.
Answers: It's important.
Question: How would scientists like political leaders to speak about these issues in a way that maximizes scientists' ability to do their work effectively?
The scientist witnesses emphasize importance of sci comm, focus on data (not politics), humility, not pointing fingers.
Question: How to re-establish protocol to convince society that scientists can make appropriate conclusions?
Relman points to issues around governance, sci comm, scientific process, expertise that need attention especially from the subcommittee on investigations & oversight.
The hearing closed, but we did not hear about the statement from the American Society for Microbiology that was entered into the hearing record. Will this statement be made public?
It's public:
"We caution against adopting policy changes absent scientific evidence, because doing so could further undermine the public’s confidence in science." asm.org/Articles/Polic…
h/t @R_H_Ebright
"ASM, with the support of fellow science organizations and institutions, issued the following letter to the House Appropriations Committee urging them to reject attempts to impose restrictions on federally funded research..."
"... or the operations of federal science agencies based on premature conclusions about how the pandemic emerged. Such efforts could have serious, negative unintended consequences for potentially lifesaving research."
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On the earliest covid cases, WHO is correcting virus sequence IDs & clarifying the 1st cluster was not linked to Huanan Seafood Market, but did not explain why the 1st patient who lived in Wuchang (near WIV) was mapped elsewhere in the WHO-China report. washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pac…
This report suggests to me that the @washingtonpost has a better handle on highly important details of the early covid cases in Wuhan than the @WHO
Can we please have a different organization convene and lead an international investigation into the #OriginsOfCovid ?
We can't have any more unintended editing errors muddling the sequences, locations, and exposure factors of the earliest Covid-19 cases.
This is not conducive to understanding when the virus first emerged and what potential sources might have been.
The wording of this letter by ASM & Partners could have been much more precise rather than scientists rejecting "attempts to impose restrictions on federally funded research... based on premature conclusions about how the pandemic emerged." asm.org/Articles/Polic…
The title "Don't Restrict Valid Pathogen Research" was not in the letter shared with me, but I agree valid research should not be impacted.
The problem is how do the people in charge decide what is valid pathogen research vs what is pathogen research with more risk than benefit?
I don't know who is signing this letter (it's just a string of associations and societies) and maybe that is for the best.
It will be up to scientists who are members of these associations to ask them why this letter was submitted on their behalf.
According to the China-WHO joint study: "Compared with the entire population in Wuhan by age and gender (Fig. 6), the “40-”, “50-” and “60-” age groups accounted for a higher proportion among the 174 [earliest Dec 2019] cases (70.7% vs 42.3%)." who.int/publications/i…
Having difficulty following this timeline:
December 30, 2019.
Shi is called by WIV director to investigate novel SARSrCoV causing atypical pneumonia in Wuhan.
Hops on train back to Wuhan.
Goes through her lab’s records. “I had not slept a wink for days.” scientificamerican.com/article/how-ch…
Within first days of Jan 2020, the WIV had obtained the full genome of SARS2. They were investigating the ICU cases, worried about SARS2 evolving to become more transmissible among humans. They knew little about the virus, source or specific treatment. biorxiv.org/content/10.110…
Some scientists are worried that the lab leak hypothesis, even if unproven, could lead to new regulation of research (& research orgs).
I heard that there is a petition letter being circulated asking scientists to add their names to reject these possible new changes in advance.
Needless to say, I think this is a terrible mistake and a trap that scientists are setting for themselves again.
It implies that the signatories are not taking lab origins seriously and their names will be on the line if and when a lab leak causes a future outbreak.
Why not write a letter calling for a public forum where both scientist & non-scientist stakeholders can reason with each other in a transparent way about what needs to be done to make research safer.
This cannot be an issue that is decided by just scientists in relevant fields.
This is happening next Wednesday: @DavidRelman will be speaking to the Investigations and Oversight subcommittee of the House Science Committee on "Principles for Outbreak Investigation: COVID-19 and Future Infectious Diseases". science.house.gov/hearings/princ…
I wish more experts were invited to give a balanced and clear-minded assessment of the existing evidence surrounding the #OriginsOfCovid
I think @DavidRelman is one of the best scientists to speak on this topic - finding the source of a pandemic that could’ve arisen naturally or involved research activity. pnas.org/content/117/47…