It's deceiving to look at long-term interest rates and think it was an easy, obvious trade. But even smart investors didn't know
Value investor Larry Tisch of Loews went all Berkshire and bought an insurer, Continental Casualty, to invest their portfolio float.
That portfolio had a big slug of duration bonds that were underwater. Larry took the loss when yields spiked and shortened the duration.
In 1984, when rates backed up again, it looked like a smart move.
Buffett at least agreed: "Larry inherited a portfolio that could have been a financial Hiroshima. The other insurance giants all stared, transfixed as their bond portfolios slid into the sea. He resorted to action while the others resorted to prayer."
Meanwhile, Tisch was bullish. But it was a pretty tactical and somewhat convoluted view. Nothing about a secular bond bull.
And Tisch wasn't a bull for long. On year later, in 1985, "stumped about the future course of rates" he sold again.
The right move (to hold and perhaps lever up) wasn't obvious. So, he ended up trading around rather than locking in returns never to be seen again.
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The story of Chobani is so wholesome and also a good example of how companies can get funded outside of VC.
Taking big risks, Chobani founder Hamdi Ulukaya went all-in betting on his heritage and a powerful emerging consumer trend.
Ulukaya grew up in a Kurdish dairy-farming family. After being questioned by police over his interest in the Kurdish-rights movement, he wanted to leave.
A fried recommended America. Ulukaya hesitated: “We thought capitalism was the reason for the suffering of poor people."
But in 1994, he made the move. First to Long Island, then upstate New York where he worked on a farm while studying.
With almost no English, he was "extremely scared. I was aware that this was going to be very, very difficult. But I was excited.
"I developed a theory: in between 2011 and whenever hedge funds got around to hiring full-time Internet analysts again, they would need all the help they could get analyzing Internet stocks. And who better to help them than a former stock market junkie turned digital marketer?"
"Hiring someone with a weird background, who gets rejected at the first-pass HR filter, is a non-correlating bet. And portfolio theory tells us that even if your non-correlating bet doesn’t do great on its own, your whole portfolio will do better if you take those bets."
This is from 1988, the beginning of the final leg of the Japanese bubble. Reminder that you can always find bull and bear arguments and rationalize what's going on.
In 1987, Fortune found only four tech billionaires: Bill Gates, David Packard, Bill Hewlett, and Ross Perot. Gates was the only one still running his business!
Olsen of Digital Equipment would have been another but he sold 77% of his stock for $70k in the 50s (worth $5bn by 87).
Gates: "The company is a high-tech stock, and high tech stocks are volatile. The price is not a reflection of the contribution we're making."
Ben Rosen, VC who invested in Lotus and Compaq:
"It seems like the three companies grew very rapidly, but they really didn't at first. Hewlett and Packard, and Gates didn't have to sell their shares to raise capital, so they wound up owning a lot of their companies."
Bank One was being hit by the recession and loan losses were exploding.
"I was slow waking up to the problems" Dimon admitted.
"They said we'd peak losing 70 basis points. History told me it would be around 100," says Dimon. "The losses hit 180!" money.cnn.com/magazines/fort…
In his annual letter, Dimon starts with the bad news:
"Bank One had an extremely difficult year in 2000. We lost $511 million. ... These results are absolutely un acceptable — to you and to Bank One’s management."