⚠️ It’s 📰💧 time of the month again 🚨

Don’t want to read 100s of pages of CFMM literature? 

You’re in luck! We review the known theory of CFMMs (plus some new goodies!) for an upcoming *textbook* chapter on crypto + DeFi w/ two new authors:

(Paper: stanford.edu/~guillean/pape…)
First: Who are they?

Stephen Boyd is a renowned @Stanford researcher known for his oft cited textbook, multitude of INFORMS/IEEE awards, and advising BlackRock on convex analysis for manage trillions of dollars

He’s also @guilleangeris’s PhD advisor!

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stephen_P…
. @akshaykagarwal just defended his PhD under Boyd and is known for his work on visualizations of embeddings via his open-source package PyMDE (minimal distortion embedding)

He’s also a core developer of cvxpy (quant traders ♥️ him) and previously worked on TensorFlow 2
Unlike our other papers, which assume knowledge of crypto, DeFi, + convex analysis, this book chapter is pedagogical + from first principles 

Goal: Quant-y undergrads who know Multivariable Calc and Linear Algebra (with proofs, like Lang) *should* be able to pick up CFMM theory
We also show a few new nifty features of CFMMs

1/ Simplified proofs

a. Round-trip trades always lose (path deficiency)
b. Liquidity Provider (LP) share value ∝ ∇ϕ(R)’R [= ϕ(R) for 1-homogeneous functions; surprisingly simple!]
c. Input + output portfolios disjoint
2/ Explicit formulas for add/remove liquidity

Previous papers assumed reserves were constant

We provide a connection between the trading function gradient and the change to liquidity ▶️ helps improve concentrated liquidity formulas (e.g. @Uniswap V3)

e.g. result below:
3/ Exchange Functions

Our curvature paper only showed properties of liquidity (e.g. curvature at fixed reserve) are too state dependent

We elucidate some properties of changes to liquidity via _exchange functions_ which turn out to be concave/convex (*w/o* metric properties)
Their metric properties, which do depend on a particular parametrization and reserve, are shown to be easily computed numerically

This, again, is very useful for measuring impact to concentrated liquidity (e.g. you can extend by linearity exchange functions to piecewise convex)
Finally, exchange functions generalize the invariant calculation done by @CurveFinance to general CFMM curves

There's a simple Newton iteration (gradient descent) for computing trade size from exch. functions

[Remember when @samczsun found a bug in curve's Newton iteration?]
4/ Expected Utility Portfolio

We provide some LP strategies for different utility functions

If we view an LP’s contribution to a CFMM pool as a portfolio allocation, we explicitly find both linear and Markowitz convex programs for how to optimize LP allocation
These are *easily* solved on a laptop and we numerically show how LP allocations change as a function of risk-aversion (cvxpy code included!)

This should hopefully lead to more principled LP allocation (e.g. useful for @CharmFinance, @mellowprotocol, @sommfinance)
We hope that a clean presentation of these results can make the field more assessable to folks in theoretical CS, ML, statistics, and other quantitative fields

But what’s next? You’ll have to wait until next month ✌🏾

Paper: stanford.edu/~guillean/pape…
Oops wrong tag: I meant @akshaykagrawal 🙈🙈🙈

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More from @tarunchitra

2 May
Wow, y'all really aped into this paper, thanks for all the memes (@0xtuba) & thoughtful comments

I figured I'd go a little deeper into the connection between lending protocols and options selling but first, don't forget to follow @htkao, @GuilleAngeris, and @alexhevans ☺️
As @cuckqueeen points out, numerical methods for simulating barrier options are hard to execute correctly (one of the reasons we run all such simulations @gauntletnetwork against the contract execution state in EVM, otherwise you will mess up liq barrier)
The paper explicitly connects the option that a liquidator holds to a down-and-in knock-in option
- a: liquidation incentive
- l: ratio of liq threshold to LTV
- p(t0): loan entry price

But you might be asking: how the hell did we get an exact, analytical formula for this?
Read 14 tweets
30 Apr
One mechanism for improving capital efficiency in CFMM trading is borrowing against LP shares (e.g. @AaveAave, @AlphaFinanceLab, @MakerDAO, @SushiSwap)

How safe is it compared to normal lending?

New 📝💧 from @htkao, @GuilleAngeris, @alexhevans y moi

stanford.edu/~guillean/pape…
We first show how to compare Loan-to-Value (LTV) / collateral factors between borrowing A with B as a collateral vs. borrowing A against an A/B LP pool share

Turns out, with dynamically adjusted LTVs you can make LP share lending *more* safe than lending of the underlying Image
👉🏾 Lending + CFMM protocols like @SushiSwap’s Kashi can provide way better efficiency if they dynamically adjust LTVs in response to price changes and fee accruals

I found this insanely counterintuitive until I wrote the equations — LP shares can be amazing collateral w/ care
Read 13 tweets
9 Apr
This is a good thread about the MEV War of 2021™️

One thing I will say is that most of the fair methodologies have a downsides themselves:
1. Added latency
2. Lack of guarantees about economic price ordering
3. Extremely unproven in production (similar to ZKPs in 2012)
Why added latency?

Theoretical (@vegaprotocol’s Wendy) and practical protocols (@valardragon) add a >= 1 block commit-reveal from validators OR added rounds of BFT-style message passing. Griefing vectors (DDoS-esque) are abundant + provable models have weak synchrony guarantees
Recent papers from @algo_class and Joachim Neu show lower bounds on these latencies and it is very unclear if the practical implementations even come close to saturating these bounds (Kelkar, et. al get to weaker bounds in their paper)
Read 12 tweets
18 Jan
⚠️ Paper Alert ⚠️

Remember the Twitter argument between @danrobinson and @SBF_Alameda?

Recall how it hinged on logarithmic vs. linear utility functions?

Using optimal control, we show utilities are a red herring

joint w/ @alexhevans @GuilleAngeris

stanford.edu/~guillean/pape…
Flip the problem upside down: LP returns are a function of how close the weights w (@BalancerLabs portfolio weights) are to the 'optimum' weight w*

Arbitrageurs can be viewed as a stochastic control mechanism that moves w around w*

Can you control |w-w*| as a function of fees?
Trad. Optimal Control: Robot/program has 100% deterministic control over the intervention (e.g. moving robot arm)

LP vs. Arbs: Stochastic control plus fees add a wrinkle — the fee interval. Arbs can never exactly get to w* because of fees, yet Martin/Dave show LPs are still 🤑🤑
Read 11 tweets
30 Nov 20
⚠️ Γ Alert ⚠️

What does part of Paul Milgrom's 2020 Nobel Memorial Prize have to do with 🦍-ing into pool 2?

2nd part of our series on CFMM shape looks at:

💹 How do you compare LP return from different pools?
🤼 Quantifying adverse selection in CFMMs

medium.com/gauntlet-netwo…
Post 1 tl;dr: Curvature controls pool price stability

Post 2: Curvature *directly* controls:
- LP profits when asset pairs are mean reverting
- ∃ a magic formula relating LP profit to adverse selection (probability α of LP realizing IL), curvature, and fees for *any* CFMM!
These results generalize Glosten & Milgrom (1984), Kyle (1985) to arbitrary CFMMs

This seminal work shows the shape of the order book represents the amount of adverse selection a market maker feels, leading to strategies where they remove liquidity to avoid adverse selection
Read 12 tweets
24 Nov 20
What does Gauss's Theorema Egregium (1827) have to do with getting rug pulled in Uniswap?

This post (1 out of 3) introduces (only w/ pictures!) new work on understanding constant function MMs (CFMMs) as the primary market for an asset

Part I: Curvature

link.medium.com/RVPG7R85Fbb
Why curvature?

@CurveFinance made it clear that some assets perform better on 'flatter' CFMMs and others on 'sharper' CFMMs

But what does it mean to be 'better'?

Our paper studies what happens when traders arbitrage btw. two CFMMs and look at the max their prices differ by
When we dug into this a little more, it became clear that Gaussian curvature controls a lot of facets of CFMMs:

1. Price synchronization between two CFMMs
2. Adverse Selection for LP returns
3. Price stability
4. Optimal incentives for yield farming
Read 7 tweets

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