This FT article on the divergent fortunes of US-based and European airlines is interesting for several reasons. ft.com/content/695513…
First, it's a reminder that the pandemic (and to a lesser extent the response to the financial crisis) has seen a real reversal of the historic pattern where Western Europe has sen more active, interventionist public sectors and industrial policy.
Support for the airline industry is a nice positive example of policy that limits price increases not by reducing demand, but by maintaining supply.
Yes, it's a problem that the FT doesn't mention the role of unions in winning the PSP. But it's also a problem that progressives in the US don't talk about it. We seem more comfortable criticizing this stuff as bailouts than taking credit for its success.
If you've picked up The American Prospect or New Republic over the past year, you've almost certainly seen ferocious denunciations of airline support as corporate welfare. Not so many pieces pointing to it as an example of why active management of the economy beats laissez faire.
Yes, in my ideal world airlines would have been nationalized as a public utility -- and then gradually downsized in favor of less carbon-intensive forms of travel. But in absence of that, are we sure that catastrophic bankruptcies and mass layoffs were the next best option?
Also interesting as a reminder that despite talk of a United States of Europe (and the real power of European institutions in many contexts) Europe still fundamentally consists of national states. Pandemic responses were national, with obvious implications for air travel.
Returning to "bailouts" question - I think it's an urgent challenge right now to find ways of talking about economic policies in response to pandemic as success stories that can be basis for permanent changes in what we expect from the state.
One of the big lessons I've taken from political work is that it's not hard to convince people that the way things are is bad. The hard part is convincing them that politics offers any realistic prospect of making them better.
This recent Jacobin piece by Hadas Thier gets it right, imo. But it feels like she's swimming against the tide.
Last night Laura and saw our first movie in a theater since pre-pandemic: The Woman Who Ran, by Hong Sangsoo. It’s a Korean movie, released last year, about a woman visiting old friends in various parts of Seoul.
It’s super low-budget — almost the entire movie consists of people sitting in a couple ordinary apartments and a cafe, with camera just pointed at them as they talk. Nothing else happens.
I thought it was wonderful.
Its big virtues, to me: 1, the people in it were real people. I don’t know if the dialogue was improvised, but it felt like it. The conversations had the undirected, repetitive, discontinuous quality that real conversations do. The people in it felt like people you might know.
Glad to see people recognizing that when strong labor markets boost wages, this does not have to mean higher prices. Higher wages can equally well be passed on to faster productivity growth. wsj.com/articles/techn…
What's strange, tho, is how people insist on seeing faster wage growth --> faster productivity growth as a *problem*.
As a matter of logic, if you are concerned either that rising wages will lead to inflation, or that lack of labor is holding back growth, evidence that employers respond to rising wages by taking steps to raise productivity should make you less worried.
Interesting: Because data on consumption basket can't be updated as quickly as prices, changes in consumption patterns distort inflation data. This probably led to exaggerated picture of price falls last year, and exaggerated picture of price rises now. ft.com/content/abad2b…
For example, the big rise in used vehicle prices is incorporated into CPI with a weight based on share of household spending on vehicles pre-pandemic. But less household spending goes to vehicle purchases now, so contribution to overall inflation numbers should have been smaller.
(I have to mention in passing a pet peeve of mine in discussions of price indexes: The constant assumption that the only thing that causes important changes in consumption patterns is relative prices. To be clear, this article doesn't do that.)
This one is more sensible. Does anyone want to make the case that "559,000 more Americans chose to work in May" would be equally reasonable? If not, can we dispense with the idea that labor market outcomes are determined symmetrically by labor supply and demand?
The point that **employment levels are chosen by employers** is so banal and obvious there would be no reason to even mention it, if we weren't hearing so much nonsense about employment being held back by "labor supply constraints".
There are three big things to keep in mind about tomorrow's jobs numbers. First, this stuff is noisy. Wherever the numbers come in, you should not draw strong conclusions from them; whatever the picture is now, it may look very different when the revised numbers come in.
While the revisions this spring weren't that big, they changed the picture in an important way: the initial numbers suggested accelerating growth over December-March, while the revised ones are closer to linear. This is important for interpreting the relatively low April number.
Interesting figure from @dhneilson showing inventory changes over the past year. Makes clear that the initial economic impact of the pandemic was a fall in demand, no supply -- something that for some reason was controversial at the time. neilson.substack.com/p/two-price
Back in spring 2020, I insisted that the economic crisis was a fall in spending, not in potential output. In retrospect, I was right on that, tho - thanks to the extraordinary stimulus - I was wrong that the pandemic would lead to a conventional downturn. rooseveltinstitute.org/2020/03/19/how…