1: China-funded railway projects in the Brazilian Amazon met a thicket of local resistance. In the Ferrogrão, Chinese and Brazilian players adapted. This terrific new paper in our @CarnegieEndow#ChinaLocalGlobal project explores these adaptive dynamics: carnegieendowment.org/2021/08/04/wha…
2: The authors, @AAbdenur, @mafolly and @msantoro1978, show learning on both sides in the mitigation and management of socio-environmental risks around Chinese investments in Brazil's transportation infrastructure. They explore ongoing negotiations, plans, and controversies.
3: This paper is the latest in our seven-region #ChinaLocalGlobal initiative, which explores how China extends its influence by working through local actors and institutions while adapting and assimilating local and traditional forms, norms, and practices.
4: The initiative spans seven regions—Africa, Central Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa, the Pacific, South Asia, and Southeast Asia—exploring adaptive Chinese strategies that leverage local realities and players, and are often ignored by Western policymakers.
6: Another is Muhammad Tayyab Safdar's deep dive into the local roots of Chinese engagement in Pakistan's education, media, and energy sectors: carnegieendowment.org/2021/06/02/loc…
7: A paper from @KatAdeney and @FilippoBoni1 dug deeply into how China and Pakistan actually negotiate infrastructure deals, showing how it is often Chinese players who have had to adapt to Islamabad's realities: carnegieendowment.org/2021/05/24/how…
8: And a prior paper from Latin America by @FranciscoUrdin explored how Chinese pandemic relief to Chile came mostly from a diverse cast of Chinese players with local experience. They adapted to Chile’s unique system of emergency and disaster management: carnegieendowment.org/2021/04/06/chi…
9: Be sure to check out today's terrific new paper on China in the Brazilian Amazon from Adriana, Maiara and Mauricio. And stay tuned for coming papers, spanning Chinese strategies and adaptations in countries as diverse Ecuador, Kyrgyzstan, Indonesia, Vanuatu, Benin, and beyond.
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1: Thread: Many argue that China exports its developmental model and imposes it on other countries. But Chinese players also extend their influence by working through local actors and institutions while adapting and assimilating local and traditional forms, norms, and practices.
2: With the generous support of @FordFoundation@CarnegieEndow is developing an innovative body of research on Chinese engagement in seven regions of the world—Africa, Central Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa, the Pacific, South Asia, and Southeast Asia.
3: The initiative, #ChinaLocalGlobal, involves a mix of textured country-specific and multi-country regional research, cross-regional comparative work, and (as COVID fades) some strategic convening. carnegieendowment.org/specialproject…
1/6: THREAD ... Some of my recent work on the future of Taiwan's economic competitiveness ... Five easy pieces:
2/6: Taiwan’s innovation advantage is in danger of eroding. My dive into why it needs a revitalized and broadened strategy, more diverse investments in human capital and next-generation industries, and forward-looking partnerships, not least with the U.S.: carnegieendowment.org/2020/01/29/ass…
3/6: Taiwan needs to look not just to the energy it needs right now but also to the energy it will need 10-20 years from now if it is to power its future. My study of two paradigmatic transformation that are especially relevant to Taiwan’s energy future: carnegieendowment.org/2020/04/27/ove…
1: Long thread follows … A lot of the commentary on RCEP today, some of which disses it as a minimalist trade deal, misses the point. If you’re American, you can’t just look at it while ignoring the larger context of 25 years of change in Asia.
2. The problem, especially for the American strategic class (of which I am a card-carrying member), is threefold:
3: The first strategic problem is that American power in this region has been premised on both security and economic pillars ...
1/6: Thanks, and agree 100%, so it's not a rejoinder but a fact. Sadly, the US doesn't coordinate that especially well anymore. More important, I've argued over many years that the US seems oblivious to longer-term structural changes, in Asia especially, altering the landscape.
2/6: From 2011 (before the Belt and Road existed or Xi Jinping had yet taken power): Some of the writing of a more integrated Asia was already on the wall. I explored why the US had lost the plot in this essay, "Why America No Longer Gets Asia" in @TWQgw: csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/le…
@TWQgw 3/6: From 2009: Two decades of post-Asian Financial Crisis ideas threatened to marginalize the US (or alter its role without major adaptations from Washington). I explored with @Rmanning4 in this @CFR_org monograph on "The United States in the New Asia": cfr.org/asia-and-pacif…
1. Thread ... I want to make a small China/FDI and Belt and Road comment, prompted by reading a few more pieces that dismiss the significance of the thing on grounds that China's pledges "don't add up" and its pledge numbers are "fake." This is a caveat from anecdotal experience.
2: In many places of the place where China Inc. or Chinese entities invest, I don’t think aggregate capital flows are a sufficient measure for understanding impact, real or prospective.
3: There are plenty of countries where the numbers aren’t large—and are often (much) smaller than advertised by the propaganda organs— but where China is either one of a very few outside investors or where global capital flows simply haven’t had an especially meaningful impact.
1: A long thread from me on US-China relations and local realities. This terrific and timely @nytimes article on Chinese investment in the US captures something crucial. For years, trade was contentious, investment less so. But that has changed utterly. nyti.ms/2JHLpar
2: Trade was contentious because it fueled an intuitive sense among some Americans that US-China interaction had become unbalanced. You can hear this in much of President Trump's rhetoric about unfair trade at his rallies. He also deployed it to effect in his run for President.
3: But investment *used* to be less contentious because it could mean jobs in the US, not China, jobs for Americans, not for Chinese. Put bluntly, it appeared to be a vote of confidence in America and in the US economy. Invest here, some said, and you "pay America a compliment."