I have a NEW PUBLICATION out, about productivity and much more. If there were one theme it is this: you can't restore UK productivity growth simply by going all-out on tech-rich, "high value" sectors.
Let's start with the Great Slowdown that began in 2008. Keep this in mind: had we kept to the trend of 1998-08 GDP growth, the economy in 2018 would have been £300bn+ larger.
Was this because the UK "put its eggs in all the wrong baskets?" NO! 2/
It is a popular, miserabilist idea: Britain stopped making things, failed to get into new, high-tech industries, instead got into shopping, basic admin - the low value services. And hence we slipped off the growth train.
But the numbers are not there: 3/
For a start, the major shift out of manufacturing - the higher-value sector decline that people most regret - took place in the *high*-growth period, up to 2008. The lower-growth decade after that saw relatively little movement 4/
I also carry out a thought-experiment similar to one @jeegarkakkad carried out a year back - swap our sectoral shape with Germany's, see what happens institute.global/policy/product…. And the result is: not much! 5/
Instead, as many others have pointed out (i.e. see this from @ChrisGiles_ and @gemmatetlow) the drag on growth was concentrated on a few sectors growing much more slowly than in the go-go years before, notably financial, professional services 6/
Alongside this, the slowdown in growth was fairly widespread. All sorts of sectors failed to grow as fast in the weak decade as the strong (see hard-to-read chart). This warns us to look for economy-wide factors in explaining it, in particular slow demand growth 7/
This also illustrates serious issues with the idea of splitting into sectors, and choosing which ones to make bigger, perhaps with R&D injections.
Economies. Are. Not. That. Simple.
The Chancellor is not like a factory owner picking which sector to sell more of. 8/
I have MANY issues with assuming bigger sector= better for UK.
Industries serve each other, compete for common resources, their size is about *demand* - the most ignored factor in productivity discussions.
And being smaller is not necessarily bad! Favourite example: energy 9/
My particular bugbear: the simplistic assumption that putting in more tech leads to more growth and high value jobs. All of these sectors saw technological/structural change - and the effect in terms of jobs (X axis) and productivity (Y axis) is ... variable... 10/
... which is why I criticize the Public Accounts Committee for demanding that the Industrial Strategy Challenge Funds show their impact on jobs and growth. No, it is not that simple 11/
So I have criticized a lot of wrongness in this report. What DO I think should be done with productivity? Well, recognise that you can't do it all with the standard sexy targets of industrial policy.... 12/
... and acknowledge (as @HetanShah recently wrote) that lower-value jobs can play a really significant part. And in fact HAVE played a part - the significant rises in productivity in retail and admin, for example, given rocket-boosters under Covid 13/
but the most radical thought, saved for last: stop ignoring economic demand! For decades UK governments have regarded this as heresy - but can it really be a coincidence that the productivity crisis emerged just as demand growth took a whack in the solar-plexus ? 14/
As well as luminaries like Janet Yellen who have called for a "high pressure economy" - check out @MESandbu book, The Economics of Belonging, which lists mechanisms by which too-weak demand can hurt productivity widely 15/
Or the smart point made by @jdportes in this piece about levelling up. London's restauranteurs are not necessarily smarter than their poorer peers elsewhere - they just get more business 16/ bylinetimes.com/2021/05/11/wha…
Thanks for making it this far. It is a better read than its dry subject matter would suggest! If you think the government shouldn't get away with thinking its R&D spending is the only productivity policy it needs, this is the report for you! 17/17
Really like the three principles. 1. Carbon pricing is about behaviour change, not necessarily revenue raising. 2. Needs to be fair to avoid gilet jaunes issues 3. It is just a piece of the puzzle, not the whole jigsaw 2/
(am particularly keen on that last principle: the refuge of the lazy laissez faire thinker - like a particular former chancellor- is "just put a price on carbon, the market will fix it." No. It. Won't. But the price helps) 3/
This morning I have mostly been investigating the thesis of @billwells_1 - that UK employment usually changes/rises in a way largely independent of GVA. And I find he is right, which may have implications for productivity ... See these sectors, for example: 1/4
If employment is just "doing its thing", rather than (quickly) responding to GVA or GDP, it means that GDP/L, the measure we most often use for productivity, on any one year will be v correlated with GDP. And look - easy to see 2/4
I am wisely warned not to over-interpret these patterns. I also warn others not to act like you can just pull a lever and increase demand in sector X or Y. But in the short term, it does justify Bill's saying - productivity is just a residual. And ... 3/4
Imagine an economy of restaurants, randomly trying different styles. Their outcomes range across a distribution. The winners create jobs, profits and annoying columns about their brilliant entrepreneurialism. The losers go bust. Restaurant eating rises in line with GDP 1/5
Bad policy wonks come along, and look at the top quartile. "If the median performance could match the top restaurants, the industry would be X% bigger" they opine. But of course they can't, not in terms of sales. Orders at Bob's Pizza take from orders at Sheila's Fish 2/
A lot of sectoral/regional analysis of growth hits this fallacy*. Even when someone calculates how much richer society would be if everyone had higher education. The sum of social gains *isn't* the sum of each individual's gain. What was gained at the expense of another? 3/
Here are some staggeringly obvious points about Gross Value Added, employment, and therefore productivity (the first divided by the second). But they might lead to some insight into manufacturing, demand, etc following the excellent @jeegarkakkad thread yesterday 1/9
If you have only data on GVA and employment (L), and want to explain movements in GVA/L (prod), you can quickly see which plays the bigger role. It is GVA, full stop. See these charts, for Total UK economy ... 2/
Bemused southern Remainers like me, about to be befuddled by the Hartlepool poll result, need constant reminders that there are lots of people who really, genuinely, honestly think that the Government did them a massive favour by pushing through Brexit ...
.... rather than, say, that a bunch of wilfully self-destructive people perversely chose to vote against their own interests to punish remote, elite others from the privileged south in an irrational spasm of cultural spite and are still somehow enjoying their vandalism
Why they still think Brexit is helping them is still beyond me, but that they do is surely undeniable