Thread.
This is a fundamental reason why I do NOT trust Crenshaw. He is unable to understand the entire situation, insurgency/counter insurgency, the context of what success is, how foreign policy shifts, and the numerous complexities that exist with the mission.
This is a fundamental reason why I do NOT trust Crenshaw. He is unable to understand the entire situation, insurgency/counter insurgency, the context of what success is, how foreign policy shifts, and the numerous complexities that exist with the mission.
https://twitter.com/yaf/status/1423795272191299584
People forget, but when General McChrystal was sent out to make his Commanders estimate, he came back with a failed solution. Typically, with an estimate of that size a Commander would come back with several options which his boss could have chosen. Instead, he came back with 1.
A large scale counter-insurgency campaign across the most hostile areas of Afghanistan among the ruins of their dead, probably never alive, economy and rather weak if not non-existent political system. It was a task that was never going to work.
It became the implied mission of US military to pacify large portions of the most wild and hostile parts of Afghanistan. This is why he opted for Counter Insurgency. And this is what we have tried for the past decade since this Commanders estimate was created.
Counter Insurgency = political reform + economic development + counter guerilla operations
That's about it. When you look at Afghanistan, the size of Texas, 35million people, many of them of varying ethnic groups, they speak languages that are not mutually intelligible, they...
That's about it. When you look at Afghanistan, the size of Texas, 35million people, many of them of varying ethnic groups, they speak languages that are not mutually intelligible, they...
dont all like each other very much from region to region, and even valley to valley.
This is a very difficult thing to do. Turns out, it is impossible. We tried applying this theory many times.
This is a very difficult thing to do. Turns out, it is impossible. We tried applying this theory many times.
Our government has tried this in South America, Africa, South East Asia, and numerous other places from the 60's up until now.
And in places where the task isnt too big. The country isnt too big. The problems are relatively manageable. People arent converted to some ideology...
And in places where the task isnt too big. The country isnt too big. The problems are relatively manageable. People arent converted to some ideology...
that demands revolution or strict adherence to ancient practices, that you can do this. Enough good works, suppression of guerrillas, growth of economy, etc - this works.
But in places that are really big where none of those conditions really apply you can throw the might of the world at the problem and you won't get very far.
And this is the problem with what we have done in Afghanistan. It is too big a task for us. We have been fighting for...
And this is the problem with what we have done in Afghanistan. It is too big a task for us. We have been fighting for...
20 years. It has too big of problems, political ones, factional ones, economic ones, ethnic ones, and the combat problem is really very difficult and if we were ever going to protect the people, we would have had to control the population. The number of troops that would...
have required was going to be a number we have never had available to go in to Afghanistan. Maybe a million. Maybe more.
Counter Insurgency was never going to work. Our plans were never going to work. The initial push to rid the region of Afghanistan of Al Qaeda was needed.
Counter Insurgency was never going to work. Our plans were never going to work. The initial push to rid the region of Afghanistan of Al Qaeda was needed.
But 20 years later arguing against withdrawal is fool hardy, and very much a John McCain move. I did not trust John McCain. I see McCain in Crenshaw. I do not trust Crenshaw.
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