Thread by @MLiamMcCollum

“We don’t invade poor countries to make them rich. We don’t invade authoritarian countries to make them democratic. We invade violent countries to make them peaceful and we clearly failed in Afghanistan.”
— James Dobbins, former U.S. diplomat
#TheAfghanistanPapers

“What did we get for this $1 trillion effort,” asked White House Staffer and Navy SEAL Jeffrey Eggers. “After the killing of Osama bin Laden, I said that Osama was probably laughing in his watery grave considering how much we have spent on Afghanistan.” #TheAfghanistanPapers

“What did we get for this $1 trillion effort,” asked White House Staffer and Navy SEAL Jeffrey Eggers. “After the killing of Osama bin Laden, I said that Osama was probably laughing in his watery grave considering how much we have spent on Afghanistan.” #TheAfghanistanPapers

“We were devoid of a fundamental understanding of Afghanistan — we didn’t know what we were doing,” Douglas Lute, a three-star Army general said. “If the American people knew the magnitude of this dysfunction . . . 2,400 lives lost #TheAfghanistanPapers

“The history of military conflict in Afghanistan [has] been one of initial success, followed by long years of floundering and ultimate failure. We’re not going to repeat that mistake.”
— George W. Bush, in a 2002 speech at the Virginia Military Institute
#TheAfghanistanPapers

“I have no visibility into who the bad guys are. We are woefully deficient in human intelligence.” - Rumsfeld on Sept. 8, 2003
#TheAfghanistanPapers

“Our policy was to create a strong central government which was idiotic because Afghanistan does not have a history of a strong central government. The timeframe for creating a strong central government is 100 years” - a State Department official in 2015.
#TheAfghanistanPapers

“Thinking we could build the military that fast and that well was insane,” a senior USAID official said in 2016
#TheAfghanistanPapers

“We stated that our goal is to establish a ‘flourishing market economy. I thought we should have specified a flourishing drug trade — this is the only part of the market that’s working.” - Douglas Lute WH Afghan war czar said in 2015
#TheAfghanistanPapers

“It was impossible to create good metrics. We tried using troop numbers trained, violence levels, control of territory and none of it painted an accurate picture. The metrics were always manipulated for the duration of the war” - senior NSC official in 2016
#TheAfghanistanPapers

“Every data point was altered to present the best picture possible. Surveys, for instance, were totally unreliable but reinforced that everything we were doing was right and we became a self-licking ice cream cone.” - counterinsurgency adviser Bob Crowley
#TheAfghanistanPapers

“From the ambassadors down to the low level, [they all say] we are doing a great job. Really? So if we are doing such a great job, why does it feel like we are losing?” - Michael Flynn, retired three-star Army general in 2015.

“Truth was rarely welcome. Bad news was often stifled ... There was more freedom to share bad news if it was small — we’re running over kids with our MRAPs — because those things could be changed with policy directives.” - Crowley in 2016
#TheAfghanistanPapers

“We lost objectivity. We were given money, told to spend it and we did, without reason.” - Unnamed executive with the US Agency for International Development
#TheAfghanistanPapers

“Not one commander is going to leave Afghanistan... and say, ‘You know what, we didn’t accomplish our mission.’ So the next guy that shows up, finds it (their area) screwed up... and then they come back and go, ‘Man, this is really bad.’” - Michael Flynn
#TheAfghanistanPapers

Oh, and this should be placed somewhere in there too. Ron Paul was right.

https://twitter.com/MLiamMcCollum/status/1427018624078794752

“During the surge there were massive amounts of people and money going into Afghanistan. It’s like pouring a lot of water into a funnel; if you pour it too fast, the water overflows that funnel onto the ground. We were flooding the ground.” - David Marsden
#TheAfghanistanPapers

“We weren’t seriously into it — didn’t have our heart in it. We were pushed into state-building.”
— Senior State Department official in 2014
#TheAfghanistanPapers

“This is a systemic problem of our government. We can’t think beyond the next election. When we went to Afghanistan everybody was talking about a year or two, and I said to them that we would be lucky if we were out of here in 20 years.” - Robert Finn 2015
#TheAfghanistanPapers

“We were dealing with parts of a society who thought the king was still in power, never knew the Russians came, or that the Americans were here. They didn’t even use currency, but bartered for items.” Jordan Sellman
#TheAfghanistanPapers

“The worst thing you can do is apply lessons from one country to another.”
— Peter Galbraith, former U.S. and U.N diplomat in 2015
#TheAfghanistanPapers

“In hindsight the worst decision was to centralize power,” an unnamed European Union official said in 2015
#TheAfghanistanPapers

“You’d think they’ve never worked overseas. Why did we create centralized government in a place that has never had one?” - a USAID official in 2016
#TheAfghanistanPapers

“Petraeus was hell-bent on throwing money at the problem. When Petraeus was around, all that mattered was spending. He wanted to put Afghans to work.” an unidentified U.S. military officer
#TheAfghanistanPapers

“Military Keynesianism” as Ron Paul would put it

“For all of us that went over there and worked so hard, and put our families through so much, and there was never a strategy. We were just going through motions, chasing ghosts through mountains.”
— Shane Reynolds, 35, Army combat medic
#TheAfghanistanPapers

“Everything that we were told was bullshit, from the level of support we had to what we were allowed or expected to do.”
— Jay O’Brien, Army infantryman, Kandahar province, 2013
#TheAfghanistanPapers

Most important quotes come from the veterans. It’s not said enough that 2/3 of all veterans supported withdrawal from Afghanistan

“The war was not going well. Nobody really knew what they were doing overall. Everyone was kind of winging it day by day.”
— John Sharplin, 26, Army infantryman, Helmand and Nangahar provinces, 2014, 2016-2017
#TheAfghanistanPapers

“There’s a lot of feeling like you’re Sisyphus, like you’re just pushing the rock up the hill, and you go home for six months, and you come back and the rock’s at the bottom of the hill and you’re like, well, now I’ve got to start pushing it again.”
— Gregg Frostrom

“I was mortuary affairs ... I handled hundreds of fallen soldiers and ensured they made it home. I have so much pride in my job and so much respect for the soldiers that lost their lives. But eventually it’s like — what is this all for?”
— Amber Chase
#TheAfghanistanPapers

“Without a conclusion to the war, I ask myself every day, ‘Was it worth it?’”
— Jason Whitman, 50, Army Black Hawk mechanic, Kandahar province, 2002
#TheAfghanistanPapers