Thread by @TFletcher

Officials in Afghanistan, like @laurie_bristow, are doing work of immense courage and compassion. Grateful to US/UK for help with individual education cases. Each one matters and we should not underestimate tough choices to be made.

https://twitter.com/laurie_bristow/status/1428602971642908674

Much has been said more eloquently about our moment of reckoning in Kabul.

Much to be said about the politics of the exit debacle should wait until we have as many to safety as possible.

I hesitate to add to noise. But we must move from anguish to lessons to next phase.

Amid commentary, I was struck by this tweet. Between us, John and I covered foreign policy in No 10 for over a third of this Afghan era. This has been part of foreign policy/development work for a generation. A defining project. And it is hard to take way it has now defined us.

https://twitter.com/JohnCassonUK/status/1426853096714653696

Nothing let down Afghanistan more than the manner of our leaving it.

Once decision taken to exit, it was always going to be a mess, move beyond our control, fail Afghans.

But it didn’t have to be such a mess, move so fast and far beyond our control, fail so many Afghans.

Yes, exit was Trump policy. Yes, he would have communicated and executed it in even clumsier, more crass way.

But we expected empathy, strategy and wisdom from Biden. His messaging targeted Trump’s base, not rest of the world, and not allies, past or (we’ll need them) future.

It will be image of Afghans clinging to US plane that defines two decades, not girls in school.

Sobering reminder of limits of military power, national patience, reliability of allies.

And of casual indifference to truth, competence and strategy of much political leadership.

There is responsibility to be shared. US machine is big, cumbersome, impatient and lurches. US allies don’t offer enough to get voice consistently heard.

Few of us really told politicians Afghanistan mattered to us. Leaders concluded we wanted out fast, and didn’t care how.

For now, focus must be on minimising the damage: to partners, reputation, trust (the currency of diplomacy) and long term interests. Right and urgent to move mountains and go beyond public opinion on refuge. To be honest about number of refugees who will come in next decade.

Then, we must rebuild an Afghan strategy from wreckage.

This must start with hard headed assessment of our influence; clarity about our interests; honesty and persistent communication about our aims; and - above all - humility about our failures.

Once cameras move on, politics will inevitably revert to domestic: potential of Afghanistan to export security, drugs, instability, migrants.

Those of us who believe we can be more than that must make case afresh. Argument by argument, policy by policy, election by election.

Those hills to fight on include restoration of aid budget; investment in foreign policy; renewal of UN/international system; painstaking coalition rebuilding; education as upstream diplomacy; practical, expedient and moral case for compassion and expertise in how we handle world.

We cannot start until we learn some lessons. Our systems are woeful at doing this: most lessons are not new, but get overlooked or neglected in fog of policy making, frenzy and churn of modern politics.

Three key areas: antennae, alliances, actions …

First, antennae. Know the history, know the geography. (@TheRestHistory @peterfrankopan @DalrympleWill)

This also means understanding our baggage (we have more of it now); and our opponents, and how their interests/politics shift. 

Otherwise we replay all this next time.

Alliances: manage expectations (ours/theirs). Do it with coalition, but recognize allies have separate cycle of politics. Do it with US where possible, but not US right or wrong. Build long term relationships over generations: not relying on dizzying turnover of Ministers/staff.

Third, actions.

Know why you’re there, and keep communicating that. Develop strategic patience (we have done sometimes). Don’t mistake military victory for success. Separate lethal, focused ability to kill from work of long term state building, and invest much more in latter.

And under actions, can we move past debate on talking to enemies? As @jnpowell1 and others have shown, there is a cost, but dialogue is a process not a reward. Identify incentives and disincentives. What do they want? What do they fear?

Final thought.

From here on, much Afghan policy will be about dealing with costs of our actions. Much Syria policy will remain about costs of inaction.

These are tough choices, and there are no right answers. We cannot avoid them. So we can and we must get better at them.