The current crisis of American power recalls Britain's interwar predicament. This is "The Gathering Storm," Washington edition. My latest for @TheEconomist : economist.com/by-invitation/… 1/10
Since 1914, the nation had endured war, financial crisis and in 1918-19 a terrible pandemic, the Spanish influenza. The economic landscape was overshadowed by a mountain of debt. A highly unequal society was a breeding ground for extreme ideologies. 2/10
Meanwhile the established political class preferred to ignore a deteriorating international situation. The result was a disastrous failure to acknowledge the scale of the totalitarian threat and to amass the means to deter the dictators. 3/10
So many books and articles predicting American decline have been written in recent decades that “declinism” has become a cliché. But Britain’s experience between the 1930s and the 1950s is a reminder that there are worse fates than gentle, gradual decline. 4/10
Britain’s public debt after the first world war rose from 109% of GDP in 1918 to just under 200% in 1934. America’s federal debt is different in important ways, but it is comparable in magnitude. 5/10
Most Americans simply do not want to contemplate the possibility of a major war against one or more authoritarian regimes. That is why the projected decline of American defence spending from 3.4% of GDP in 2020 to 2.5% in 2031, will cause consternation only to Churchillians. 6/10
Like Britons in the 1930s, Americans in the 2020s have fallen out of love with empire—a fact that Chinese observers have noticed and relish. 7/10
The problem, as this month’s debacle in Afghanistan perfectly illustrates, is that the retreat from global dominance is rarely a peaceful process. 8/10
It doesn't need to be this way. There is nothing inexorable about China’s rise, much less Russia’s. And yet it is all too easy to see a sequence of events unfolding that could lead to another "unnecessary war," most probably over Taiwan. 9/10
If American deterrence fails and China gambles on a coup de main, the United States will face the grim choice between fighting a long, hard war—as Britain did in 1914 and 1939—or folding, as happened over Suez in 1956. 10/10
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My former student @stephenwertheim complains that I misrepresented his 2020 Foreign Affairs piece “Why America Shouldn’t Dominate the World” in my @TheTLS review article here: the-tls.co.uk/articles/the-r… Let’s see. 1/12
Wertheim wrote: “The rise of a near-peer competitor does not necessarily pose a grave danger to the United States … China has yet to undertake a costly bid for military dominance in East Asia, let alone the world.” 2/12
And: “China is not poised to dominate East Asia by force” but “remains focused on local issues: defending the Chinese mainland, winning disputes over small border areas and islands, and prevailing in what China sees as its unresolved civil war with the government in Taiwan.” 3/12
One of many relevant episodes in the book describes how, in 1992, a network of speculators attacked the Bank of England with a huge short sterling trade. The leader of the network was of course George Soros.
"Sometimes events are beyond a new president’s control. Sometimes they are unforced errors of his own making. But presidents don’t simply make history. Often, history comes at them fast." bloomberg.com/opinion/articl…
The fiscal and monetary policies favored by Biden's economics team — deficits and quantitative easing as far as the eye can see — will widen the country’s already wide inequalities by cranking up further the prices of real estate and financial assets. bloomberg.com/opinion/articl…
But the left wing of the Democratic Party cares more about identity politics than working-class living standards, so they will be fed a steady diet of green new dealing, critical race theory and transgender rights. Welcome to the ESG administration. bloomberg.com/opinion/articl…
Very important piece by Kurt Campbell and Rush Joshi, who will be driving Asia strategy on Biden's NSC: foreignaffairs.com/articles/unite….
“A strategy for the Indo-Pacific today" should be based on 3 lessons from post-Napoleonic Europe: "the need for a balance of power; the need for an order that the region’s states recognize as legitimate; and the need for a ... coalition to address China’s challenge to both."
“The way Beijing has pursued [its] goals—South China Sea island building, East China Sea incursions, conflict with India, threats to invade Taiwan, and internal repression in Hong Kong and Xinjiang—undermines important precepts of the established regional system."
More than two years ago, I warned of "the tendency of the network platforms to respond to public criticism by restricting free speech by modifying their terms of service and the guidelines they issue to their ... content monitors." hoover.org/research/what-…
Those unthinkingly applauding the latest actions by @Facebook, @Twitter and @Google should at least read the following paragraph:
Today's scenes in the Capitol are a disgrace. The organizers and perpetrators of this banana republic coup attempt must be prosecuted and punished. Any politician who does not unequivocally condemn what happened should have no future in democratic politics.
Hard questions must be asked about the role of the Capitol police. Was this just ineptitude? A grave danger in a situation such as this arises if the police have been politicized to the point of sympathizing with the mob.
There is a strong temptation at this point to say that I was wrong and that this really is Weimar America, after all: bloomberg.com/opinion/articl…