Thread by @KamranBokhari

Last year in late Sept, I published this #NetAssessment for our @NewlinesInst predicting that the Islamic Republic regime would be replaced by an emirate 2.0 and outlined its architecture in considerable detail.

newlinesinstitute.org/governance/the…

At the time I was assuming that a U.S. withdrawal would lead to a prolonged civil war. And that in a best case scenario at some point both sides would arrive at a power-sharing deal leading to a new regime that would be a Sunni Afghan version of Iran's clerical regime.

But now that the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan fell on its face and in a little over a week there is a need to revisit my analysis and forecast.

The core of my assessment remains unchanged. But it is important re-examine it in the light of the current situation.

Even though the Talibs have militarily overwhelmed their opponents they have an imperative to be "inclusive". What that means is that by and large they will impose a new order but will include many of the their opposing factions in it.

It is too early to tell who all from their rivals will be included in emirate 2.0. I doubt the Taliban leadership itself knows the answer to that question. But it is likely working on how it can use the structure & institutions of the fallen regime to shape emirate 2.0.

As I explained in detail in this thread

https://twitter.com/KamranBokhari/status/1428447504706719752

Pakistan's establishment is engaged in brokering talks b/w the Taliban & its opponents. It also has decades of experience in constitutional engineering at home, which it will be leveraging to influence emirate 2.0

For the Talibs, the starting point is their old regime from the 90s, which wasn't much of a pol economy. This is why emirate 2.0 has to be able to manage a country that has experienced 20 years of modernization. And it needs to be good enough to garner int'l recognition.

However, it has to be one that the Taliban movement - given its skillset and tradecraft - can control. Therefore the first order of business will be to establish the office of emir al-momineen, which will be occupied by Mullah Haibatullah (the overall Taliban leader).

Think of the emir al-momineen as Taliban's version of Iran's supreme leader. Considering that the Taliban's leadership has been run by a council of mullahs (Quetta shura). the emir, while at the helm of the new regime, won't be as powerful as Khamenei has been in Iran.

Like Iran's supreme leader, the emir of emirate 2.0 will be overseeing an executive branch. The chief executive could be a president given that whoever occupies it will be the regime's interface with the outside world. But could be called something different.

Regardless this position will likely go to Abdul Ghani Baradar the man who led the talks with the United States and has been the head of the Taliban politburo in Qatar. He is a veteran of the movement & knows how to deal with the outside world.

Many of the sovereign ministries will go to Taliban leaders such as defense, interior, finance, foreign affairs, etc. That said there is a need for experienced individuals in some of these & to have a veneer of power-sharing.

It could be possible that foreign affairs and finance will be given to some anti-Taliban figures like Abdullah. But it will be a function of trust. It could be that Talibs become the ministers with experienced non-Talib deputies.

But they will definitely control defense, interior and may create an intelligence ministry or a separate agency. Taliban # 2 Sirajuddin Haqqani (leader of the Haqqani network who got an op-ed in the NYT last year days before the deal with the US) could become defense minister.

But there is the much more bigger matter of how the Taliban will establish a new security architecture under emirate 2.0.

The Taliban is a rag-tag militia of ~150k+ fighters, which will take years to be converted into a professional police force, army or intelligence service.

Then there is a far greater number of ANDSF personnel who went through US/NATO training for 15-18 years.

There will be purges at the command level but disbanding the entire edifice could turn it into militias that could pose a serious security risk to the coming Taliban regime.

There are some parallels here that are noteworthy with not just Iran but also with Saudi Arabia.

In fact, this 2nd Taliban regime is in some ways like the founding of the 3rd Saudi State in the 1920s. The modern kingdom had not 1 but 2 prior incarnations, 1744-1818 & 1824-91.

The first two were actually called emirates of Diriyah and Nejd, respectively. Those medieval polities were ctrl’d by tribal/religious militiamen.

The founder of the modern kingdom, faced a challenge of how to convert his rag-tag desert warriors into a professional military.

In fact, even before the formal founding of the current Saudi regime Abdulaziz faced a major rebellion from a significant segment of his fighting force because of what it saw as a compromise on religion.

The Talibs face a similar risk as they go about pursuing int’l recognition.

While the Sauds were fortunate that their tribe back then had a monopoly over radical religious ideology the Taliban today face competition from ISIS. Therefore, they face serious constraints to how far they can go in even appearing pragmatic.

The Sauds were not just lucky on the ideational level but also materially with the discovery of oil in ‘38 that helped convert a medieval dynasty into a modern state. In sharp contrast, the Taliban emirate 2.0 is utterly dependent on int’l financial assistance.

Even w/ all the oil wealth + American & European assistance it took decades for the Saudis to establish a modern state security organs. KSA formed two parallel militaries, the regular armed forces under the defense ministry & the National Guard to preserve the Saudi regime.

After the ‘79 rev, the new clerical regime in Iran perfected the Saudi model of a nat’l guard force (composed of religious militiamen) when it established the IRGC with the raison d'être of protecting the new regime and its Islamist ideals. Talibs will form a similar entity.

While the IRGC quickly became an effective mil org capable of ops well beyond Iran’s borders, the Taliban version of an elite ideological mil will face serious challenges getting off the ground. Iran’s Islamist revolutionaries tho led by mullahs were a modern lot.

In comparison the Taliban is largely a rural & at best suburban phenomenon. Decades of war has had a massive demodernization effect on Afghanistan. The Talib militiamen will need a long shakedown period to be converted into an effective IRGC-style or even Hezbollah-type entity.

Unlike in Iran, where the IRGC eclipsed the regular armed forces, Artesh & the two parallel military orgs were effectively brought together beneath a joint staff command structure, emirate 2.0’s ideological mil force will be in tension with ANDSF’s successor.

Any such ideological mil force will have to be overseen by a Taliban leader with years of experience leading the jihadist insurgency. Sirajuddin Haqqani or one of his top associates could be given the responsibility.

In places like Afghanistan even regular police officers tend to engage in abusive behavior towards citizens. Therefore, law enforcement will also be a huge challenge given how Taliban militiamen are even more prone to public abuse. Not to mention how to deal w/ the ANP personnel.