Pak PM Imran Khan's had phone calls with three of the top Gulf Arab leaders. Apparently the first one was with MbZ, the second with MbS and finally with the Qatari Emir. Obviously, Afghanistan was the main topic and the return of the Taliban is a huge issue for KSA & UAE.
Emirate 2.0 throws a major monkey wrench into the Saudi/Emirati struggle against Islamism/jihadism. Riyadh & Abu Dhabi had been making significant progress in rolling back this phenomenon in the Middle East in the decade since the Arab Spring with the most recent gain in Tunisia.
The Saudi-Emirati alliance defeated Islamists who have been backed by Turkey and Qatar. The Taliban comeback represents a major setback to the MbZ/MbS agenda in the region because it will likely energize Islamists throughout the Arab/Muslim world.
More importantly though, from the Saudi and Emirati POV, the Taliban comeback allows Turkey and Qatar to play a much larger role. And they know that Doha and Ankara are close to the Pakistanis.
The Saudis & Emiratis take comfort from the fact that neither Turkey nor Qatar has financial leverage over the Paks the way they do. So, this phone call was a reminder to Islamabad that we know you need all the help you can get but let's not get carried away.
So, the Pakistani strategy for Afghanistan is constrained by Islamabad's need to ensure that Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are on board. Another way for the U.S. to shape Emirate 2.0 without having to be directly involved.
While the Saudis and Emiratis will be able to constrain Taliban via the Pakistanis they still have the problem in the form of the psychological boost to Islamists and jihadists.
Thus, unlike their recognition of v. 1.0, KSA and UAE will drive a much harder bargain before they recognize Emirate 2.0.
Meanwhile, Iran - despite enhanced ties w/ the Taliban - is having its own challenges with Emirate 2.0.

It was hoping for a balance of power of sorts b/w the Talibs & their foes but has to deal w a regime in which its traditional allies have a minor role

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with Kamran Bokhari

Kamran Bokhari Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @KamranBokhari

4 Sep
Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence chief visiting Kabul at a time when intra-Taliban disagreements have delayed the formation of a gov reminds me of the countless visits by IRGC officials to Iraq in years past to mediate differences among Iran’s various Shia proxy factions.
For several reasons, Iran was able to make use of the US intervention in Iraq to flip the country from an enemy to a client state.

In sharp contrast, and due to a different set of factors, Pakistan is facing a far more dangerous Afghanistan than ever before.
The nature of its republic, geosectarianism & intelligence tradecraft, has allowed Iran to effectively manage its disparate Iraqi Shia proxies.

Pakistan, however, suffers from a major handicap in that its Afghan proxies represent a major threat to its own republic.
Read 15 tweets
4 Sep
Thanks, @FrudBezhan for this critical intel on why the delay in forming the Talib gov.

These disagreements show that the US read, & very early on in the war, identifying the Haqqanis as a network distinct from the Taliban, was so accurate.
The Haqqanis have always been a group within a group.

Too small to stand on their own but big enough to dominate the parent org.

First under Hizb-i-Islami - Younus Khalis (rural rival to Hekmatyar's more urban faction by the same name) and since the mid-90s, the Taliban.
This would explain why when HiI-YK fizzled out the Haqqanis still remained a force.

And when the Taliban rose in the south in '94 the Haqqanis enabled the Talib domination of the Pashtun regions.
Read 16 tweets
20 Aug
Last year in late Sept, I published this #NetAssessment for our @NewlinesInst predicting that the Islamic Republic regime would be replaced by an emirate 2.0 and outlined its architecture in considerable detail.

newlinesinstitute.org/governance/the…
At the time I was assuming that a U.S. withdrawal would lead to a prolonged civil war. And that in a best case scenario at some point both sides would arrive at a power-sharing deal leading to a new regime that would be a Sunni Afghan version of Iran's clerical regime.
But now that the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan fell on its face and in a little over a week there is a need to revisit my analysis and forecast.

The core of my assessment remains unchanged. But it is important re-examine it in the light of the current situation.
Read 28 tweets
19 Aug
Thanks for sharing, @Natsecjeff.

This interview with Ahmed Shah Massoud's brother Ahmed Wali Massoud is a small piece of a very significant and high stakes process underway in Pakistan to shape emirate 2.0 that needs to be unpacked.
The Pakistani civ-mil elite is divided between two views of the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. On one hand it is being seen as a historic opportunity while on the other an existential threat.
These are not necessarily two camps because there are plenty of those who see the Taliban comeback as both an opportunity and a threat.
Read 33 tweets
4 Jul
Important thread here👇from @bsarwary on how the country’s northernmost Badakhshan province appears to be rapidly falling under Taliban ctrl.

The Talib’s focus on this province is a highly significant geopol dvlpmnt as US forces are about a month away from a complete pullout.
Badakhshan was the one province that did not fall under Taliban control even during the heyday of the jihadist regime prior to 9/11.

Thus it served as the staging grounds from where the U.S. backed Northern Alliance forces began the ground offensive to topple the Talib emirate.
Given its location the former Northern Alliance forces were supported by Russia, India & Iran from across the border in Tajikistan.
Read 29 tweets
18 Apr
1st took place in Baghdad on April 9 about the Houthi attacks.

Saudi side led by intel chief Khalid bin Ali al-Humaidan & Iraqi PM facilitated

2nd round next week. No mention of who represented Iranian side. Intel Min Mahmoud Alavi?
ft.com/content/852e94…
If confirmed, this diplomacy is likely part of the Biden admin’s strategy to dealing with Iran’s disproportionate regional influence while it tries to restore the nuclear deal.
Hard to believe that Team Biden was only working on a return to the JCPOA without addressing the bigger Iranian regional threat. That was the whole criticism against the Obama deal that it provided the cash Iran needed to become further aggressive in the Middle East.
Read 23 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Too expensive? Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal Become our Patreon

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us on Twitter!

:(