Pak PM Imran Khan's had phone calls with three of the top Gulf Arab leaders. Apparently the first one was with MbZ, the second with MbS and finally with the Qatari Emir. Obviously, Afghanistan was the main topic and the return of the Taliban is a huge issue for KSA & UAE.
Emirate 2.0 throws a major monkey wrench into the Saudi/Emirati struggle against Islamism/jihadism. Riyadh & Abu Dhabi had been making significant progress in rolling back this phenomenon in the Middle East in the decade since the Arab Spring with the most recent gain in Tunisia.
The Saudi-Emirati alliance defeated Islamists who have been backed by Turkey and Qatar. The Taliban comeback represents a major setback to the MbZ/MbS agenda in the region because it will likely energize Islamists throughout the Arab/Muslim world.
More importantly though, from the Saudi and Emirati POV, the Taliban comeback allows Turkey and Qatar to play a much larger role. And they know that Doha and Ankara are close to the Pakistanis.
The Saudis & Emiratis take comfort from the fact that neither Turkey nor Qatar has financial leverage over the Paks the way they do. So, this phone call was a reminder to Islamabad that we know you need all the help you can get but let's not get carried away.
So, the Pakistani strategy for Afghanistan is constrained by Islamabad's need to ensure that Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are on board. Another way for the U.S. to shape Emirate 2.0 without having to be directly involved.
While the Saudis and Emiratis will be able to constrain Taliban via the Pakistanis they still have the problem in the form of the psychological boost to Islamists and jihadists.
Thus, unlike their recognition of v. 1.0, KSA and UAE will drive a much harder bargain before they recognize Emirate 2.0.
Meanwhile, Iran - despite enhanced ties w/ the Taliban - is having its own challenges with Emirate 2.0.
It was hoping for a balance of power of sorts b/w the Talibs & their foes but has to deal w a regime in which its traditional allies have a minor role
Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence chief visiting Kabul at a time when intra-Taliban disagreements have delayed the formation of a gov reminds me of the countless visits by IRGC officials to Iraq in years past to mediate differences among Iran’s various Shia proxy factions.
Thanks, @FrudBezhan for this critical intel on why the delay in forming the Talib gov.
These disagreements show that the US read, & very early on in the war, identifying the Haqqanis as a network distinct from the Taliban, was so accurate.
Last year in late Sept, I published this #NetAssessment for our @NewlinesInst predicting that the Islamic Republic regime would be replaced by an emirate 2.0 and outlined its architecture in considerable detail.
At the time I was assuming that a U.S. withdrawal would lead to a prolonged civil war. And that in a best case scenario at some point both sides would arrive at a power-sharing deal leading to a new regime that would be a Sunni Afghan version of Iran's clerical regime.
But now that the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan fell on its face and in a little over a week there is a need to revisit my analysis and forecast.
The core of my assessment remains unchanged. But it is important re-examine it in the light of the current situation.
This interview with Ahmed Shah Massoud's brother Ahmed Wali Massoud is a small piece of a very significant and high stakes process underway in Pakistan to shape emirate 2.0 that needs to be unpacked.
The Pakistani civ-mil elite is divided between two views of the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. On one hand it is being seen as a historic opportunity while on the other an existential threat.
These are not necessarily two camps because there are plenty of those who see the Taliban comeback as both an opportunity and a threat.
1st took place in Baghdad on April 9 about the Houthi attacks.
Saudi side led by intel chief Khalid bin Ali al-Humaidan & Iraqi PM facilitated
2nd round next week. No mention of who represented Iranian side. Intel Min Mahmoud Alavi? ft.com/content/852e94…
If confirmed, this diplomacy is likely part of the Biden admin’s strategy to dealing with Iran’s disproportionate regional influence while it tries to restore the nuclear deal.
Hard to believe that Team Biden was only working on a return to the JCPOA without addressing the bigger Iranian regional threat. That was the whole criticism against the Obama deal that it provided the cash Iran needed to become further aggressive in the Middle East.