Thread by @MMazarr

Someday we'll know the full story of what the US told its allies and when, how much time it gave them to react. Many reports do make it seem like this was terribly botched. But the general narrative of US unilateralism + European victimhood is too simple
asiatimes.com/2021/08/bidens…

Take 2009: Obama decides to surge; US military knows it needs more troops than he'll give them. The appeal goes out to NATO, and: NATO leaders "gave a tepid troop commitment to President Obama’s escalating campaign in Afghanistan ...
nytimes.com/2009/04/05/wor…

... mostly committing soldiers only to a temporary security duty. ... Despite a glowing reception and widespread praise for Mr. Obama’s style and aims, his calls for a more lasting European troop increase for Afghanistan were politely brushed aside"

In response to this appeal: “No one will say this publicly, but the true fact is that we are all talking about our exit strategy from Afghanistan,’ a senior European diplomat said Saturday. ‘We are getting out. It may take a couple of years, but we are all looking to get out.’”

Meantime like the US, Europe was always halfway out the door. The "lack of co-ordination and ... unwillingness to increase their economic and military contributions" left NATO countries "unable to affect the overall strategy”
files.ethz.ch/isn/91746/Afgh…

The European role suffered from "lack of clarity, lack of visibility, lack of coherent policy between allied states and development aid partners, conflicting priorities ... and failure to monitor and report on development activities + outcomes"
thediplomat.com/2020/02/europe…

Some went all the way out (or basically, in combat terms), like France did (for understandable reasons) in 2012. “A senior NATO official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the delicacy of the situation, said the French decisions ..."
nytimes.com/2012/01/28/wor…

" ... were bound to create problems for the alliance because they would give encouragement to the forces fighting the Afghan government, supporting the idea that attacks on NATO and coalition troops would push governments to leave Afghanistan sooner than planned”

Then of course, all along, there were the caveats, at their peak 80 or more restrictions on what NATO forces could do which significantly constrained the impact of their deployments
press.princeton.edu/books/hardcove…

None of this is meant to downplay the incredible commitment, bravery and sacrifice of NATO troops who did serve. (Some had high casualty rates as %/population) These govts were doing the best they could under trying political circumstances--most EU publics didn't buy into the war

The basic lesson to take forward is that dedicated US friends and allies stepped up + supported the US as best they could. The US was often too brusque and domineering in refusing to take input. America ran the show and bears ultimate responsibility for the conduct of this war

But this idea that the final story of the war is one of European devotion to a moral cause only to be stabbed in the back by the US doesn't reflect the reality of the last 20 years. The US has soul-searching to do, especially about the awful departure planning. But so do others

And we can best do that in a spirit of mutual humility. Washington needs to start that, and the tone so far has been too defensive. But this is a time for friends to forgive each other's imperfections, speak bluntly behind closed doors, and try very hard to do better next time