A couple of profound lessons the United States should learn from the Afghanistan experience--one that go well beyond CT and COIN and corruption and nation building, to the broader principles of a post-primacy foreign policy acutely aware of America's shifting global position
1. Stop being infuriated with others for having different interests + perspectives on issues and refusing to accede to US demands. Often we "blame" others for behavior that we could easily have anticipated (and often did). That's on us, not them thediplomat.com/2021/09/the-us…
Whether it's Pakistan's view of Afghanistan, or China's interests in DPRK, or India's view of Russia, or EU's of Iran: We need to work around others' divergent perspectives rather than trying to bully them into our lane. One lesson: Stop w/the sanctions, especially secondary
2. Drop the zero-sum thinking. We ought to know by now that a loss for the US doesn't equate to an unqualified win for our rivals. Often situations that challenge the US create equal or greater risks for others foreignaffairs.com/articles/china…
Sometimes, too, a seeming decisive loss eventually gives way to significant geopolitical advantage asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Vietna…
All that highlights the need to drop absolutism and moralism, distinguish essential baseline goals + interests from maximalist ones, think systemically and long-term, be clever and efficient in strategy vs piling on resources. Unclear yet if we're capable of this paradigm shift
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Much more to find out about AUKUS and the process by which it came about. But the more detail + official reactions emerge, the more one wonders: Did we have to alienate *the* major European advocate for a stronger EU role in Asia in order to get this trilateral connection?
Australia's frustration with the French deal had been brewing. It may have been headed for an exit anyway. But to engineer that outcome in a way that infuriates the French, *on top* of other US-EU economic + geopolitical disputes, seems gratuitous ... politico.eu/article/why-au…
... and *on the very day* that the EU announced its new Indo-Pacific strategy. That strong statement should have been an unqualified win for the US. Instead it lands w/a thud + an echo of resentment. The timing seems almost calculated to embarrass the EU reuters.com/world/europe/a…
Many complex aspects here. But it's interesting that we just spent months berating senior officials for sitting by + doing nothing amid the self-deceptions of the Afghan war. And now some are berating a senior officer for *not* standing by + doing nothing when risk of war loomed
If we want a system able to correct itself in real time, we must accept the risk--and it is a risk--of officials sometimes stepping outside their lane. The alternative to conformism isn't always tidy procedure. It can require bureaucratic rebellion that breaks rules
To those who say, "Follow the rules + work w/in the system," I'd reply: That's what George Ball did in 1965. It's what Powell did in 2002. It's what people using "official dissent channels" do. Mostly, *it doesn't work*: The system grinds on; path dependence + conformism win out
Important essay in FA which hints at a very plausible route to a collapse of US policy toward Iran. First: more evidence that the bullying approach just doesn't work. US "maximum pressure" didn't cause back-down + deepened IRGC economic role in Iran foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/…
Then, on future: Space for grand bargain is gone. Tehran doesn't see value of abandoning JCPOA but feels no urgency to fully revive it. Potential = public Iranian claims of willingness to renew while demanding US concessions (sanctions) + slow-motion expansion of nuke capability
This NYT story has been rightly criticized as alarmist + too simple, but it does highlight a seemingly clear underlying trend. An actual time frame of 6 months vs 1 won't reassure the US, Israel or others nytimes.com/2021/09/13/us/…
For those hardy few interested in professional military education: Another misleading take on the role of war colleges in producing national tragedies. I get the idea and agree w/their ire at jargon + abstract guidance. But many problems w/this thesis city-journal.org/putting-the-wa…
1: Generals don't set national strategy. Blaming the "graduates of this [PME] system" for Iraq and Afgh. presumes that bad military strategy was the source of failure. Instead it was the choice to go to war combined w/fact that the conflicts weren't resolvable by military means
No magic PME curriculum will generate strategists able to overcome the problems the US faced in Afghanistan. We do need military leaders more willing to state openly that a given mission isn't feasible--but that's an issue of service culture + civil-mil relations, not PME
Someday we'll know the full story of what the US told its allies and when, how much time it gave them to react. Many reports do make it seem like this was terribly botched. But the general narrative of US unilateralism + European victimhood is too simple asiatimes.com/2021/08/bidens…
Take 2009: Obama decides to surge; US military knows it needs more troops than he'll give them. The appeal goes out to NATO, and: NATO leaders "gave a tepid troop commitment to President Obama’s escalating campaign in Afghanistan ... nytimes.com/2009/04/05/wor…
... mostly committing soldiers only to a temporary security duty. ... Despite a glowing reception and widespread praise for Mr. Obama’s style and aims, his calls for a more lasting European troop increase for Afghanistan were politely brushed aside"
There's been bitter political criticism of the administration and Biden over what is indisputably a fiasco in planning and execution. But let's subject other post-war presidents to the "how did you end the war" test and see how they fare ... newsweek.com/lindsey-graham…
Nixon: Pretty obvious (can we all say "decent interval"?). Talking w/Kissinger Nixon contradicted his public stance: "I look at the tide of history out there, South Vietnam probably is never gonna survive anyway." And injected political considerations too millercenter.org/the-presidency…
Kissinger's reply: "If a year or two years from now North Vietnam gobbles up South Vietnam, we can have a viable foreign policy if it looks as if it's the result of South Vietnamese incompetence. ... We've got to find some formula that holds the thing together a year or two ...