1/The purpose of tracking online disinformation is to determine who is producing it, and to try to stop it. At some point, this tracking and study necessarily begins to yield diminishing returns, as more is learned about the networks behind it.
2/Our efforts must, then, necessarily shift to exposing and countering the relatively compact networks behind these efforts, and dismantle their capability to build audiences and harm people. We need to make it too expensive and hard to be worthwhile.
3/I am concerned that many in the academic/technology industrial complex are too wedded to “study” to move into “countering,” and indeed it’s likely not their mission. What that means is academia is yielding reducing returns, and no one owns the problem of “countering.”
4/Tracking a known network of actors and making their life harder is an existing discipline: counterintelligence. Because there seems to be no plan to take on this domain within the realm of government (primarily because of 1A, 4A limitations)…
5/the void is being filled by a network of private actors; individuals, companies, each of whom has different motives, skills. And some are acting in bad faith. We are thus facing a crisis where no one really is responsible for countering the known networks pushing disinfo.
6/Tech platforms seem to want to simply minimize their costs related to this set of problems and have no apparent concern for the issue itself. They are purchasing influence in academia and government as part of that strategy, understandably so.
7/Those concerned with this problem will soon need to choose between low-yield “study” and the urgent need to “counter.” For my part I am shifting to a mix of about 15% study and 85% countering.
Simply put: We know who is doing this. Now it’s time to stop them.
Simply put: We know who is doing this. Now it’s time to stop them.
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