TLDR: Maybe. Valuations are consistent with this, especially considering real yields, but borrowers are also in better shape than in 2006.
Maybe build a one-sheet Excel model for expected housing returns and decide for yourself.
Thread
2/ Most of the realtors I've talked to tell me that the housing market is even hotter than in 2005, at least when metrics like months of inventory, days on market, and rapid price increases are concerned.
3/ Where I live, houses are on the market for <20 days on average, and buyers pay an average of 10% above asking and waive their inspection contingencies. Some are coming in with all cash.
Inventory (valuation) matters a lot in the short (long) term.
6/ "Crazy 2005-type leveraged speculation isn't there in 2021."
This is a good point, especially with so many cash buyers. It's possible that we won't see a bubble-type crash, just years of stagnant, below-inflation returns until the after-inflation prices become reasonable.
7/ "Inflation is high, and housing is a hedge for inflation."
Neville et al. found otherwise. In the U.S., housing beat inflation in only 25% of extended high-inflation periods. Commodity futures, especially in a basket, do better. (Small sample, though)
8/ "Rates are low, so it's okay for prices to be high."
This is really an argument for low expected returns: "Bond yields are low, so it's okay to push up all other assets until there's not much left to squeeze out," especially w/ yields below inflation.
10/ "Owners are willing to pay a lot because they expect rents to go up."
The expectations hypothesis has historically not worked. In other words, today's rent (as a % of property value) is a better predictor of the future than owners' expectations are.
12/ It's also the basis of the paper Value and Momentum Everywhere.
In other words, valuations (cap rates) matter, and momentum (probably related to metrics like months of inventory) also matters - but momentum is only a short-term predictor.
13/ Demers and Eisfeldt found that higher cap rates predicted higher total returns (yield + price appreciation). This risk-adjusted effect existed across metros as well but was weaker.
TLDR: Valuations have historically mattered for real estate.
14/ Also, any discussion of renting (long-term lease) vs. buying has to consider the returns you are giving up by owning a single house rather than a more diversified portfolio. The difference could be used to pay for private school & save up for college.
16/ There are murmurs that I didn't state an opinion. It's true that I didn't make a bubble call (I don't think it's wise as a trader to state 100% probabilities).
But I did strongly suggest to sell the house and rebalance into a risk parity portfolio (though no one will do it).
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
1/ Explaining the Recent Failure of Value Investing (Lev, Srivastava)
"We identify two reasons for the failure of value investing: (1) accounting deficiencies and (2) fundamental economic developments which slowed down mean reversion of value & glamour."
2/ "The value strategy had already lost much of its potency in the late 1980s and yielded negative returns in the 1990s, barring a brief resurgence in 2000-2006.
"The expensing of intangibles started to have a major effect on book values and earnings in the late 1980s."
3/ "The effect of our intangibles book-value adjustments are more pronounced for glamour than for value stocks. Among glamour stocks, our adjustments had a larger effect on small than large companies, since small, high-growth glamour firms tend to invest heavily in intangibles."
1/ Unsettled: What Climate Science Tells Us, What It Doesn't, and Why It Matters (Steven Koonin)
"This book is about how science, with its certainties and uncertainties, becomes The Science—how it gets communicated, & what’s lost in the process." (p. 15)
3/ “The science of climate is neither settled nor sufficient to dictate policy. Rather than an existential crisis, we face a wicked problem that requires a pragmatic balancing of costs and benefits.” —William W. Hogan, professor of global energy policy at Harvard Kennedy School
1/ Zillow Talk: Rewriting the Rules of Real Estate (Rascoff, Humphries)
"The democratization of real estate data is profoundly important. The enemy of truth isn't the lie but the myth. This book deploys data to replace folklore with facts." (p. 9)
2/ "In 1950, the average number of residential square feet per person in the United States was less than 300. By 2000, that figure had climbed to almost 900—both because homes got a lot bigger and families got a bit smaller." (p. 10)
3/ "In 1970, companies used to plan for 600 sq.ft. per employee. Today, thanks to technology, collaboration, and the near-extinction of office libraries, secretaries, and “computer rooms,” the average number of office square feet per person has shrunk to less than 100." (p. 10)
2/ "As a result of an information advantage relative to clients, expert agents may mislead clients by exaggerating the costs or difficulty of a solution, providing unneeded services, or otherwise distorting information to maximize the expert’s own payoff.
3/ "A listing agent has strong incentives to sell a house quickly, even at a lower price, and thus may encourage clients to accept sub-optimally low offers too quickly.
"Typically, the agent receives only 1.5% of each marginal dollar of the price for which the house sells.
1/ Do Real Estate Brokers Add Value When Listing Services are Unbundled? (Bernheim, Meer)
"In an open-access listing service used by all sellers, when listings are not tied to brokers, a seller's use of a broker reduces final sale price by 5.9-7.7%."
2/ "Our market has a single open-access listing service used by essentially all sellers, regardless of whether they employ brokers. The market consists of roughly 800 houses and condominiums located in a collection of largely contiguous neighborhoods on Stanford University land.
3/ "Because ownership is limited to Stanford faculty and some senior staff, the MLS plays no role. (The listing service is free.) Brokers charge standard commissions (historically 5-6%).
"This allows us to identify effects of brokerage services when separated from MLS listings."