Leaning *very* heavily on @hengenahm's amazing work, this is as best I can figure the situation in #Panjshir: Taliban overran NRF mountaintop positions (dark green) and crossed the mountains above Gulbahar, giving them access to the valley, then moved troops as far up as Tawakh
"A senior official of the NRF...confirmed that the Taliban had taken over. 'Yes, Panjshir has fallen'...Ahmad Massoud, is 'at [a] safe place' the official said, adding that Amrullah Saleh...had fled for Tajikistan."washingtonpost.com/world/2021/09/…
Geolocating some older footage from last month in Baghlan as local militias in Andarab, Dehsalah and Pul-e-Hesar districts threw out what few Taliban fighters were there, and were then quickly overwhelmed by the Taliban's response. Baghlan revolts lasted about 48 hours.
Video from Sept 2 seems pretty instructive on how the Taliban entered Panjshir by infiltrating side valleys and then crossing the mountains, basically flanking the NRF's defensive positions
Other Sept 3 photos show how Taliban fighters seized one mountaintop, likely enabling them to suppress NRF fighters on another and advance through the river valley below; this valley then gave access to flank NRF and enter the main Panjshir valley
(Just to be clear, dates are approximate, usually based on the date that the source I'm quoting posts them)
Video posted today show a Taliban convoy just northeast of Khenj, driving southeast towards Bazarak from the direction of Paryan. Almost certainly means that the Taliban holds the entire central Panjshir valley
The July 26-27 massacre of 41 Congolese civilians in a church in Komanda by ISCAP (ADF) fighters is making some headlines, but some misinformation is circulating and most attention is now paid to the M23 war. So here’s a (long) thread on the context and what we know so far:
A lot has changed in the past year as UPDF troops operating under Operation Shujaa have expanded their area of operations against the ADF, and the attack illustrates how retaliatory massacres remain the group’s strategy of choice as military pressure has mounted.
Based on conversations with ADF defectors, security sources and local reporting, the attack bears all the hallmarks of ADF’s longstanding strategy of dissuading and redirecting offensives against its camps by carrying out massacres of civilians elsewhere in its area of operations
Very bizarre situation. Seems Malanga brought along his American-born son Marcel, who played football and sold used cars in Salt Lake City and was at least visited his father’s gold mining venture in Mozambique. Marcel was arrested during the attack.
The two other Americans were Malanga’s partners in the gold mining venture in Manica province, Mozambique. Cole Patrick Ducey had been involved in a patent dispute over a cannabis herb grinder, before moving to Eswatini. He was arrested during the attack.
Benjamin Reuben Zalman-Polun was also purportedly involved in the cannabis business before getting involved in the gold trade. He appears in a video during the attack, but it is unclear if he was arrested.
Worrying reports that IS-Mozambique fighters have launched a large scale assault on Macomia town, the second assault on a district capital this year and the second since SADC and Rwanda intervened in 2021. No coincidence this coincides with SADC's withdrawal.
Reports suggest around 100 IS-Mozambique fighters are taking part in the assault, overrunning Xinavane town to the southwest, clashing in Macomia town's eastern neighborhoods and cutting off the roads from Awasse to the north and Pemba to the southeast.
This closely mirrors IS-Mozambique's May 2020 assault on Macomia, during which 90-120 fighters overran Mozambican security forces and controlled the town for three days. acleddata.com/2020/06/02/cab…
Very excited to present the latest report by the Bridgeway team:
Clerics in the Congo: Understanding the Ideology of the Islamic State in Central Africa hudson.org/terrorism/cler…
From its early years as an amalgam of Ugandan Islamists and Bakonjo separatists, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) has often been seen as opaque. Even after joining Islamic State in 2017, many questions have been raised about the group's true ideology and objectives.
Through interviews with hundreds of defectors and analyzing dozens of taped sermons by the ADF's top leadership, we chart what the group tells its membership, how it justifies its campaign of violence against civilians in eastern Congo, and how that has evolved over time.
A thread on Friday night’s massacre at Mpondwe Lhubirha secondary school by the ADF, during which at least 42 people including 38 students were killed, 7 others injured and at least six kidnapped and taken across the border into DR Congo.
Officials stated that around 5 ADF fighters locked the doors of the boys’ dormitory before burning it, while killing female students with firearms and machetes. A guard and three local residents were also killed. Graphic pictures of the aftermath corroborate this account.
Mpondwe Lhubirha secondary school had received significant support from community members and organizations in Hillsboro, Oregon, a suburb of Portland. oregonlive.com/hillsboro/2015…
EAC is denying as fake a dramatic letter of resignation by now-replaced EAC Regional Force chief. Fake or not, tensions between Kinshasa and EACRF over its role and mandate are getting quite serious, even as thousands of EAC troops have deployed to Congo
The EAC's Regional Force was designed to deploy thousands of troops into Congo to actively assist the Congolese state in dismantling rebel groups that refused to join the demobilization process. The language was pretty clear: “contain, defeat and eradicate negative forces”
Early communiques quite explicitly stated that EACRF would deploy in support of and under the leadership of FARDC, and M23 was expelled from Nairobi following attacks on FARDC positions in late March. M23 then seized Bunagana and other important positions in a June offensive.