1. Firstly, analysts shouldn't juxtapose transnational terrorism and local insurgency.
Operational capabilities and tactical considerations may shift, but AQ/IS have always and will always focus on external operations as well as co-opting local insurgencies. It's not either/or.
2. Additionally, what we are witnessing is not jihadists regressing back to their local insurgent roots.
On the contrary, we are seeing local insurgencies be entirely subsumed by inherently transnational movements like the Islamic State.
3. "Few today doubt that al Qaeda is moribund."
Dubious, and Hassan has always downplayed AQC's control over its "affiliates" despite evidence to the contrary.
6. An arbitrary distinction is being made between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. They are not separate organizations in any relevant sense.
7. This leads to a broader problem: the Taliban are NOT non-state actors. Like Hezbollah and Iran, they are functionally an arm of the jihadist cabal controlling Pakistan.
8 (or 5, since I skipped 5🤦♂️). There just isn't evidence that jihadists have stopped attempting mass casualty attacks against the West.
Security services in every country are overstretched monitoring jihadists, and many "lone wolf" attacks are actually guided by organizations.
9. The AQAP-linked Pensacola shooting was ~2 years ago. Islamic State was shipping bombs to blow up planes in Australia and conducting suicide bombings in Manchester as of 2017.
The idea jihadists have given up trying to attack the West is just silly.
10. The opposite of the below assertion is true. Jihadist groups, if counterterrorism pressure is reduced, will regroup and start launching successful attacks against the West again as soon as they can.
The US may want to avoid conflict, but the jihadists certainly do not.
11. It might make more sense, logically, not to attack the West and force their hand.
But ideologues don't change their thinking based on logic. They can be pragmatic, but the goals always remain the same.
I don't know if France is inviting Russia in as part of some hare-brained scheme to reduce or supplement its own footprint or whether Russia is just displacing France across the continent as it seemingly did in CAR, but this is not great: reuters.com/world/africa/e…
Seems pretty clear Russia had a role in the coup: "Several hundred Malians rallied in the capital Bamako on Friday to support the army, as well as Russia, AFP journalists said, after the military reasserted control in the unstable Sahel state this week." africanews.com/2021/05/29/mal…
State Department: I mean, this current Taliban cabinet isn't ideal, what with being all-male, all Taliban old guard and all terrorists, but we won't judge it because it's only interim and the REAL Taliban government in the future might be inclusive!
Very interesting discussion with @ObaidullaBaheer, @jmurtazashvili, and Michael Semple on Taliban "governance" and the conundrum of humanitarian aid provision, funds, and engaging with the Taliban given the looming humanitarian catastrophe.
My own opinion on this issue is that NGOs and governments empowering, legitimizing, and subsidizing brutal regimes and insurgents like the Houthis, Taliban, Assad, TPLF, AQ, etc out of humanitarian concern does far more harm than good 👇
While I am always happy to hear someone trash "CVE," and this article contains some legitimate criticisms, its overall thesis is 😬 newlinesmag.com/argument/under…
The author's key contentions: 1) CVE stigmatizes [Muslim] communities 2) CVE refuses to blame Western foreign policy for Muslim radicalization 3) Joining the jihad no different to drug addiction or other social ills, so "focus on making our societies more inclusive and hopeful"
Ironically, the author, in criticizing CVE, inadvertently falls into the same trap as the industry: It's the ideology, stupid.
"Improving the lot of youth" is not the answer to CVE – it's just another expression of the same liberal delusions.