This is a very cogently argued, interesting thesis.
However, I think it's a misinterpretation of the data and an error of framing: newlinesmag.com/argument/what-…
However, I think it's a misinterpretation of the data and an error of framing: newlinesmag.com/argument/what-…
https://twitter.com/PetrVTuma/status/1436034877384794119
1. Firstly, analysts shouldn't juxtapose transnational terrorism and local insurgency.
Operational capabilities and tactical considerations may shift, but AQ/IS have always and will always focus on external operations as well as co-opting local insurgencies. It's not either/or.
Operational capabilities and tactical considerations may shift, but AQ/IS have always and will always focus on external operations as well as co-opting local insurgencies. It's not either/or.
2. Additionally, what we are witnessing is not jihadists regressing back to their local insurgent roots.
On the contrary, we are seeing local insurgencies be entirely subsumed by inherently transnational movements like the Islamic State.
On the contrary, we are seeing local insurgencies be entirely subsumed by inherently transnational movements like the Islamic State.
3. "Few today doubt that al Qaeda is moribund."
Dubious, and Hassan has always downplayed AQC's control over its "affiliates" despite evidence to the contrary.
(see, for instance:
➡️hudson.org/research/14365…
➡️lawfareblog.com/al-qaeda-after…
➡️hudson.org/research/16806…)
Dubious, and Hassan has always downplayed AQC's control over its "affiliates" despite evidence to the contrary.
(see, for instance:
➡️hudson.org/research/14365…
➡️lawfareblog.com/al-qaeda-after…
➡️hudson.org/research/16806…)
4. The entire purpose of these so-called local insurgencies is to establish a base from which to export jihad.
https://twitter.com/monkeyparalysed/status/1436168654136086531?s=20
6. An arbitrary distinction is being made between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. They are not separate organizations in any relevant sense.
7. This leads to a broader problem: the Taliban are NOT non-state actors. Like Hezbollah and Iran, they are functionally an arm of the jihadist cabal controlling Pakistan.
https://twitter.com/Ayei_Eloheichem/status/1436172732689891330?s=20
8 (or 5, since I skipped 5🤦♂️). There just isn't evidence that jihadists have stopped attempting mass casualty attacks against the West.
Security services in every country are overstretched monitoring jihadists, and many "lone wolf" attacks are actually guided by organizations.
Security services in every country are overstretched monitoring jihadists, and many "lone wolf" attacks are actually guided by organizations.
9. The AQAP-linked Pensacola shooting was ~2 years ago. Islamic State was shipping bombs to blow up planes in Australia and conducting suicide bombings in Manchester as of 2017.
The idea jihadists have given up trying to attack the West is just silly.
The idea jihadists have given up trying to attack the West is just silly.
https://twitter.com/Ayei_Eloheichem/status/1436176244215672837?s=20
10. The opposite of the below assertion is true. Jihadist groups, if counterterrorism pressure is reduced, will regroup and start launching successful attacks against the West again as soon as they can.
The US may want to avoid conflict, but the jihadists certainly do not.
The US may want to avoid conflict, but the jihadists certainly do not.
11. It might make more sense, logically, not to attack the West and force their hand.
But ideologues don't change their thinking based on logic. They can be pragmatic, but the goals always remain the same.
And attacking the West is a goal.
But ideologues don't change their thinking based on logic. They can be pragmatic, but the goals always remain the same.
And attacking the West is a goal.
https://twitter.com/Ayei_Eloheichem/status/1436178931049066529?s=20
These are just some desultory criticisms I have, in no particular order.
tl;dr I do not agree with this localization thesis.
tl;dr I do not agree with this localization thesis.
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