FISCAL DOMINANCE is massively overstated as a motivation or risk for the Fed.

FINANCIAL DOMINANCE is greatly overstated as a motivation or risk for the Fed.

Understanding the actual Fed the issue is really about EMPLOYMENT DOMINANCE, and that is more good than bad. A 🧵:
1. Fiscal dominance says the Central Bank deliberately keeps interest rates lower than it would otherwise in order to prevent the government's debt from growing too fast. With debt much higher than in the past they have the motive, so the argument goes, to keep rates low.
Most serious people think we don't have fiscal dominance now but some worry that we'll have it in the future if there is a less responsible Fed Chair or President. I think this misunderstands both the White House's interests and the Fed's actual behavior.
Any White House (not specifically commenting on this one) is always going to care much much more about inflation and employment (both of which matter to ordinary voters) than to whether the deficit is, say, $1.3T or $1.1T (a distinction that doesn't matter to voters).
Any White House will always care about what is, and is widely agreed should be, the Fed's mandate much more than it cares about changes in debt. (To the clear, the White House might weight unemp vs. inflation differently & certainly weights unemp today vs. tomorrow differently.)
Also, if the Fed keeps rates lower that doesn't have a huge immediate impact on deficits because it doesn't affect interest payments on longer dated bonds. It only matters as these bonds mature & get refinanced. And WH cares even less about $1.1T vs. $1.3T deficit 5 yrs from now.
And even if the White House cared more about how interest rates affect deficits a few years from now than employment and inflation the Fed would ignore them--and there are a lot of cultural and institutional checks that would need to be overcome to change that.
2. Financial dominance says the Fed is keeping rates lower than it would otherwise in order to keep stock prices high, either because it wants to help the rich or because it is afraid of a stock crash or some such.
This also misunderstands Fed policy. First, in the past there has been as much push in the opposite direction (raise rates to pop bubbles) as in this direction. But neither helping nor hurting financial markets its own sake has ever really carried the day in a huge way.
The Fed should, can and does care about overall financial conditions. So if interest rate spreads are rising and this threatens employment then it should consider easing.
In general, however, interest rates have been low because their naturally much lower than in the past, not because the Fed woke up with some crazy theory.
3. Employment dominance comes closer to explaining the way the Fed actually thinks and acts lately (and to a lesser degree in the past). They really care about maximum employment. This is a much, much, much, much bigger motivation than affecting interest on the debt
One way you get to employment dominance is thinking that inflation will always be 2% next year. Which means that even if in theory you're supposed to have a dual mandate in practice it collapses down to a unitary employment mandate.
The Fed has more employment dominance now but it is not completely new. In the 1990s it was almost universally thought that the natural rate of unemployment was 6% and many argued it was 7%. Alan Greenspan barely bat an eyelid as it fell to 4%.
I think employment dominance is mostly a good thing and is a big improvement over a mental model that thinks that unemployment can't fall below some poorly measured level or that hyperinflation is around the corner.
Still, like all mostly good things, not every aspect of its current implementation is ideal. For example, I would rather see the Fed admit it places much more weight on employment than inflation than pretend that inflation is about to be 2%.
Still, a lot of people make the mistake of thinking the Fed does what it does to help the White House by keeping interest payments/deficits/debt low or to help Wall Street. Anyone who has talked to monetary policy makers, or observed their actions, understands that's not true.

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More from @jasonfurman

24 Sep
Jeremy Rudd has a paper on inflation expectations that is well worth reading if you're interested in this topic. Takeaways: (1) don't be reassured by anchored expectations & (2) be worried if people start noticing actual inflation.

Some thoughts:

federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/f…
1. I agree with Jeremy that inflation expectations risk being a residual term that make models work perfectly, that much casual economic conversation has that feature, but they also can be effectively operationalized so wouldn't ditch them entirely.
2. His argument goes against relying on measures like the Index of Common Inflation Expectations (CIE) to argue that Flexible Average Inflation Targeting (FAIT) is working. It takes away the dovish argument, "sure inflation is up but don't worry, expectations are anchored."
Read 8 tweets
22 Sep
The FOMC median inflation projections are likely, once again, underestimating future inflation. But less obviously true than their previous projections.

They expect PCE / core PCE inflation to be 4.2% / 3.7% this year. To hit that would require a large inflation slowdown.
In the first 8 months of the year (including a reasonable forecast for Aug based on the CPI & PPI), inflation rose at around a 5% annual rate. To hit their numbers for the full year will require it to slow to about a 1.5% annual rate. In other words, 0.12% monthly prints.
That could happen if either a lot of transitory level increases reverse themselves (e.g., used car prices will likely fall more) or if there are transitory falls due to spreading virus (e.g., further falls in travel/tourism prices).
Read 9 tweets
21 Sep
A enlightening thread from @JayCShambaugh on whether the dynamics of the U.S. current account are explainable, he thinks they are.
Unsure whether @JayCShambaugh's arguments get to the actual number. I was focused on the $32b increase from 2020-H2 to 2021-H1. That is when we saw the massive divergence in US & world fiscal policy and also a divergence in growth, the opposite of the recession in his 1st point.
I would think if we used your estimates to calibrate the impact of fiscal stimulus we would have predicted a much larger current account move, almost certainly relative to last yr and likely for 2021 relative to 2019 too (the ~$280b annual rate you note). aeaweb.org/articles?id=10…
Read 4 tweets
16 Sep
The House bill doubles cigarette taxes from $1/pack to $2/pack and raises other tobacco taxes. The direct effect of this is regressive but the indirect effects are much larger, more important and very progressive--conferring larger health gains for lower-income households. A 🧵.
I addressed this issue in a speech I gave when I was at CEA arguing that the tobacco taxes disproportionately benefit lower-income households.

To fully analyze it we need to understand four components:

obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/…
1. The direct effect. This is regressive because lower-income people smoke more and thus end up paying more in taxes.

(Technical aside: The incidence of the tax is likely partly but not fully on consumers because contrary to conventional wisdom demand is not inelastic.)
Read 10 tweets
16 Sep
Retail sales out this morning (I'm a bit late to it). Surprisingly strong:

--Nominal sales up 0.7% (that's A LOT for a single month, especially when they were already well above trend).

--Spending at restaurants and bars was flat in August and 1.4% higher than June.
Stepping back for the bigger picture, nominal retail sales are 14% above trend. The majority of that is prices but the quantity (real retail sales) is still 6% above trend.

Reminder: these data are ~half of consumption & are miss most services, which are still below trend.
The huge spending bump on cars and parts is now over and instead we're just left with a large spending bump. But that spending bump is all to cover the higher prices, adjusted for inflation they are lower than they were pre-pandemic. Is the opposite of pent-up demand.
Read 6 tweets
14 Sep
August CPI is out, most benign headline reading since January... but in a reversal from previous months the underlying trends were somewhat worse than the headline.

The underlying trend many have focused on was about the same as previous months. Image
In August some of the temporary factors driving up inflation went into reverse either because they had overshot the mark (used car prices -1.5% in Aug & car and truck rental -8.5%) or because the delta resurgence temporarily dampened prices (airlines -9.1% & hotels -3.3%).
Inflation from February to July was extraordinarily high: core CPI rose at an 8.0% annual rate. We always knew that inflation would not continue at an 8.0% annual rate. The question is will it slow to something like 2% (the Fed's view) or something meaningfully higher (my view).
Read 6 tweets

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