NB too though that Brexit offers scope for tidying up often bizarre rules on food (biscuits/cake; crisps made from potato) without extending VAT to more food (something chancellors have been reluctant to do).
All though complicated by the NI Protocol, where the VAT directive still partly holds: change GB rules and the Irish Sea barrier gets that little bit higher.
PS to a large extent, oddities and rough edges in the tax system are the price you pay for democracy, even though they drive practitioners (lawyers and economists mad).
One very fair criticism of the EU is that changing VAT law in response to changes in technology or peculiar court rulings is far too hard. You perhaps get a somewhat more rational system as a result, but at a price in democratic legitimacy.
That said, the reason why changing EU tax law is so hard is that certain Member States (looking at you 🇬🇧, though see also 🇮🇪 and 🇱🇺) were determined to keep it hard.
And NB too that the way in which we actually make tax law, with many important changes bounced on the cabinet, let alone Parliament, at no notice, is distinctly sub-optimal and often minimally democratic.
I agree - more excellent opportunities for tidying up.
NB too that pretty much all varieties of Brexit deal - including EEA - meant leaving the scope of the VAT directive. So the current government can’t point to these features as particular advantages of its choice of Brexit.
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Not really a thread - and haven’t checked the detailed statements: but Schedule 3 to the Competition Act 1998 contains appropriate powers. legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/41/…
Would add to this excellent thread the point that using Article 16 as a response to complaints about Article 10 (as suggested by @eastantrimmp in the debate on the Subsidy Control Bill on Wednesday) is a non-starter.
The (relevant) threshold for using it is “serious economic difficulties that are likely to persist”. But it’s hard to see how such an argument could run in relation to Article 10.
The bottom line on Article 10 is that it requires certain measures to be approved by the Commission. But the Commission is able to take account of any “difficulties” to NI’s economy that the measure is designed to deal with in deciding whether to grant approval.
Two main points about the current government’s proposals to revisit “retained EU law” (the mass of mainly technical but often important EU law that remains in force in the UK).
1. The somewhat hand-waving, “let’s seem to be doing something Brexity”, suggestion of changing its status vis-a-vis domestic legislation is simply unwise, for the reason well-summarised by Peter.
A critical devolution issue is local government finance: if you want seriously to devolve power to local level, you have to give it its own tax base, immune from Westminster’s tendency to grab power by fiddling around with finance.
And also immune to its tendency to concentrate all restrictions on public spending on local government, in the hope that Westminster will avoid responsibility for the consequences.
For electoral reform specialists, this is a problem with the German (and Scottish and Welsh) system, as explained here. Essentially, that system fills ~1/2 the seats by FPTP, and then allocates the other half (list seats) so as to achieve an overall proportional result.
This is how it worked in Scotland last time: the SNP wins almost all the FPTP seats (fans of FPTP: note) but gets hardly any of the list seats, so as to bring its overall seat total to just under 50%.
But FPTP is easily capable of throwing up even madder results than that: in a multi party system, a party may win almost all the FPTP seats with ~30% of the vote, efficiently spread around, with the opposition split.